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
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# THE JOURNAL

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### THE CHURCH'S ANSWER TO COMMUNISM

By THE MOST REVEREND AND RT. HON. HIS GRACE THE LORD  
ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY

On Tuesday, 13th December, 1955, at 3 p.m.

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR ARTHUR J. POWER, G.C.B., G.B.E., C.V.O.,  
in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: It would be an impertinence for me or anybody else to introduce our guest today. It is my privilege on your behalf as your Chairman to welcome him very warmly to the Royal United Service Institution. It is for this Institution a very great honour indeed. Those who are lucky enough to be present this afternoon can underline the date with red ink, for it is a red letter day for you.

There are all too few great men in circulation today, and the ones there are have to be in two or three places at the same time. Our guest today suffers from that very great strain; he is required to be at more than one place at the same time, and so there will not be time for questions.

However, I feel that you will all have plenty to think about when you have heard an address by His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury.

#### LECTURE

MAY I begin by saying that I do not enjoy talking about communism at all. I do not like talking about communism for three reasons. First, everything has already been said about it *ad nauseam*. Secondly, talking is a modern evil. I mean that perfectly seriously. Everybody talks far too much, and the result of that is to nullify the effect of anything that is said. The third reason is that to talk about communism diverts our minds away from doing our proper job which is constructive, in order to think all the time about defensive operations which, however necessary, do not get anything really positive done. I prefer the Coolidge method. You will remember that President Coolidge went to church when some of his family did not. On his return, they said, "What did the preacher preach about?" Coolidge replied, "He preached about sin." The family said, "What did he say about it?" Coolidge replied, "He was against it." I am against communism, and there I should like to leave it.

However, you have called upon me to give the Church's answer to communism, which is another thing. May I begin by a few perfectly objective judgments, not on the theory of communism, but on it as you see it in practice.

It always pays to judge your adversary right, and we should remember that as a political system communism does have some apparent virtues, of a pagan kind.

A

First of all, it provokes in many of its adherents a spirit of bravery, sacrifice, and contempt of death. That has been evident in the whole process of the communist revolution. It has a strong leadership which liquidates the weaklings : but it brings into operation a great many of the military virtues, by which people will stand together through thick and thin and in spite of any kind of opposition.

Secondly, it breeds in some of its adherents a real spirit of idealism in the service of man. They sincerely and ardently believe that this is the way by which to serve mankind in its best and long-term interests ; they are convinced that they have got a gospel for mankind. They say, "We have a gospel, and to that gospel we give our wholehearted dedication." Dedication in itself does not tell you anything about the merits of the cause to which a human being dedicates his life. It may be a completely wrong cause, but the dedication in itself is a form of virtue and a powerful one.

Next, will you remember that this political system does eliminate some evils from society. It creates a lot more, but it does eliminate some. I am never able to forget this, since I heard on the best evidence that when the communist revolution took place in China, many of our best Christian brethren there were for it because they said, "It cannot be worse than the corrupt system that it is replacing." In the long run, of course, they may indeed find that it is worse and not better, but it did eliminate for a time at least, a certain number of corrupting influences, substituting for them an iron discipline which does produce a certain degree of social welfare. We must not allow ourselves just to ignore that fact.

Finally, among these pagan virtues, since communism operates throughout by irresistible force, it is enabled to disregard all other differentials of colour, race, wealth, and creed. How much of the difficulties in the rest of the world and in our civilization spring from the fact that being faced with differentials of this kind, we will not ignore them but find it difficult to overcome them. The Communists can ignore them all and simply say, "We treat you all alike," as indeed they do. It may not be very nice treatment, but they treat all alike. We do not ; and our consciences are always disturbed by the fact that we have to take into account whether the other man is an African or an Asian, or a European, whether he has economic power or none, whether he is one kind of a Christian or another.

But having drawn your attention to these pagan virtues, I must say next that the system is thoroughly bad. I need not specify and I will not illustrate its cruelties, its naked injustices, its total disregard for all spiritual considerations, and the fact that it is built confessedly and openly on lies—and the devil is the father of lies.

All that is horrible : but though horrible, it is accepted and applauded as part of the communist creed. The Communists are not ashamed of it. You cannot say, "My dear fellow, please think again." They have thought again, and this is what they think. Their creed has only one article of faith—everything which makes the communist State strong against the rest of the world and enables it to overcome the rest of the world is right.

Again—I am not parodying them ; it is the admitted basis of their belief—a communistic society, as they believe, is inevitable, its triumph irresistible ; it is in the nature of things that it shall become universal and, therefore, they can adopt any method to hasten its coming.

It follows that the individual has no rights against the State—none at all. Justice has no existence except as a weapon of the State. Cruelty is not cruelty ; it



is merely a necessary means of exterminating opposition or bad thoughts or anything else which spoils the purity of this State. Truth has no existence at all. There is no dispute about all that.

Thirdly, communism claims on the basis of what I have said to be infallible. That is where the real strength of it and the danger of it lies. It is not only *a* gospel, but *the* only gospel. When any group of human beings think they are infallibly right and can adopt any method which they think right to advance their cause, then you are really in the presence of the devil. Communism is bound by its own creed to seek to exterminate every other social order and to possess the world.

We, as decent people who are working for peace, have always got to assume that when the Communists show the Geneva spirit, they mean it. That is very hard, but it is the necessary part of the make-up of every peacemaker to take his enemy at the best whenever he shows, or appears to show, his best. You must always respond to the Geneva spirit when it appears, even while knowing that, in fact, it will not last or mean anything unless as a result of some kind of change of direction, some sense of co-existence, the faith behind it has been modified.

The Church's answer is given in different ways according to the needs of the local situation. Thus the Orthodox Churches have one way, the Roman Catholic Churches another, and the Protestant Churches a third. But all have their martyrs who have suffered in witnessing to their Faith, and nothing can take away the glory that is theirs.

Then, I come to the Church of England. We are not so directly involved—except for the Anglican Church in China, from which we are now cut off—as either the Roman Catholic Church or the Orthodox Church. That means that we can look at the problem a little more detachedly. We can keep our balance a bit better.

We in the Church of England believe that communism is to be resisted by every appropriate means. The whole trouble in every part of the world is: what is 'appropriate'? To use the appropriate means to a situation, and neither more nor less is the most teasing and difficult of all human problems.

I would say, first, that the Church of England recognizes that our statesmen and our Country must, under God, take every possible political step to deliver us from the threat of communism. That is an overriding duty. In doing it, it is, as always, their duty to go to the limit to preserve peace, for that is in the end the only reliable defence.

The Church is not itself concerned to do more than observe what the politicians do and judge with such powers of judgment as they have. I think it is true to say that the Church all through these last 10 years since the war has, generally speaking, approved the steps that our governments have taken both to preserve peace to the utmost and yet to resist the illegitimate demands of communist States.

I would say for myself that deterrents to communism are good, even the H-bomb so long as it deters. As soon as it is used it becomes perfectly useless, if I may so put it. It becomes as useless as a volcano in eruption which wipes out life and does no more. As long as it deters it buys time, and if it buys time it has bought the one thing which is essential for the work of achieving a lasting peace.

As regards the political sphere, therefore, the Church says, "Use the appropriate means to preserve peace and resist the advance of communism. We shall try to judge you by how appropriate the means are that you use. When there is a Geneva spirit,

exploit the Geneva spirit as far as you can. When Bulganin and the others make remarks in Asia, return the soft answer if you can, and if you cannot, say what you have to say in as decent and gentlemanly language as you can. Seek peace and ensue it."

But that is only part of the Church's answer. Now I come to the deepest answer that the Church makes to this situation.

What is communism? At root, it is an attempt to meet the course of history with a faith. Never forget that! It has become a political system. It has become a form of imperialism. It has developed a colonialism of its own at the very moment when it denounces the colonialism which we developed and which, for all its faults, has served the world faithfully and well. But in the root communism is a religious faith, a reaction to the environment of the world, and a belief with which to meet it.

Why is it bad as a faith? I would say because it rejects three necessities for man's salvation. I am happy to think that every one of you will agree that man does need saving. Just over 100 years ago, or even 50 years ago, with what a shock of surprise such a statement would have been received—"Saving? We are quite competent, thank you, to save ourselves." Nobody dreams of saying that now.

Communism rejects three necessities for salvation. First, it rejects God as a participant in history. He does not take any part in human history at all, according to the Communists. Communism thereby falls into an ancient heresy, that man is the master of his own fate. Pride is the first sin, the sin by which the angels fell.

May I remind you that western materialism and scientific humanism hold precisely the same belief, that God takes no part in human history whatsoever: and scientific humanism is the religion, unconscious or avowed, most popular in the West. Both communism and scientific humanism say that man is to be saved by his own science, knowledge, and skill. But there is a difference. Scientific humanism says, with a rather despairing note, "scientific knowledge gives us all that we can have." Communism says, "knowledge gives us everything that we want." The result is that scientific humanism is a religion of despair, while communism is at least a robust religion. Communism is completely satisfied; it does not want anything else. Scientific humanism knows that it leaves some of the deepest of human needs unsatisfied.

What the Church says is that only the meek and the humble can meet life truly because they know that God is in history and judges everybody. We all have to plan today: the whole of our material western civilization depends upon planning at every point; but planning must be humble as well as everything else, and the planners must know that at any single moment they may by design or accident wreck some part of God's purpose for man, some portion of the spiritual heritage of man.

Secondly, communism rejects man as a unit of value. The community, the State, has absolute rights. Man, as such, has none, no significance, no value. But western scientific humanism says precisely the same. Do not blink the fact. Being nice, kindly people with kindly instincts, we of the West do not say it, but a great part of our order of life means it.

Scientific humanism no less than communism, by the very nature of its creed, in fact robs man of every kind of significance. As long as we can we shall get along somehow in spite of the fact and treat one another well: but when things become difficult, then if we live by this creed, unselfishness will be gone, and self-interest, the nearest and dearest moral instinct left to man, will always win. We must really face



that fact quite brutally. We look at communism and say, "How horrible! It robs men of all significance." We are doing the same ourselves if we have no faith beyond that of scientific humanism to pit against the ever increasing mechanization and materialisms of modern life.

Lastly, communism rejects any idea of a future life. That is precisely what scientific humanism thinks as well. Communism, on the other hand, does believe in a messianic kingdom. All is marching on towards the glorious day of the classless society. They have got something which they believe in to look for: and it is coming—not from heaven, because there is not one—but from the very nature of things. They have a messianic gospel which they live for, work for, and oddly enough, will die for too. Scientific humanism has got nothing to work for at all. It has no future—it is worse off here than communism—no future to look to, to work for, or indeed to die for.

The real point about not believing in a future life is that at once all your proportions get wrong, and are bound to. That is why the world is so distracted; all the true proportions in the relations of men to nature, to other men, and to God, have been confused and lost.

If you believe in a future life, then this life is a pilgrimage. One of the most joyful things of the Middle Ages was their pilgrimages. They enjoyed them. Why? One reason is that they travelled light. If you are going on a pilgrimage, you do not take 15 American trunks about with you. You take only what you can carry. Another is that you enjoy your work. It is part of the fun to take your full share in the work of the pilgrimage as you go along. And thirdly, you enjoy intensely the fellowship which helps you along the journey; in that fellowship you covet nothing from anybody and generosity inspires the common life. You do not want to tie yourself down to the places you pass through and stop there and make money; you want to go through them and on to adventure something new on your pilgrimage.

I mean quite seriously that the loss of the belief in a future life has put the whole proportions of everybody wrong. What that means is this. Defensively, we have to resist communism and all it stands for with all our power. What is our power? In very truth the only significant power we have is in our moral stability, our spiritual devotion, and therefore in our religious faith which breeds them. Scientific humanism is a little more kindly and courteous than communism, but it is equally bankrupt of any real belief in the present or in the future, in man or in history, because it leaves out God.

We can only meet the situation, therefore, by a perfectly real revival of our old beliefs. The first is belief that God does intervene in history and has his place in it, and, therefore, our first duty is humility, to try to read His will before we think we ourselves are so clever; and right belief here at the beginning matters to the scientist and the research worker and the intellectual and the politician just as much as to the rest of us.

Secondly, we have got to believe in man again as having the worth, responsibility, and joyful duty of a pilgrim, which is to do his share of the work and take his share of the fellowship and give more than he gets. If you look all round the world, this is the problem. I was in Africa earlier this year. There is a major problem in central Africa where they have to work out too fast for comfort a multi-racial State, for the first time in history on such a scale, with the power in the hands of a tiny minority and with the undeveloped element vastly greater in numbers. The only conceivable hope is in

the realization by everybody that every single one—African, Asian, or Indian—is significant, not through his economic power, not through the way he is looked at by other people, but because of the significance which God has given him.

There must be belief in God, belief in history, belief in man as significant, and, finally, there must be belief in the future life, because it makes sense of this life and makes it 10 times more exciting than it otherwise is. It was Stevenson who said that it is better to travel than to arrive. I have never believed it. If you have had a long day's tramp, you are glad to get to the end and have a rest. You cannot begin to travel unless you believe that there is somewhere you can arrive. Abolish the future life, and there is nowhere where you can arrive, the whole journey is stupid, and, then, as is evident to see, we all quarrel about how to make our journey profitable while it lasts.

THE CHAIRMAN: I doubt if anyone here would like the task of trying to make sensible remarks following an address like this. If anyone does, I should be glad for him to take my place. It is extremely difficult for anyone like me to get up and offer any remarks after such an address as we have just heard. The only thing I can do is to be brief.

We have had lectures here from distinguished men which have given us the present position *vis-a-vis* communism. We have heard how we built up N.A.T.O. in the West, and how we have tried to tackle communist diversions in other parts of the world. That is really current business. We have heard scientists refer to what I might call the near future and say how their inventions should prove to be a deterrent.

His Grace spoke about weapons as deterrents. He said that as long as they deter they are useful, but once they are employed they are useless. He referred to our methods of buying time. He said that we must buy time and that today we are just buying time until the ultimate answer arrives, and that is that God once again intervenes in history.

I will say no more except to ask you to thank His Grace once again for the splendid address which he has given us. I believe that if you go out into your families, meet people at clubs and in one place and another, and talk about what you have heard this afternoon, you will further the cause of the fight against communism. (*Applause.*)

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## THE BRITISH TRANSPORT SYSTEM

By GENERAL SIR BRIAN ROBERTSON, BART., G.C.B., G.B.E., K.C.M.G.,  
K.C.V.O., D.S.O., M.C.

On Wednesday, 1st February, 1956, at 3 p.m.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR MAURICE S. CHILTON, K.B.E., C.B., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: We are very lucky to have General Sir Brian Robertson today to talk to us about "The British Transport System". As you all know, he is the Chairman of the British Transport Commission, and of course there is nobody in the world who can talk to us better on this subject. But, besides that, Sir Brian Robertson has made a habit throughout his life of always arriving at the head of the organization or thing to which he goes, and of course he has a terrifically wide experience of all walks of life. Besides being an ordinary soldier earlier in his life, he was then a Managing Director of Dunlop's. In the 1939-45 War he came back into the Army and ran the administration in the Middle East, and after that in Italy. Afterwards he governed about a quarter of Germany very successfully, and then he ended up by having a most distinguished career as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. But I will not go on telling you about all his qualities; I will now ask him to give you his address.

### LECTURE

WHEN talking to you this afternoon of the British Transport System, I shall limit myself to that area of public transport which became publicly owned under the Transport Act of 1947 as modified by the Act of 1953. You must not expect me to comprehend the whole transport industry of the Country, including the municipal transport undertakings, the transport services owned and operated by industrial concerns, nor of course the private motorists. I shall confine myself to the transport system which is identified with the British Transport Commission, of which I am chairman. People often speak of the Commission as a nationalized industry; transport, as I shall show, has not been nationalized, and the Commission is not of itself an industry. When all the transport activities, by rail, road, and water, operated by all the undertakings owned by the Commission are added together, they represent less than half the total transport activity of the Country. In fact, the Commission are both minority employers and minority producers in the whole transport field. Nevertheless, the Commission's undertaking, measured by its capital and judged by industrial standards, is a big one—big enough at any rate to attract a good deal of public scrutiny, as you may have noticed.

The basic concept of the Act of 1947 was that various forms of inland transport should be grouped under single and national ownership and that their integration should be effected thereby. Whatever the merits or demerits of that idea, it could scarcely be described, as some people persist in describing it, as an act of sacrilege or revolution. On the contrary, it is much more probable that historians in the future will regard it, party politics notwithstanding, as a natural sequel to the course of events in the transport world in this Country since the 1914-18 War. It was in 1921 that 123 separate railways were finally regrouped into four main line companies. In 1930 a Royal Commission reported that "the aim should be to harmonize the newer and the older forms of transport with the object of obtaining from each the maximum of advantage. . . . The nationalization of the railways alone—leaving other forms of transport in other hands—would certainly not produce any real co-ordination of transport". In subsequent years a series of further Acts were passed

providing for certain practical means of co-ordination between road and rail transport although in a limited and local way. The most significant of these Acts was the London Passenger Transport Act of 1933.

The emergency of war from 1939 onwards made it necessary to impose a central control over the various agencies of public transport. Through the machinery of the Central and Regional Transport Committees, traffic was allocated to the form of transport best able to carry it at a given moment. A Central Canal Committee was set up in 1942 to co-ordinate the use of inland waterways. A national Road Haulage Organization operating through numerous divisions, areas, and units, was not disbanded until September, 1947. In the field of road passenger transport a concentration of resources on a national scale had already by 1947 gone a long way. The majority of local operating companies in the provinces had been grouped within three large holding organizations to which I shall refer later. In London the complete integration of public road and rail services was already an accomplished fact.

And so it can be seen that processes which had been at work before and during the war had led to a concentration into large groups of the various forms of transport and to a measure of co-ordination between them. The Act of 1947 merely carried the process a stage further by vesting the main line railways, certain docks and waterways, and London Transport in a public corporation, which was also given certain powers to acquire road haulage. Under the Act the British Transport Commission (which was the title given to this public corporation) was instructed to devise a properly integrated inland transport system. In the event that proved to be easier said than done, though some progress had been made when the Commission's mandate was changed six years later.

The 1947 Act created under the British Transport Commission a number of so-called Executives responsible for the management of the various forms of transport. The principal of them was the Railway Executive under which the former four main line companies were grouped as a unified railway system. By relieving this new railway administration of responsibility for catering, for the former railway-owned harbours, for railway operation in Northern Ireland, for certain road transport activities like Pickfords, and for the tourist agencies of Thomas Cook and Dean & Dawson, the Act enabled it to 'strip for action' and to concentrate on the heavy tasks of making good the war-time and post-war dilapidations on the one hand, and of stemming the loss of traffics to other forms of transport on the other. A very great deal of sound, and indeed, essential work was done by the Railway Executive in those first years. By streamlining the organization of the railways and standardizing both equipment and methods, great economies were made. This work was not popular everywhere, but it was very necessary at that time.

I cannot usefully enlarge on the provisions of the 1947 Act in regard to road haulage, because these have been to some extent cancelled out by the 1953 Act to which I will refer in a moment.

The road passenger transport field (in plain language, the bus business) before nationalization was divided between (a) the municipally-owned undertakings in many large cities, (b) the London Passenger Transport Board, (c) the provincial bus companies which had already come under the ownership of three large groups. These groups were, and are, the Tilling and British Electric Traction groups, of approximately equal size, covering England and Wales, and the Scottish Motor Traction Company (now the Scottish Omnibus Group) in Scotland. There were also some semi-independent operators mostly engaged in private hire.

Before nationalization, the former railway companies had acquired approximately 50 per cent. of the equity capital of each of the three provincial bus groups. The Commission took an early opportunity to acquire the remaining 50 per cent. or more of the shares in the Tilling group of omnibus companies, owning some 8,000 vehicles, and the same in the Scottish Motor Traction Company. The Commission's holdings in the British Electric Traction group, in which we exercise no management control, remain as before nationalization. The whole undertaking of the London Passenger Transport Board was vested in the Commission by the 1947 Act.

The Act of 1947 had been the subject of hot political controversy and inevitably a change of Government brought a change in legislation.

Whereas the 1947 Act enjoined the British Transport Commission to secure the provision of an adequate and integrated system of public inland transport and port facilities within Great Britain, the 1953 Act only required the Commission to provide an adequate and properly co-ordinated system of passenger transport in the London Transport area, and, otherwise, merely to provide, in such places and to such extent as may appear to the Commission to be expedient, other transport services. The three main features of the 1953 Act were an order to the Commission to sell the major part of their road haulage undertaking (to be qualified if a Bill recently laid by the Minister becomes law), an injunction for the decentralization of railway management, and a promise of the removal of restrictions on the Commission's charging freedom, in particular in relation to the railways. Generally speaking, what it was intended by the 1947 Act to achieve by integration, it was intended under the 1953 Act to procure by competition between Commission-owned and privately-owned transport services, and by some measure of rivalry between different parts of the Commission's undertaking. In compensation, as it were, for giving up what was meant to be, but which never became, a monopoly of long-distance road haulage, the Commission were promised freedom of charging on the railways and release from restrictions on the rates which they may quote. Due to the cumbersome procedure which has to be followed before approval can be had to a new Rail Freight Charges Scheme the railways have not yet achieved the flexibility in charging which the Act promised them; meanwhile the competition of privately-owned road transport grows daily, as I shall mention shortly.


Following the radical changes in the whole set-up which followed upon the 1953 Act, much of the energies of the Commission in the course of 1954 were devoted to problems of reorganization. The Executives having been abolished, as part of the policy of decentralization, Area Boards were set up to exercise powers on behalf of the Commission in the Regions. The Headquarters staff of the Commission itself were entirely recast to enable it to compete with its new task.

In case you should jump to the conclusion that the organization is top heavy, or too large to be efficient, I should like you to see the picture in its proper perspective. The Commission control an organization approximately twice the size of the British Army. The Headquarters from which the Commission exercise their control has an establishment of about 400, which does not, I imagine, compare too unfavourably with that of the War Office. Looking at things another way, when the Army was twice its present size, nobody so far as I know suggested that it was too big to be efficient. I am not, mark you, claiming that the two cases are strictly comparable. You may regard the Commission as roughly comparable with a holding company having a number of diverse but allied businesses under its control, similar to many



CHART "A"

# BRITISH TRANSPORT COMMISSION OUTLINE ORGANISATION



NOTES.—(a) Headquarters of these Divisions are, for convenience, grouped round H.Q. B.T.C.  
(b) The territorial organisation of the local managements, which is the equivalent of the regional organisation of British Railways, is not shown for reasons of space.  
(c) These cover a wide variety of activities. They are not in the same category as the Boards, Executive and Divisions directly under the Commission, and indeed differ very considerably from each other.

modern industrial combines whose names spring to mind. Chart "A" shows the make-up of the Commission's undertaking division by division. Size by itself is no virtue, but there is benefit in the grouping for control of allied activities within the same industry, as has been proved so often in the basic industries.

I have heard it said sometimes that because the railways are nationalized now, and because the show is so big, the railwaymen do not know who is their boss. If that is true, which I doubt, it seems to me to be a poor tribute to the influence of the popular Press.

I should like to say a word at this point about the relationship between this publicly-owned transport system, a minority part of the transport industry, and the Minister of Transport and Parliament, who gave us birth.

While the Commission have to conduct their affairs like a commercial corporation, they are primarily accountable to Parliament, the normal channel to which is through the Minister of Transport. When the national corporations were set up, Parliament deliberately denied itself the right to exercise administrative control over them. Yet, Members of Parliament, prompted by representations from their constituents or other interested parties, and inspired by a very proper sense of vigilance over matters affecting the national interest, naturally wish to seek information or to query from time to time the wisdom of a nationalized body's conduct of its undertaking, even down to quite local matters. For our part we are at all times anxious to keep Parliament and its Members fully informed as to our work and progress. We want Parliament to understand our problems and to have confidence in our ability to surmount them. By means of the 200 or more parliamentary questions which are answered every year by Ministers on matters directly affecting the Commission, by direct correspondence with Members of both Houses and by contacts with them and with Parliamentary Committees, the Commission does 'open its books' freely and there is no aspect of our affairs that I am not prepared to discuss frankly with them.

It is sometimes urged that Parliament should exercise more control over the conduct of nationalized transport on the grounds that the Commission's undertaking is a monopoly, and that we are spending public money. While I appreciate to some extent why people press this issue, I am sure that great care should be taken before changes are made. In the first place, our undertaking is very far from being a monopoly. On the contrary, we are on the whole engaged in a highly competitive business. Many of our services are fighting for their lives. This applies especially to many of the services provided by British Railways. The second reason for care is that a parliamentary body is, by its very nature, incapable of running a business, and greater parliamentary control could all too easily mean greater political pressure in a sense that no wise parliamentarians would desire to see.

I will now speak for a few moments about the progress made with the main carrying services, British Railways, British Road Services, the road passenger companies, and the waterways.

First, British Railways. When one considers the immensity of the task of adapting their services (many of them planned over a century ago) to present-day needs and of providing them with the vast amount of new equipment which they so urgently need, one feels indeed that the railways are the problem child in the family. Our road undertakings, and even the canals, do not present the same problems. As I shall show later, these other services are holding their traffics and generally


speaking, paying their way. Railway passenger traffic has fallen slightly since 1947, and the corresponding receipts from £127 m. to £117 m. Chart "B" shows the increase in the numbers of buses, coaches, and private cars over the same period. Freight train traffic to the end of 1953 had risen from 21,700 m. net ton-miles to 22,700 m. net ton-miles. But freight traffic has steadily declined in the past two years, and is now almost back to the level of 1947. Again the chart shows how the fall in railborne traffic was paralleled by an increase in road goods vehicles. Over this same period the operating ratio of working expenses to gross receipts has risen from 94 per cent. to 97 per cent.—far too narrow a margin to provide for interest on capital and for any reserves to meet adverse trends like inflation.

It is sometimes said that the railways lose traffic because they do not give good enough service. To some extent of course that is true, and it is the basic assumption

## BRITISH RAILWAYS

## CHART "B"

## Freight Traffic and Competition





underlying our £1,200 m. modernization scheme, of which I shall have something more to say. As we have frankly admitted in that plan, British Railways are not today working at full efficiency, mainly because they have been prevented from keeping their physical equipment fully up to date. Almost equally serious is the fact that the railways are expected to do more things than they should undertake under present conditions. They are expected to accept gratefully the skimmed milk, while others walk off with the cream of the traffic. For example, they are expected to give a universal parcels service with collection and delivery over wide areas at an entirely unremunerative level of charges. They are expected to carry the odd and awkward consignments of merchandise for remote destinations or split deliveries, and to carry these consignments at standard charges, while the larger consignments and those for easily accessible destinations are carried by the firm's own road transport.

On the passenger side, the railways provide a vast number of local and stopping train services which are little patronised, in spite of the inducement of cheap tickets and timetables adapted to suit local needs. These local and stopping services represent a loss to the Commission of many million pounds a year. In the make-up of our annual deficit, no-one seems to care very much about these losses; it is taken for granted that they should be made good out of our earnings on other services, though for myself I confess I cannot see the justification for such cross-subsidies. The time has come when we must allow the railways to concentrate on those services, such as the express and suburban passenger routes and the middle and long distance hauls of full wagon loads of freight, in which they can give a service second to none, incidentally yielding an excellent return on the capital employed. That is a main object of our modernization plan.

As I have emphasized before, we cannot offer a complete 'new look' on the railways overnight. Electrification and the complicated modernization of signalling which is an essential concomitant necessarily take a long time, particularly on our system, the dense traffic on which can never be stopped. It takes time in any case to make the permanent way, so long neglected, fit to take trains running at start-to-stop speeds averaging 75 m.p.h. and top speeds of perhaps 120 m.p.h. Modern rolling stock, replacing the 4,000 or more life-expired coaches which post-war restrictions have forced us to keep in commission, cannot be conjured out of a hat. Brand new passenger stations, like the one at Potters Bar, badly needed though they are, will not spring out of the ground like magic mushrooms; nor, on the freight side, can we completely reorientate our operations overnight. In our main line electrification, we shall take account of the great advance made in France, which we have studied.

This great transformation, a second railway revolution which will far exceed even what our friends the French Railways have achieved since the war, will take all of 15 years to accomplish. It will only be accomplished within that time if successive Governments continue to give it their full backing, and provided we get the response we hope from our industrial suppliers. Of course, during those 15 years, improvement will build up progressively, slowly at first and rapidly later on. Some improvements are already manifest; for example, the new multiple unit diesel trains which are now running in East Anglia, Lincolnshire, West Riding, West Cumberland, and on the North East Coast are giving excellent service and winning passengers back to rail and creating new traffic. For example, receipts of the West Cumberland services have increased since the introduction of diesel trains by 71 per cent. and those of the West Riding services by over 116 per cent.

Yes, we are moving forward, and we shall gather pace as we go, but I am afraid that for some time to come and despite every effort, we shall not be able to satisfy all our customers. A really high standard of speed and reliability will only be achieved when we can wean ourselves from steam traction; when we can run all freight in faster fully-braked trains; when we have re-sited many of our main marshalling yards on the main traffic flows and completed the mechanizing of our goods terminals; and when, perhaps as important as anything else, we can provide decent working conditions for the men. The conditions under which our men have to work at present are in many places quite disgraceful.

The people of this Country have always enjoyed poking fun at their own institutions. The present condition of their railways, which results from past neglect, is too good an opportunity to be missed. It would be foolish if we were to be hypersensitive or resentful about criticism up to a point. Beyond that point it seems fair to say that it does not fortify morale or discipline to tell the men that they are a crowd of miserable slackers and that those in charge of them are a bunch of blithering idiots. Incidentally, neither the one nor the other is true.

It is not the quality of our manpower that concerns us but the quantity. The numbers employed on the railways have fallen from 641,000 in 1948 to 564,000 at this time. This represents a big effective saving and reflects the streamlining of the organization which has already taken place. Further important economies in manpower will flow from the modernization plan. On the other hand, there is a serious number of unfilled vacancies, particularly in the operating grades and on the permanent way. These shortages are a grave handicap to the efficiency of our services, and we must remedy them.

Obviously, too, we must constantly seek to make ever better use of the manpower which we do employ. When we set up our Productivity Council last year representing the Commission, the General Managers, and the Trade Unions, it was to preach the gospel of increased productivity in relation to the numbers we employ, and to discover ways and means in consultation with the men themselves. It is, I think, gradually coming to be understood that British Railways can only survive with more productive methods of working. I hope that you noticed the very important statement put out by the Council after their meeting on 27th January.

The greatest possible tonic to morale of course will be the sight and successful operation of new rolling stock, better station premises, better working conditions and amenities, and better handling arrangements to avoid congestion and delays. As I look to the future, I believe that the railways in this Country have never offered finer prospects for young men, be they inclined to engineering or to the commercial side of the business, than now.

I come now to our Road Haulage Division which has been considerably reorganized as a result of disposals under the 1953 Act. I say with confidence that British Road Services, as a national road haulage system, have been saved, not so much by second thoughts in Parliament as by their own efficiency. They no longer enjoy any measure of privilege as compared with other road hauliers. The prospect of our keeping rather more lorries than was contemplated in the 1953 Act is inducing some people to say that B.R.S. will now become a giant monopoly. This is mere exaggeration and propaganda. There is still room for a legion of private hauliers.

We must not, of course, anticipate Parliament's decision as to the number of lorries we shall be allowed to retain, but we know that it will be substantially less

than the number we held in June last. In June last we were outnumbered 15 to one, by other holders of licences for freight-carrying vehicles, and as far as one can judge, these odds against us are likely to be doubled. Is it really necessary to be so frightened of us? I suppose we should feel flattered.

It is, of course, not open to question that a large road haulage organization can supply regular and country-wide services, and engage in research, in a way that a collection of smaller independent units cannot do. The achievements of British Road Services in this direction are now generally acknowledged. Another very successful enterprise of great value is the national network of road parcels services which B.R.S. have given the Country for the first time. So perhaps what some people are really concerned about is not that we shall have a monopoly, but that we shall be too efficient for their comfort.

Turning to our road passenger services, the Tilling and Scottish Bus groups' net receipts have shown a steady increase in recent years. A feature common to many of the constituent companies is the relatively high proportion, of the order of 10 to 20 per cent., of their services which run unprofitably in sparsely-populated rural districts. New or augmented bus services introduced following the closure of railway branch lines are themselves often of an unremunerative character. Nevertheless, we accept that our road passenger services will to an increasing extent take over the functions of local railway services which the travelling public have abandoned.

In spite of increasing traffics on our main commercial canals, on which, as we have recently announced, we are to spend a further £5,500,000 in improving facilities, the publicly-owned inland waterways, of which 1,420 miles are in commercial use, are still running at a loss. This is due largely to the recurring and irrecoverable annual deficit, amounting to about £200,000 before charging interest, on some 770 miles of waterways which are either disused or which carry insufficient traffic to justify their retention as commercial navigations. Of this mileage, some 260 miles have already been closed to traffic or abandoned and much of the remainder could not again be made navigable except through heavy and unremunerative expenditure. As a commercial undertaking required by Parliament to pay our way, we are not in a position to spend large sums in maintaining or restoring waterways which can be shown to be no longer required for transport purposes. As you know, the Minister of Transport is now setting up an enquiry into this question. I am only too anxious to see it settled in a way which will restrict our responsibilities to the canals which have a genuine transport value, while making other and more satisfactory arrangements to preserve other waterways which are an asset to the country in other ways.

I have endeavoured to review the evolution of that part of the public transport system for which the British Transport Commission are responsible. For lack of time, I have not referred to London Transport which is the finest municipal transport organization in the world, although Londoners are loath to admit it. Nor to British Transport Docks, where we have spent large sums on new equipment and facilities and which are showing on the whole excellent results. Nor to our hotels and catering services which are steadily improving as their results show. To conclude, I will say a few words about the outlook for nationalized transport as I see it.

Before I do so, however, I should like to remind you that our basic problems are not peculiar to Great Britain. They do not really stem from public ownership, nor can they exclusively be ascribed to the shortcomings of our equipment, of our methods, or of our men. The financial position of nearly every foreign railway system is pre-

carious. On railroads everywhere there is a malaise brought about largely by road and air competition and often disguised by subsidies in one form or another. With us, there is no subsidy and no camouflage.

Nor has any country that I am aware of found a satisfactory solution to the fundamental conflict between the claims of road and rail transport, and more particularly between the public common-carrier and privately-owned transport. Some countries have nationalized all public transport and placed severe restrictions on private transport. South Africa is a case in point. But that is not a solution which the people of this Country would be willing to accept, and in truth it would not be a sensible answer for us. At the other extreme, some countries still believe in unrestricted competition between the various transport agencies, but they do so in obstinate disregard of the chaos which it creates.

Somehow or other it seems to me that we in our own odd way are instinctively stumbling towards the right solution. Already, I believe, we are ahead of most other countries, including the United States and France, in the search for a better balance between private and public transport operations. The sooner we learn to treat this matter as a scientific problem, and not as a conflict of political ideologies, the more quickly shall we reach the goal. It would be a great help, for example, if people would stop bandying about the word 'nationalization' as if it were a heavenly benediction, or contrariwise, a term of abuse.

One cannot, of course, take transport out of politics to the extent of removing it entirely from the political arena. But it really is about time that politicians, on both sides, stopped talking about party doctrine on transport.

Secondly, it is essential that the Country should make up its mind whether public transport should be run as a commercial enterprise, self-supporting financially and as free to run its affairs as any commercial enterprise under private ownership: or, on the other hand, whether it is to be regarded as a service, bound to minister to every want of the community, however uneconomic it may be. That inevitably would mean subsidizing it from taxation.

But, you may ask, can it be done? Will the organization ever be able to stand on its own feet? Is it not so hopelessly in the red that it can never get out of it? Will the men work? Does the management know its stuff? These and many other questions are stridently shouted at us by those who, in their hearts, would very much like to see us fail. But they will be disappointed.

The financial position since nationalization is not a comfortable one and it is going to get worse before it gets better. On the other hand, it is certainly not a hopeless one. The accumulated deficit on the Commission's entire undertaking for the first seven formative years was less than one per cent. of total gross receipts. It does not take a big change in fortunes to put a position of that sort right. Our potential earning power is there and the Country needs our services. The job can be done. We must never fall back on the heroin shot of subsidy, however administered. Nobody in our organization has any doubts at all about the ultimate success of our plans. In saying this, I would remind you that on the Commission itself and on our Area Boards there are men whose reputation and ability in the business world cannot be challenged. Ask them what they think, you will find them just as confident as I am.

Of course we must have the backing of Government, because the programme of capital expenditure must go forward steadily, and not be jerked backwards and forwards with every change in the Country's economic circumstances.



We do need, too, the backing of the users of public transport and of those who wish to see the British Transport System established on a solid social and flourishing basis.

I am very grateful to the Royal United Service Institution for giving me this opportunity to explain our situation and our problems, because the more widely they are understood, the more readily shall we secure the backing which we need.

#### DISCUSSION

SQUADRON LEADER L. T. MERSHAM: There is an increasing tendency towards urbanization and the outward spread of industry and private dwellings into the country, which will tend to aggravate the condition of unremunerative services to the sparsely populated areas. Nevertheless, the needs of these sections of the community have to be catered for somehow. Can Sir Brian Robertson advocate a solution for this problem? Does he see any way of an organization doing that and not incurring a loss? If the Transport Commission cannot do it, who does he suggest may be able to do it?

THE LECTURER: It is a question which cannot be answered by "Yes" or "No". To a large extent these problems can be solved by co-ordination between the various forms of transport. For example, in an area served by an unremunerative train service and an unremunerative bus service, proper co-ordination may make it feasible for both of them to run. That, I think, is one of the main ways of solving the problem.

There are various ways of cheapening transport which are constantly being tried out, such as the one-man bus, such as running a railway like a tramway. These expedients will prove to be the answer in certain cases, but certainly are not panaceas.

At the end of the road, if it is not possible to solve the problem by any of those means and if it is essential to solve it, then presumably somebody has got to do what is in fact to provide a subsidy, but not, I hope, to the furnishers of transport. I would much sooner see, say, the remote areas of the Highlands helped directly by the Government in some way or another, because it is considered desirable to keep the population there, but not through subsidization of the transport services.

MAJOR M. C. SANDS: May I ask two questions? Is anything being done to increase the reliability and regularity of the services? I am sure that a lot of the loss of traffic is due to the fact that the trains are now usually late. It is not a question of modernization, because the same trains by the same methods on the same lines were nearly always punctual before the war. On my own line they are always dirty and they were always clean before the war. As far as freight goes, a large part of the loss of traffic is due to the unreliability of the railways. A neighbour and friend of mine bought two calves at Shrewsbury and consigned them to Banbury. They should have taken six hours, but in fact took 24 hours, and one arrived almost dead.

A second question is whether anything is being done to use road and rail containers. A lot of commercial users fight shy of rail transport because of the damage done to goods in handling. If they could load the container in their own factory and then shift it by rail, they would be much more likely to consider the use of rail transport.

THE LECTURER: With regard to punctuality, the questioner said, I think, that the trains always used to run to time and do not do so now. He does not really mean that, because the trains have never always run to time. I was reading an extract in *The Scotsman* the day before yesterday which asked why it was that the railways were so dirty and so unpunctual, whereas in France they were so good—and that was dated 50 years ago!

But having said that, I readily admit that the standard of punctuality is a long way short of what it ought to be and short of the best of the pre-war years. There are a great many reasons for it, and a principal one is not the 'blooming slackness' of the driver. We do not run our trains late deliberately. There are a whole series of things which make

up the reasons for unpunctuality, and a very prominent one among them is the state of the permanent way. The permanent way got into a really bad state, and a tremendous amount of work is being done on it every day of the week, and, of course, especially at weekends—and it is on Sundays when the services are most irritating. You may say, "Why don't you alter your timetables if you are going to do this?" But one cannot alter a timetable every day of the week. This work is going on up and down the line; at one time it is affecting a place where you have to have low speed restrictions, whereas at other places you can get away with less. It is impossible to keep pace with all that in the timetable.

Coal has a certain amount to do with the matter. On the Western Region, for example, the locomotives were designed to run on the best Welsh steam coal. That is not generally available to them today, and they do not run nearly so well on, say, Polish coal.

There are, indeed, a great many causes. I would say that maintenance, for example, is one of them. We are short of staff and we have our difficulties in that respect in the same way that most people have. It is not easy to have that absolutely first-class standard of maintenance which ensures that the engines never give trouble.

I can assure you that we are doing our very utmost about it. The Area Boards themselves are all of them devoting a lot of time and effort to it. Things got a little bit better last year—not nearly as much as they should do—and I hope that they will get better this year.

I think the questioner said that modernization has not got anything to do with it, and I must join issue with him there. On the French railways the expresses, at all events, are very seldom late. The chief reason is that those trains have an immense reserve of power, and if a train gets half an hour behind, it can pick up time again without much difficulty. Our steam locomotives today lack that reserve of power which is so useful in maintaining punctuality.

Cleanliness is a very difficult matter on which to answer. An enormous amount of trouble is taken to keep our trains clean inside and outside. I think genuinely and seriously that most of the trouble about complaints in regard to dirty trains is due to old stock, which looks filthy outside and inside. We are compelled to keep a lot of it running, and especially, of course, do we bring it out in the Summer when traffic is at its highest. I am not saying that there is never a train that is not properly cleaned—certainly not.

Might I perhaps say this a little in defence of the railways. We get, for example, talk about dirtiness not only of trains but of our stations. I had an hour or two off when I was in Paris on business recently, and just out of curiosity I went to the St. Lazare Station at the peak traffic hour of 6 p.m. I looked along the great concourse which stretches behind a couple of dozen platforms, and I could see hardly a bit of paper on the ground. But there was nobody sweeping up paper either. There was no paper being dropped!

Our freight services are not as good as they should be, and they are of much more consequence to the economic life of the Country. I am bound, however, to say that they cannot possibly be right with our present equipment. They can only be got right when we can run our freight trains much in the same way as passenger trains, instead of cluttering up our lines with trains that run about as fast as your can kick your hat and are shovelled in and out of an excessive number of marshalling yards instead of being marshalled as few times as possible, if at all. That is the way to run a freight service. That is the way we intend to run it. But it will take some time.

That is the best answer I can give to the question, which was a fair criticism.

WING COMMANDER M. D. THUNDER: We know that road transport pays taxes only a fraction of which is spent on the roads and that the railways are already running at a loss. When you spend your new capital investment on the railways and put up your charges, will you then be able to compete with fundamental road charges?

**THE LECTURER :** There is no doubt that we should be able to compete with road charges now if we were put on a square level with the road. But of course it is not possible ever to do that. We pay for the permanent way on which our trains are run. We pay for the signalling of them, and a great many other expenses involved. Road transport certainly pays tax, but that does not pay for the facilities which it enjoys altogether. It does not, for example, pay for the traffic police.

That there is a conflict between road and rail transport I have been at some pains to tell you. That in the end we shall be able to compete when we have spent this money I feel absolutely confident.

There are certain services which the road will always do better than the rail. There are certain services which the rail can do better than the road.

**COMMODORE R. HARRISON :** On the problem of co-ordination between buses and passenger trains, I wonder whether the Commission would consider a suggestion. Every station in the country usually has two sides, and most termini have at least three. The only station that I know in the London area where passengers from a bus are able to transfer directly into the station is Golders Green. I do not know whether Sir Brian has noticed what happens at Victoria Station, where there is a very large bus yard, with about 1,100 buses entering every day. Allowing that they have, in and out, 45 passengers—they can carry 56, which means 112 if they are full both ways, but say that they have 45—that makes about 50,000 a day. Each one of those passengers has to skedaddle through lines of taxis before getting in or out of the station, and though the station has four sides or entrances, all four are allotted to taxis and private cars.

Would the Commission consider giving buses one side or part of a side at all stations so that passengers can transfer directly and safely between bus and station and, when the money is available, under a roof so that they would not have to queue in the rain? These conditions are very general throughout this Country. In many other countries this discomfort and danger has been avoided. I do not know whether Sir Brian has been to Sydney. There the Central Station is so arranged that taxis all go to one side and trams run through the top of the station, so that passengers go directly to trains under cover. Would the Commission consider this as a general proposition for the future?

**THE LECTURER :** On the general proposition that the bus services and the rail services should be linked much better than they are at the moment at the stations, I am entirely in agreement with the questioner. I think I will have to invite him to come to one of our Commission meetings, because he says so much better what I have repeatedly said myself.

As to Victoria Station, I cannot answer without going into it very much more carefully. It is a very congested station. It has an enormous suburban traffic. These buses do not all start at Victoria; most of them are running through, and exactly what would be the result of bringing them right alongside the station I am not certain without investigation. I will ask Sir John Elliot to have a look at it.

**COMMODORE R. HARRISON :** I suggest that the reason for the present position is that the gentlemen in the past who were responsible for these matters of co-ordination never travelled in a bus.

**THE LECTURER :** That does not include me.

**CAPTAIN D. H. HARRISON :** The lecturer very kindly made reference to camaraderie between the railway officials and their subordinates, and as one who has had 45 years on railways I would ask him if he could assure us that the training—and I am not asking him to divulge anything regarding his school, of which I hold high regard—of the present and future railway officers is such as we received 45 years ago, that is to say, that they are coming up the hard way. I have retired, but I was delighted to hear the lecturer's remark that the railway youngsters are being given the opportunity. I only ask are they being given the opportunity the hard way?

THE LECTURER : I think that perhaps the best way I can answer that question is to say that promotion on the railways is from the ranks upwards, as it were. It is through the normal step by step method with which you, Sir, are doubtless familiar. There is, if you like, as an exception to it, the traffic apprentice scheme. That scheme was introduced not by the Commission since nationalization but by the Companies before that. It is a scheme whereby a young man with approved qualifications is brought in and given special opportunities to acquire a more general knowledge of the industry than he would if he were kept, say, to a signaller's job or a driver's job ; and a special eye is kept on him with a view to bringing on the man who will fill the senior managerial posts in the future. Such a system could very easily lead to trouble ; that is very clear, and therefore special precautions are taken to ensure that it does not ; and the principal of those precautions is that the selection of those young fellows is made by the Committee on which the Unions are represented.

THE CHAIRMAN : There is only one thing I would like to say, and that is that there was one very important thing that Sir Brian Robertson said at the end—that we had to choose between a subsidy and running the thing as we wanted. I am relieved to hear that Sir Brian thinks we can get what we want for the Country without a subsidy. We all know what a frightful thing a subsidy is. At the same time I am sure that we must have what we want as regards the railways, especially as soldiers. Unless we have an efficient railway system in this Country, then if the worst should ever happen again we would not be able to move anything. In the end road or water cannot begin to compete with the railways, as I am sure you will agree. We must, for the freight business and for quick movement of troops, always keep the railways going. They are vitally important to us. It is a very cheering thing to hear Sir Brian say that they will get efficiency and keep going without a subsidy.

I am sure you would like me to thank on your behalf Sir Brian Robertson very much for his extremely interesting lecture and for the extreme frankness with which he has answered all our questions. (*Applause.*)

COMMODORE R. HARRISON : It is my privilege, on behalf of the Council, to ask you to join in expressing our grateful thanks to the Quarter-Master-General for his kindness in sparing the time to come here this afternoon and preside. Thank you very much, Sir. (*Applause.*)

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## STRATEGIC VALUES AND WEAKNESSES OF N.A.T.O.

By CAPTAIN CYRIL FALLS

On Wednesday, 11th January, 1956, at 3 p.m.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR JAMES ROBB, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.,  
in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: We welcome here today Captain Cyril Falls who is to talk on the strategic values and weaknesses of N.A.T.O. He needs no introduction to you as a military historian. Though he may not be known to you personally, you all know of him and his writings. He was *The Times* military correspondent for 14 years, and from 1946 to 1953 was Chichele Professor of History at Oxford.

Captain Falls is the author of many works, notably one, a part of the official history of the First World War. He has also written innumerable articles on the art of war, to which he has devoted life-time study. Ladies and gentlemen—Captain Cyril Falls.

### LECTURE

I HAVE been given a hard task. Some of the difficulty lies in the word 'strategic.' It has been defined as the art of bringing forces into contact with the enemy. N.A.T.O.'s intentions being purely defensive, that is obviously not a field in which it can have wide liberty of action. And I am going to include certain factors which at one time would not have been considered as coming under the heading of strategy.

I am not going to deal with questions such as the structure of command, except on one point. If you ask 20 reasonably well-read people—I do not, of course, include this audience—what N.A.T.O. means in a military sense, 19 will probably answer, the defence of free Europe. That is its biggest task. But the answer leaves the very title of the North Atlantic Treaty meaningless. N.A.T.O. also stands for the defence of the North Atlantic. Again, if these 20 are asked the meaning of the word SACEUR, most of them may guess that it is Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, but they would probably add that they had never heard it used. They have heard of General Gruenther and they have heard of S.H.A.P.E., his headquarters, but not of SACEUR.

SACEUR, however, suggests that there is another supreme allied commander somewhere. And there is, of course, at Norfolk, Virginia. I paid a long and interesting visit to his headquarters. SACLANT, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, is not quite the counterpart of SACEUR because, unlike the latter, he leaves command of national forces to national officers in peace-time and stands by for war; but he does take command in big naval exercises and he does deal with intelligence. It is also the case that N.A.T.O. involves the defence of the greater part of the American continent, and the most important part by far, as well as that of Europe.

The greatest strategic advantage of N.A.T.O., using the word strategy in the strictest sense, is that the most powerful partner in it, the United States, with which Canada is closely linked in the defence of the polar approaches to their continent, stands back from the acute danger in which the European partners are placed, stands back in another hemisphere. The richest, most productive, the strongest militarily, the most populous, and the most extensive N.A.T.O. base of operations is the United States, and it is at the same time the least vulnerable. It is true that even the United States is vulnerable now to an extent never before conceived. It is true that Soviet Russia approaches the New World closely at the Behring Strait. Yet the prospects of defence are far better. The efficacy of warning systems must be far greater, and they are an essential factor in any defence in nuclear warfare.

This is a vital advantage. It is to start with a formidable deterrent to aggression. If a global nuclear war should occur, it is the best guarantee that it would not be lost. It is, in short, the fundamental element in the strength of N.A.T.O. that, whereas the United States can project its power into other continents, its own continent is happily situated for its own defence and therefore to maintain its power to strike for its partners.

I have said that SACEUR is an active Supreme Allied Commander and S.H.A.P.E. an active Supreme Allied Headquarters. And this activity is the first of the valuable features of N.A.T.O. in Europe. There never has been before, that I know of, an active working headquarters exercising the full functions of command in time of peace in any alliance, however close. There have been many military alliances in history. Some of them have been frank and cordial. Information has been exchanged. Arrangements have been made to place certain forces of one partner under the command of an officer of another in the event of war or an emergency period when war is imminent. But N.A.T.O. has set up in S.H.A.P.E. the first Allied headquarters which as a matter of course regularly and continuously exercises the functions of command in time of peace. This is an immense merit from the military point of view, but an arrangement to which the signatories of N.A.T.O. would in all probability not have been prepared to submit if they had not considered themselves to be in great danger—as they assuredly were when the organization was set up.

Of course the theoretical power of command is not in practice absolute. That would be contrary to human nature. Tact has to be exercised. Persuasion may have to take the place of such an order as would be issued by the commander-in-chief of a national force to one of his subordinate commanders. Persuasion may not always succeed in its object. But, to sum up as briefly as possible this aspect of the value of N.A.T.O., particularly in Europe, it is the most realistic organization ever set up to co-ordinate the defence of a large group of nations, differing in size and population, in power and resources.

Another way in which to assess the value of N.A.T.O. is to consider what the state of affairs would be if it had not been created. You remember that the method of Hitler in his occupations was described as following the principle 'one by one.' You remember that he used this principle first in the remilitarization of the Rhineland, so that he might put up a shield behind him to the west while he made his moves to the south-east. Then came the forcible *Anschluss* with Austria, the acquisition of the Sudetenland, the rape of Czechoslovakia. On each of those four occasions the chief European Powers, Britain and France, could not make up their minds to act. When he took his fifth step, against Poland, they did act, but they went to war on the occasion which was the least favourable. A senior officer said to me at the time, with British fondness for sporting images, "We have chosen to bat on the worst possible wicket."

The pre-N.A.T.O. period after the end of the 1939-45 War was not very different, though there was less likelihood of the Russians getting away with aggression without having to fight for it than there had been in the case of Hitler's Germany, because Russia could not advance westward without coming into contact with the American and western European forces of occupation. But there was no general understanding. Various individual treaties existed, but it was not always easy to assess their value. Thus, Turkey had treaties with Britain and France, but not with the United States, and our treaty was fly-blown because we felt that the Turkish interpretation of it during the war had been unsatisfactory. We had made a guarantee of aid to Greece

in case of aggression, but experts did not agree whether it was still valid or whether, since it applied to the situation existing in April, 1939, the promise had been fulfilled during the war and as it were 'used up.' Defence wholly lacked co-ordination.

It also lacked strength. The principle of mutual aid was impossible. One of the features of modern war is that small nations can no longer equip themselves without the aid of larger, richer, and more highly industrialized allies. In 1864, within the lifetime of nonagenarians, when Denmark fought Prussia and Austria, the Danish armed forces were as well equipped as those of their powerful foes. I need not say that this would be quite impossible today unless Denmark obtained equipment from outside.

If we are more favourably placed today and the shadow of war has lightened, at least for the time being, this is very largely due to the creation of N.A.T.O., to the increase in strength which it has brought about, to a new solidarity and co-ordination.

Another valuable feature has been the establishment of a general unity of doctrine. This has, inevitably, been imposed from above. It is mainly American, though it has certainly been influenced also by British ideas. It extends to tactics to a certain extent, but they have not become entirely uniform, and it is not necessary that they should. British and American army tactics differ slightly—and we think ours to be the better—but neither in war in Korea nor in manoeuvres in Germany have there been any serious difficulties when British troops have operated alongside American.

The pooling of knowledge and experience has also been of great value. The regular inspections and consultations have taught the higher commanders and their staffs the characteristics, the problems, and the prejudices of the partners in N.A.T.O. The big combined manoeuvres have had the same effect. Sometimes this has proved rather unwelcome to national pride, and that may be so even in the case of a great nation like ourselves. I recall the big naval exercise in 1952 when the United States carriers *Midway* and *Franklin D. Roosevelt* came over to this side of the Atlantic and our weakness in naval aircraft at that time was rather uncomfortably shown up; but one cannot doubt that in the long run the effects of such knowledge of the armed forces of partners are healthy. Again, for armed forces, perhaps the most valuable of all knowledge comes under the heading of intelligence. I would almost go so far as to say that the highest standard of intelligence can be reached only by an international staff. I was told by an intelligence officer of a N.A.T.O. headquarters that intelligence which came in to him included items which never came to the staffs of his own country. This was not a matter of espionage or any cloak and dagger work. It was simply a matter of the large number of channels which became available. And when a perplexing item of intelligence comes to the head of an intelligence department of an international staff, he has generally among his subordinates someone who can explain to him its probable significance.

Economy of force is another product of N.A.T.O., and in this case perhaps most of all with respect to naval and air forces. One can see it at its simplest in the function of control and defence of the Atlantic. The two chief naval Powers who are members of the treaty are the United States and the United Kingdom; Canada is a member of the British Commonwealth and also closely linked with the United States. Their main naval ports and main naval strength lie on either side of the Atlantic. Convoy escorts may carry through from one side to the other, but a large proportion of its strength can be used by each Power in its own section of the ocean and they can combine in that central area on either side of which was called, and perhaps still is, "the chop line," which has always proved difficult to defend. The stronger of the two, the

United States, can afford to allot considerable strength to the Mediterranean. The same thing applies to the land-based aircraft of these two Powers which are destined to play a part in the control of these waters.

As regards air forces, economy of force is also secured. An immense advantage has been derived from the availability of bases, both defensive and offensive in character and objects. Here it seems to me certain that the disposition of offensive bases, made possible by N.A.T.O. for the most part, has made an important contribution to Russia's realization of the danger in which she lay from counterstrokes if she launched an attack on the West. And this in its turn has led to the recent easing in relations.

One of the greatest of all the strategic benefits of N.A.T.O. seems to me to be as follows: the main strength—and I would add the will—of N.A.T.O. lies in the United States and the United Kingdom, and neither can be attacked without bringing on massive retaliation. Strategically, as I have pointed out, it is an advantage that the stronger of the two, the United States, is the more remote and the less vulnerable. Supposing the United States were to be the first and main victim of attack, as some American experts think would be the case, it appears unlikely that the surprise would be so complete as to make retaliation from United States air bases impossible, and if it did there would still be our bombers and American bombers on airfields outside the United States available. In the case of an attack on this Country alone I am afraid that the surprise might be so great as to preclude serious retaliation, but the aggressor would be subjected to the full weight of retaliation from the United States. And if the attacks were simultaneous, the aircraft directed against the United States would have to start first, and again some warning would be practically certain. This seems to me to be a very important point.

The moral factor is also, it does not need to be said, important in strategy. Morale has without any doubt been raised by the treaty and the way in which it has been carried out in the military sphere. Remember that in the terrifying years after the war the United States, the most powerful arm on the side of freedom, had entered no European group pact. It is true that she had some forces in Europe. It is true that her sympathies were obvious and that she might be expected to act in the event of war. But she was hardly drawn in to the defence of Europe in advance. It was not until April, 1949, some nine months after the famous 'Vandenberg Resolution' in the United States Senate, that the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington. And of course even after that it took some time before the organization could be set on a firm footing. Since then the most important developments have been the entry of Greece and Turkey into N.A.T.O. and the Balkan Pact between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, the last-named of which is not a member of N.A.T.O. Naturally, as the growth of N.A.T.O. strength in Europe was a slow and laborious process, the rise of western European morale was slow also. But there can be no doubt that there has been a steep rise.

It is always harder to point out and analyse the advantages of a military pact than its weaknesses. Before I go on to talk of some of them, which is only too easy a task, I will end what I have to say about the value of N.A.T.O., by telling you that what seems to me a basic item of value is that state of preparedness for action, the arrangements made and kept up to date for swinging over to a state of war, which could be achieved only by an international organization of this sort. There has been much talk of deterrents. One of the most efficient of deterrents is knowledge that all is ready for resistance and retaliation and that no one victim can be marked out for slaughter singly, because attack on one would be regarded as attack on all.



Now I turn to the weaknesses.\* Some appear very grave at this moment ; in fact, it seems to me that N.A.T.O. has come to a bifurcation of roads, one leading to a continuance of its success, the other to failure. Optimistic views on one factor, pessimistic on another, have influenced the European members. They believe that the possibility of a world war in the near future has been greatly diminished. This is not an unreasonable belief. But they link with it a belief that, if a world war should occur, it would be immediately decided by nuclear weapons. This belief, again, may be correct. The lesson they are inclined to draw from both these beliefs, however, is that so-called conventional forces have ceased to be of value.

In the small European States especially, there is steady pressure to cut N.A.T.O. costs in favour of more popular expenditure. I foresee that this year will be marked by even greater efforts to do so, even more marked hanging back. On top of this tendency there has recently been a deadly drain on the strength of N.A.T.O. in Europe by the shifting of all the best French troops to North Africa and their replacement to only a limited extent by reservists.

Remember that each signatory is largely the judge of its own provision for defence. Look round Europe and you find everywhere differences in the strength of the professional element and the length of service of the conscript element in armed forces. Each signatory is also its own judge of the nature of the assistance which it should give another signatory if the latter becomes the victim of aggression. Again, any member may refuse to permit the bases of stronger allies to be established on its territory. Such refusals have been made. The little State making them takes out as it were a double assurance : first against attack by joining a partnership the big members of which would go to war if the little one were attacked ; secondly, by making itself inconspicuous and unprovocative, not neutral of course but with some of the elements of neutrality created by keeping the forces of the big members off the national soil.

People in the mass understand only simple ideas. Even highly educated people often understand only simple ideas on any but subjects in which they take a special professional or intellectual interest. On these, of course, they can understand highly complex ideas. The idea that nothing counts but hydrogen bombs is simple ; therefore it appeals to the multitude—and to a good many politicians, either because their strategic mentality is similar or because they flatter the multitude. Once you arrive at the belief that nothing counts but hydrogen bombs, your enthusiasm for N.A.T.O. obviously droops. It may disappear altogether. But N.A.T.O. is expensive. Why pay for outdated means of defence ?

The contrary, and I am convinced the true, idea is complex. To begin with, the frightful force of the hydrogen bomb has brought up, almost for the first time in the thermo-nuclear age, the possibility that a major war might be fought without it. I am not prophesying that it would be, not even suggesting that this would be desirable, since the West looks much more likely to be beaten in a non-nuclear than in a nuclear war, because it has to deal with vastly superior conventional forces. What I am asserting is that this possibility, even if the balance of probability is against it, raises the importance of conventional forces.

The appearance on the scene of tactical atomic weapons is another new factor. These are at the command of S.H.A.P.E., whereas the hydrogen bomb is not. The weight of opinion seems to be that the use of tactical atomic weapons would involve that of the big bombs. Yet, again, this is not completely certain. If it proved that those tactical weapons did not bring down the big bombs, then the value of con-

ventional forces would increase. This might be particularly the case with armour; but infantry, artillery, and engineers would all rise again in importance.

If land forces at the disposal of N.A.T.O. in Europe were reduced beyond a certain limit, there would be a risk of small forward moves, infringements of frontiers or lines of demarcation, by the other side. We might see another series of step-by-step advances, and just as the democracies hesitated to allow Hitler's advances to bring on a world war, so they might in future consider that it would be a crime to start a nuclear war on such a provocation. If they did not, where would the process stop?

Finally, there is the question of minor wars, with tacit agreement to keep them within artificial limits. A Korea was undoubtedly better suited to the Far East than to Europe, but a secondary war of the type cannot wholly be discounted. It would, of course, be fought with conventional forces.

Time has forced me to close up my argument tightly, and I do not know how far it commands your assent. I say with all seriousness that the weakening of the enthusiasm for N.A.T.O., the edging out of its responsibilities, appears to me to be a grave danger and an acute one. I trust N.A.T.O. will not be wrecked on this rock, but I believe it might well be.

A serious weakness has been the absence of the Federal Republic of Germany from the ranks of the defence. All military authorities and military students have perceived the impossibility of putting up a defence in Western Germany, anyhow short of the Rhine, unless Western Germany took part in it. Now at last the principle of German rearmament has been conceded, but there is still no German Army. The delay has encouraged elements in the country hostile to rearmament and in some cases neutralist in aspirations to fight on. Even now, if that great personality, the Federal German Chancellor, were to pass on, no one can foresee to what extent his policy would be carried out. The decision has also been hung up long enough to allow rueful calculations of its effect on taxation to penetrate the minds of the citizens. Hitherto German industry has enjoyed advantages just because Germany was defeated and disarmed. These will end with rearmament.

And no one is asking more insistently whether the war will not be decided over their heads by the hydrogen bomb than the Germans. West German newspapers, carefully following recent manoeuvres, were dismayed by the simulated use of tactical atomic weapons in retreat. Some concluded that they would wreck the country, even if nothing bigger were brought into action. It has occurred to many Germans that they might avoid untold ills by not rearming. So far it does not look as though these defeatist counsels would prevail. It would be a disaster if they were to.

Glance at a map of Germany. You will see that the frontier between Western and Eastern Germany—which was of course merely meant to be a temporary boundary of zones of occupation and has become what it is through Russian bad faith—you will see that this frontier starts in the bay of Lubeck, runs due south to the Elbe, and follows the course of the river for about 50 miles before bending south-west at Wittenberge. Now the slightest push on the northern end of this frontier where it touches the bay of Lubeck opens a door into Denmark through Schleswig-Holstein. A push as far as the Elbe at Hamburg, a normal distance for armoured forces to travel on the first or second day of a surprise offensive, leaves open every road between Germany and Denmark. Danish military strength is, I need not say, trifling. The Danish Government is one of those which will not have foreign armed

forces on its soil. Once an invader enters Jutland he will find little trouble in spreading out all over Denmark. Those who have visited the place we call Elsinore know that there the Sound looks like no more than a broad river. So a small advance on the N.A.T.O. left flank might lead to the occupation of all Scandinavia. I need not go into the consequences of that.

I am not so naive as to suppose that the Germans would defend this flank out of pure altruism, but it would be to their strategic advantage to allocate a proportion of their strength to it. When I was in Oslo in 1954, I found this question very much in the minds of those concerned.

The next weakness is that the members have not been in all cases able to sink political differences or to get rid of jealousies and rivalries. Fortunately, these have been rare in western Europe and it would be hard to think of any serious one existing at the present moment. But, as you all know, this is by no means the case in the eastern Mediterranean. You remember that Greece and Turkey first concluded a pact and then obtained admission to N.A.T.O. Next the then Greek Prime Minister, Field-Marshal Papagos, whose friendship was a source of pride and pleasure to me—and information too—engineered the Balkan Pact between his country, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. From the strategic point of view it was a masterpiece of policy. Turkey entered it with the greatest eagerness. In fact, she became anxious and even angry over the delay on the part of Yugoslavia in ratifying the treaty and Papagos had to jog Marshal Tito's elbow. But look at the state of affairs now. What has happened has been tragic and it is hardly too much to say that, while the Balkan Pact itself is virtually in ruins, the whole structure of N.A.T.O. in that part of the world is threatened. The bitter quarrel between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, followed by the destruction of Greek property to the tune of millions by Turkish mobs, followed again by Greek vexation over our attitude in Cyprus—which I myself think has been mistaken—and the attitude of the United States about the Greek effort to bring the Cyprus issue before the United Nations, has been disastrous. It has been officially stated that Greece was at one time considering withdrawal from N.A.T.O., not as a probability, but as a possibility.

I do not put this forward as an intrinsic weakness of N.A.T.O. any more than it would be of any pact. But it is certainly a practical weakness at the moment. Even if the Balkan Pact remains in being, and Greece and Turkey remain members of N.A.T.O., no pact can be efficient without a basis of cordiality. The attitude of the third member of the Balkan Pact, Yugoslavia, is perhaps rather outside my subject, though it does affect it. All I shall say on that point is that Marshal Tito's interpretation of the principle of coexistence is peculiar and not quite what it appeared to be when he subscribed to the Balkan Pact.

The last strategic weakness I see comprises psychology as well as strategic planning. It can be described in the familiar question: "Whose finger is on the trigger?" Its essence is the dilemma caused by the terrific power of the major thermo-nuclear weapons. The main striking power is not in the hands of N.A.T.O., not in the hands of an alliance, but in those of the President of the United States and his advisers. Supposing there were signs pointing to Russian preparations for aggression, what should be the reaction? The future of the world might depend on the answer to that question. We may feel assured that the problem has been faced realistically and with the aid of the highest military skill, combined with prudence. They cannot altogether remove the dilemma. And no country is more deeply concerned in this decision than our own.

The value of N.A.T.O. outweighs its weaknesses, as things stand. The danger is that of an increase in the weaknesses, due to over-confidence that the danger of war has been eliminated, impatience with the burden on budgets and manpower, perhaps also by means of the subversive sapping and mining which is a feature of the cold war. We must keep our eyes open to this danger and not let ourselves be blinded by comfortable conventionalities. Of all the 'famous last words,' those most likely to be uttered by a modern democracy are: 'Jolly good show!'

That is all I have to say, and I am conscious of its inadequacy. I have not found it easy to apply a strictly strategic appreciation to N.A.T.O. One reason is that strategy implies choice, whereas much of N.A.T.O.'s policy is dictated by defence, imposed upon it, as the ground is. N.A.T.O. is by its nature defensive, and a defensive strategy is difficult to talk about as well as to carry out. I hope I have at least been able to supply some slight assistance to your own speculations on this subject, even though they may be in some cases better informed and more to the point than my own.

#### DISCUSSION

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GIFFARD MARTEL: We have had a very interesting lecture, as we always get from Captain Falls. There is one point which I should like to take up.

Captain Falls said he thought that the shape of the N.A.T.O. set-up was realistic. I am wondering whether it is in fact realistic. Surely the form of warfare which is likely to take place is that method of warfare by which the Soviet Union has already captured half the world with hardly a casualty. In view of that, does anyone really imagine that the Soviet will adopt another form of warfare, and are we going to do nothing about it? Surely the most important duty of N.A.T.O. is to meet the most probable form of attack which may take place. I have asked Lord Ismay that question in this very hall and in Paris and he replied that it is left to individual governments to decide what they should do in this matter.

THE LECTURER: It is a matter of opinion whether N.A.T.O. should be entrusted with what may be called psychological warfare. On the broader point of what General Martel has said, I feel that if you make what is a quite reasonable assumption, that a major war is most unlikely, but you carry that to such a point that you are completely denuded of strength to face a major war, then there would be no major war because you would have to obey the demands of a superior power. That was my main reason for saying that one must maintain a reasonable measure of material strength.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GIFFARD MARTEL: I did not suggest that we should not have our forces. Of course we must have them, but when you say to us that if we have a sufficiently powerful fighting force we are secure and safe, I do not believe it for one moment. This infiltration will go on, however strong our military forces may be.

COLONEL R. A. HARRIS: The lecturer referred to the political difficulties which N.A.T.O. faces. Is there not an Article in the Treaty which states that a political organization shall be set up to back it, and has that been considered?

THE LECTURER: I did not say there was no political backing of N.A.T.O. There is the North Atlantic Council which has direct political control. The point I made was that the contributions and the responsibilities of different members of N.A.T.O. varied. In some places those responsibilities are higher than in others simply for geographical reasons. Take, for instance, countries like Belgium and Portugal. Belgium may be no stronger militarily than Portugal, but she is a front-line country. Therefore she has higher responsibilities under N.A.T.O. than Portugal, but there is very great latitude in the responsibility that signatories need accept.

COMMANDER N. R. CORBET-MILWARD, R.N.: What will be the effect upon N.A.T.O. if, after the departure of Dr. Adenauer, a Government comes to office with a less strong pro-western bias and greater inclination towards unity with Eastern Germany at all costs?



THE LECTURER : I am afraid that is rather out of my field. I used to know Western Germany at one time fairly well, but not so much in the last few years. I should have thought that on the whole, having reached the present scale in self-defence, they would be unlikely to go back on it.

CAPTAIN E. A. S. BAILEY, R.N. : The lecturer has dwelt on the subject of the deterrent. I should like to know whether he would be prepared to state, as an historian, what his views are on whether we in this Country should press on with the necessary steps to survive the enemy's nuclear power with the same priority, or comparable priority, that we give to our own contribution to the deterrent which lies behind N.A.T.O. ?

THE LECTURER : We are the Country which is the worst favoured from that point of view. For a country like Norway, for instance, it is possible to hew into the rock behind every city, particularly a city such as Oslo. It is possible on the outskirts to tunnel straight in and also to provide the medium for evacuating the whole of the population of the cities. In this Country it is impossible to provide for more than a fraction of the population, and that is even more the case with nuclear weapons than it was in the 1939-45 War. It is a very difficult problem.

THE CHAIRMAN : Captain Falls has done a great deal this afternoon to bring us up to date on the state of affairs in Europe. Many of the problems facing N.A.T.O. today that he has discussed are similar to those of N.A.T.O.'s predecessor, the Western Union Defence Organization. This military agency was the direct result of the prompt action of the Foreign Ministers of the five countries—Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—when they signed at Brussels a defensive alliance. This was on 17th March, 1948, less than one month after the communist cold war capture of Czechoslovakia. It was an action which had early effect in halting the communist risings in France and Italy and which gave hope and assurance to those European countries which knew they were high on the communist list for "conquest without war." On the formation of the Western Union Defence Organization, Field-Marshal Montgomery was appointed permanent Chairman of the Land, Air, and Naval Commanders-in-Chief Committee, with headquarters at Fontainebleau. Commanders-in-Chief were nominated : General de Lattre de Tassigny for the Army, myself for the Air, and Vice-Admiral Jaujard for the Navy. At that formative stage very small defence forces, land, air, and sea, were in existence and the radar early warning system upon which all air defence depends was also very small and with a limited radius of action. These factors, of course, dominated the early decisions on strategy. It was interesting, therefore, to read last month the Supreme Commander's report on the present position of N.A.T.O. General Gruenther stated that the new strategy of defence based on atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons will cost more than is now available. "The price of security has risen and will go on rising. The essentials are : (i) an efficient early warning radar system ; (ii) air forces to be kept up to date and strengthened much further ; (iii) ground forces, which are alarmingly inadequate, must at least be modernized."

So the problems that we, of the Western Union, were confronted with eight years ago are still the problems of N.A.T.O. today.

You will all agree with me that Captain Falls has given us a most interesting, and a very disturbing, talk. His brilliant analysis of the strategic values and weaknesses of N.A.T.O. underline the need for every officer, for everyone who has the future of his country at heart, to study this.

We are indebted to Captain Falls for this lecture and I ask you to express your appreciation. (*Applause.*)

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## THE OFFENSIVE IN LIBYA : DECEMBER, 1940-FEBRUARY, 1941

By " HAFIZ "

*" Control Events Instead of Letting Them Happen. "—*

MARSHAL FOCH.

**S**O many portentous events have happened, such great victories have been won since 1940, that our first outstanding success on land in the last war is likely to be forgotten. Yet the Country owes much to the late Field-Marshal Lord Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief, and his generals who, in the midst of disaster and in face of heavy odds and endless difficulties, planned to seize the initiative ; and who, with great moral courage and determination, brought to a successful conclusion one of the most audacious campaigns ever fought. In these operations the British forces, who never exceeded 31,000 at any one time and were supported by a numerically inferior air force, advanced 500 miles and destroyed 10 Italian divisions in two months at a cost to themselves of 500 killed, 1,373 wounded, and 55 missing.

This brief campaign produced lessons of particular significance today. It also indicated what can be done by well-trained, hardy troops against heavy odds when led with skill and determination, and the value of close co-operation between the three Services to attain the immediate object.

The fall of France caused an ugly situation in the Middle East, and plans made in conjunction with our late Ally had to be abandoned. On land, the Italian army in North Africa, some 250,000 strong, was free to concentrate against Egypt. In Italian East Africa a hostile army of about 250,000 faced the Sudan, Somaliland, and Kenya. The British forces, numbering only 85,000, were dispersed over a wide area and were not all in normal formations ; moreover, the Australians and New Zealanders were not yet fully trained or equipped. Neither the 7th Armoured nor the 4th Indian Divisions was complete ; in fact, throughout the Command there was a shortage of arms, ammunition, equipment, transport, and ancillary services.

On the other hand, the movements of the enemy were restricted by lack of communications and by areas devoid of water. In North Africa they had insufficient transport, whilst their artillery and armour were generally below modern standards. Morale was low. In East Africa the requirements of internal security absorbed large numbers of their troops.

In the middle of August, 1940, British Somaliland was lost, but, towards the end of the month, the flow of reinforcements and stores from the United Kingdom commenced. The decision to strengthen our forces in the Middle East, despite the situation in Europe, was one of the most timely and momentous acts of the war. Convoys were also on the way from the east with the 5th Indian Division and Dominion troops to complete formations.

It must be borne in mind when studying this campaign that Wavell was responsible for the defence of the Middle East, especially the naval base at Alexandria, the Suez Canal, and the land approaches to the Red Sea through which all convoys had to pass. The Vichy French in Syria were hostile though quiescent, but there was a considerable internal security problem in Palestine. We could afford to give ground to some extent in Kenya and in the Western Desert, but not in the Sudan. One reason was that the air reinforcement route from West Africa, just beginning to function, had to pass through Khartoum and down the Nile Valley. In the Western Desert, Wavell intended to delay an enemy advance and then to counter-

attack in front of Matruh when their communications would be stretched approximately another 100 miles. He therefore allotted the 5th Indian Division to the Sudan, and the 4th Indian and 7th Armoured Divisions to the Western Desert. Matruh had strong defences and was garrisoned by the 22nd Infantry Brigade. Preparations to develop Egypt and Palestine as a base for a large force were already in hand, as were improvements to the Western Desert lines of communication.

#### THE WESTERN DESERT: MAY-OCTOBER, 1940


Along the Mediterranean coast as far west as Gazala lies a narrow strip of low sandy country bounded on the south by the Libyan Plateau reached by an escarpment which restricted the movement of wheeled and tracked vehicles north and south, especially near the Egyptian frontier. Movement across the desert is possible in any direction, subject to the limitations imposed by the escarpment and certain areas of soft sand, but skilled driving and good navigation are essential as well as confidence based on what has been termed 'desert sense.' Matruh, the British railhead, which had the only good water supply between Alexandria and Tobruk, was also connected with the Delta and Sollum by an indifferent road. Apart from the good Italian coast road which ended at the frontier, there were no other roads, only recognized tracks following the lines of small native wells across the plateau.

By the end of May, while the Egyptian Frontier Force patrolled the border, the 7th Armoured Division assembled in the vicinity of Matruh with covering forces between the main body and the frontier. Major-General R. N. O'Connor assumed command of the Western Desert Force (afterwards the XIIIth Corps) on 8th June. Two days later Italy declared war. British covering troops began to act offensively at once. Ranging far and wide into enemy territory they caused alarm and despondency as well as the impression that our forces were much stronger than was actually the case. This policy of harrying and deceiving the enemy was successfully maintained through July and August. The troops gained much experience at small cost to themselves, except in wear and tear of precious vehicles, and demonstrated that, with 'desert sense,' there would be opportunities for enterprise and initiative. The enemy, on the other hand, did not appear to venture far from roads and tracks.

It had been assumed that the Italians in Libya would not remain inactive, though it was considered impossible for them to employ all their forces in an invasion owing to the supply and transport situation. Marshal Graziani, appointed Commander-in-Chief at the end of June and ordered to prepare for the invasion of Egypt, immediately asked for more artillery, armour, and transport. But, on 7th September, Mussolini issued a peremptory order for the advance to begin on the 9th. Five divisions, some seven tank battalions, and a small mechanized group were available for the operation. In addition, two divisions were held in reserve near Tobruk. Graziani's original plan had been to advance on both sides of the escarpment but this had to be modified owing to shortage of transport and finally abandoned because of confusion in the assembly area. Thus, any attempt at a flanking movement was given up and the force advanced slowly along the coastal strip.

The Support Group of the 7th Armoured Division, reinforced by additional artillery, machine guns, and a few cruiser tanks, opposed the Italians. The rest of the Division had been withdrawn to an area south of Matruh and the 4th Indian Division had assembled farther east. Various means of deception were used; for instance, dummy tanks were positioned to make it as difficult as possible for the Italians to ascertain the real locations and strength of the two armoured brigades.

# SKETCH I - SIDI BARRANI



The covering troops, deployed on a wide front, delayed the enemy near the frontier before evacuating Sollum, where everything of value had been destroyed. Then, keeping in touch with the Italians, they withdrew by a series of bounds to the east of Sidi Barrani. By this time the road from Sollum had become practically useless owing to demolitions and heavy traffic, while the water supply at Sidi Barrani had been rendered undrinkable. (See Sketch I.)

The R.A.F. attacked airfields, concentrations, and transport from 9th September onwards: between 16th and 21st September, 60 sorties were devoted to day and night attacks on camps and transport columns. On the 17th, the Navy joined in the task of harassing enemy communications.

The Italian advance stopped on 18th September, about 80 miles short of Matruh. They had suffered some 3,500 casualties against a British loss of only 150. It soon became evident that Graziani had no intention of moving on for some time. He had, in fact, begun to rebuild the road back to Sollum. In addition, the Italians were constructing a series of entrenched camps from Maktila to Sofafi on the plateau, a frontage of some 50 miles.

#### WAVELL'S PLANS AND DIFFICULTIES

In the back of Wavell's mind was always the thought that with his inferior numbers it might be less risky to take the offensive than to await attack. Late in August, he began to contemplate an offensive against the Italians in Eritrea, and an invasion of Cyrenaica early in 1941. He knew that the promised reinforcements, including two regiments for the 7th Armoured Division and the 7th R.T.R., equipped with 48 heavy "I" tanks (Matildas), were on the way. But when the Italians were still stationary in mid-October, he began to consider the possibility of an earlier offensive in the Western Desert.

Both Wavell and O'Connor thought the enemy's dispositions on a wide front to be thoroughly unsound, especially as their entrenched camps were not mutually supporting. The first proposal was to attack both flanks of the enemy line. O'Connor, however, was averse to the dispersion involved and considered the Sofafi camps too strong for a frontal assault. He favoured making his main thrust in the centre. Wavell accepted this view and directed Generals Wilson<sup>1</sup> and O'Connor to work out tactical details.

The Commander-in-Chief's optimism received a setback and he was forced to reconsider his proposed offensive against Graziani when the British Government ordered several R.A.F. squadrons to Greece with a contingent of anti-aircraft artillery and administrative units. Weakness in the air had always been one of the limiting factors, and the risks now appeared too great despite the obvious weaknesses of the enemy. However, on receiving a promise of early replacements, he decided to go on with the operation if the air situation made it at all possible.

Surprise was vital to success. Yet to gain surprise as to the time and place of an attack in an open, almost featureless desert, under cover of a numerically inferior air force, appeared at first sight to be out of the question. Moreover, could the secret that an offensive was intended be kept in a base swarming with spies, enemy subjects, and doubtful neutrals? But mindful of his experience under Allenby in 1918, he took every possible step from the outset to ensure secrecy and to mislead the enemy. The number of even senior officers with any knowledge of his intentions was kept to the minimum.

<sup>1</sup> G.O.C., British Troops Egypt.



## PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE

During November, reconnaissance was intensified and from patrol reports, air photographs, and other sources it was established by degrees that anti-tank ditches and minefields were under construction in front of the entrenched camps but not in rear. The northern group of camps consisted of works at Sidi Barrani and Maktila on the coast, to the south of which were Tummar West and East and Point 90. These were held by the 1st and 2nd Libyan and 4th Blackshirt Divisions. In the centre, about eight miles farther south, was Nibeiwa, with a perimeter a mile and a half by a mile, garrisoned by a mixed group 3,000 strong with 35 tanks. Some 15 miles farther south-west lay the Sofafi group of camps occupied by the 63rd Division; the 62nd Division was farther west along the escarpment towards Halfaya; and, about Buq Buq, lay the 64th Division. Their tanks were not concentrated in armoured formations. O'Connor's information as to enemy dispositions was substantially correct. (See Sketch I.)

The 15-mile stretch between Nibeiwa and Sofafi, known as the Enba Gap, was found to be unoccupied. The vital importance of this gap in the coming offensive was recognized by those in the know and when enemy columns tried to establish a post at Bir Enba in November, they were attacked and driven off. The 'gap' remained empty except for British patrols.

The British force consisted of the 4th Indian Division<sup>2</sup>, the 7th Armoured Division, and Selby Force. The last, made up of units and detachments from the Matruh garrison, was about 1,800 strong—all that could be transported—and included a 'brigade' of dummy tanks. The attack would be made in three stages:—

*First*: 4th Indian Division to pass through the Enba Gap, wheel northwards and attack in succession Nibeiwa, Tummar West, Tummar East, and Point 90 from the west. 7th Armoured Division to protect 4th Division against interference from Sofafi and the Buq Buq areas. Selby Force to pin down the enemy in Maktila.

*Second*: 4th Indian Division to move northwards to attack Sidi Barrani from the south and west. 7th Armoured Division to disrupt enemy movement and communications in the vicinity of Buq Buq.

*Third*: Exploitation by 7th Armoured Division, west or south-west.

The Italian air force available in Libya was estimated at 250 fighters and 250 bombers, but a number of these were destroyed on the ground before the offensive started. By temporary withdrawals from other parts of the Middle East, the R.A.F. was able to assemble 48 fighters and 116 bombers for the offensive. In addition, an army/air component of two squadrons and one flight of mixed fighter and reconnaissance aircraft, under the direct control of O'Connor, formed a tactical air force with a sound system of co-operation.

Late in November, an exercise was held for the 4th Indian Division and 7th R.T.R. to "practise attack on entrenched camps." Though replicas of Nibeiwa and Tummar were used, only a few senior officers were aware that this was the rehearsal of a definite operation. A good deal was learned and a memorandum issued by Wilson advocated methods which formed the basis of the actual attacks. A clever touch in the last paragraph was that "a further exercise would be held at a later date." About the same time rumours were started in Egypt about reinforcements for Greece and reliefs in the desert.

<sup>2</sup> The Division had only its 5th and 11th Brigades; the 7th, recently arrived, was still on the L. of C. But the 16th British Brigade and 7th R.T.R. were under command for the operation.

Owing to the shortage of transport something had to be done to avoid the long carry from railhead to the objectives. This was achieved by establishing a field supply depot some 40 miles west of Matruh for each division, stocked with five days' rations, petrol, and ammunition, plus water for two days which could be replenished by tank lorries. Great pains were taken to conceal these depots, and the administrative movements were explained as a precautionary measure to meet an Italian advance. By this means it would be possible to ensure supplies for an operation lasting five days, though Wavell made it clear to Wilson that should a favourable opportunity occur, the force must be "mentally, morally, and administratively prepared to take advantage of it."

With plans for the Libyan operation developing well, Wavell's thoughts turned once more to his intended offensive from the Sudan and Kenya, timed for early February, 1941. It was evident that the force in the Sudan would have to be reinforced by another division. For various good reasons he chose the 4th Indian and decided to replace it in Libya with the 6th Australian Division from Palestine. Time and space calculations showed that, using every possible means, it would take six weeks to transport the Division from Matruh to Kassala in the Sudan. A momentous decision would have to be made very soon after D Day in Libya.


On 4th December, Wavell held a final conference at which the Commanders-in-Chief of the Royal Navy and R.A.F. were present. It was decided to concentrate on bombing enemy airfields and for offensive patrols to cover the approach march against discovery and interference. The Navy would bombard Maktila and Sidi Barrani during the night 8th/9th December, and attack communications near the coast later. They would also be prepared to pump water ashore should the occasion arise. On 5th December, Wilson sent his first and only written instruction to O'Connor, who issued his formal orders next day.

#### THE FIRST PHASE: SIDI BARRANI

The approach march began on 6th December to an area astride the Siwa track where the formations halted for 36 hours. Here the troops were told that this was not another exercise. Moving well dispersed, the 4th Indian Division covered 60 miles on 8th December, in daylight, to a position of assembly just south of the Enba Gap and 15 miles from Nibeiwa. Fortunately, visibility became poor as the day went on and only one enemy aircraft was seen. In the meantime, the 7th Armoured Division assembled farther to the south-west. As darkness fell, the 11th Infantry Brigade and 7th R.T.R. moved off to their final assembly position for the assault on Nibeiwa. In the coastal sector, Selby Force moved from Matruh, put up the dummy tanks as a decoy and got into position a few miles south and west of Maktila before daylight on the 9th. (See Sketch I.)

At 0715 hours on 9th December, the divisional artillery opened the attack on Nibeiwa with a series of concentrations. At the same time two squadrons of the 7th R.T.R., closely supported by a battery and infantry carriers, broke through the north-west corner of the perimeter. Thirty minutes later the infantry began to mop up the defences and all fighting ceased by 1040 hours. Surprise had been complete. Meanwhile, the 5th Infantry Brigade had been moving up west of Nibeiwa to attack Tummar West and was joined by the 7th R.T.R. at 1100 hours. The guns began to register at noon and an hour later the tanks broke in, again from the north-west corner. The infantry followed through the western perimeter and by 1600 hours resistance had almost ceased. The attack on Tummar East then started, but was

# SKETCH II—THE PURSUIT



delayed by a small counter-attack from that camp and had to stop owing to darkness. Tummar East and Point 90 were cleared next morning.

The 4th Armoured Brigade, passing west of Nibeiwa at first light on 9th December, protected the western flank of the 4th Division and was soon in a position to prevent the enemy reinforcing Sidi Barrani. The Support Group protected the southern flank and watched the Sofafi camps ; the 7th Armoured Brigade remained in reserve.

During the afternoon of 9th December, the 16th Infantry Brigade moved northwards to get astride the exits from Sidi Barrani ; next morning, supported by the divisional artillery and 7th R.T.R., they reached their objective in a dust storm after overcoming considerable resistance. Reinforced by another battalion and more armour, the Brigade attacked again at 1600 hours and cleared Sidi Barrani. The remnants of three Italian divisions, hemmed in between this Brigade and Selby Force, surrendered early on 11th December. The 7th Armoured Brigade cleared the Buq Buq area the same day, but the 63rd Division in the Sofafi camps escaped owing to the late arrival of an order to the 4th Armoured Brigade. Italian losses were 38,000 prisoners, 237 guns, and 73 tanks.

#### THE SECOND PHASE : BARDIA AND TOBRUK

On 11th December, Wavell decided to withdraw the 4th Indian Division at once ; one Brigade of the 6th Australian Division was already on the way up. Despite the capture of large stocks of petrol, oil, water, and over 1,000 vehicles, administrative difficulties were intense, yet preparations for a further advance went ahead and advanced supply depots were established, while as much pressure as possible was maintained on the enemy. By 16th December, Bardia had become their most forward position. Four days later it was cut off from the west. (See Sketch II.)

The Bardia defences consisted of a chain of mutually supporting posts wired in and provided with concrete trenches and shelters. Both flanks rested on the sea and the whole front of some 18 miles was covered by an anti-tank ditch, belts of minefields, and a double-apron fence. British Intelligence had underestimated the strength of the garrison, which consisted of whole or part of the 1st and 2nd Blackshirt, 62nd, 63rd, 64th Divisions, and some fortress troops. The 6th Australian Division had, under command, the 16th British Infantry Brigade, a machine gun battalion, the 7th R.T.R. (now reduced to 23 tanks), and additional artillery bringing the total guns available up to 120. The outline plan was that, under cover of a barrage and concentrations, the infantry would secure a bridgehead to pass the tanks through. Every effort to be made to gain some measure of surprise. The 7th Armoured Division was to hold the ring.

During the night 2nd/3rd January, the northern part of the defended area was attacked by the Navy and R.A.F. and, from 0800 to 0845 hours, heavy ships bombarded the defences north of the Bardia-Tobruk road, while the bombers turned their attention to the Italian airfields. After a short approach march under cover of darkness, the break-in took place at 0700 hours on 3rd January, south of the Bardia-Tobruk road, and at 1100 hours another attack was launched farther south. The "I" tanks did magnificently, though when resistance ceased on 5th January, only six were still serviceable. The enemy lost some 40,000 men killed and captured, over 400 guns, and 130 tanks.

When Bardia surrendered, the 7th Armoured Division was already on the way to cut off Tobruk and, by 7th January, two Australian Brigades had arrived opposite

the eastern sector of the defences which were similar to those at Bardia but had fewer troops to defend a longer front. Nevertheless, a deliberate attack was necessary. Planned on the same lines as at Bardia, but with only 18 "I" tanks available, the break-in took place on the south-eastern face on 21st January, whilst the 7th Armoured Division made a diversion against the western front. Nearly half the defended area was captured by nightfall; next morning the 61st Division and other troops totalling 25,000 with 200 guns and 87 tanks surrendered. Most of the installations were undamaged and no time was lost in clearing the port; the first convoy started unloading on 28th January, and its stores were in time for the third phase.

#### THE THIRD PHASE: BEDA FOMM

On 22nd January, the 7th Armoured Brigade began to move forward along the coast road towards Derna. The place was held by the 60th Division, less a detachment at Mechili where there was also a brigade of 160 tanks. On 29th January, the 19th Australian Brigade relieved the 7th Armoured Division and began to probe the enemy resistance. The same day the 4th Armoured Brigade fought a successful action at Mechili, but most of the enemy managed to withdraw to the north-west during the night. However, the Italians evacuated Derna and, by 31st January, were retreating towards Benghazi, pressed by the Australians and harassed by the R.A.F. (See Sketch II.)

The coast road ran through the difficult Jebel Akhdar to Benghazi, then turned south towards El Agheila. It was appreciated that a direct pursuit in this area would be slow and there could be no opportunity for decisive action by the armour. A parallel or indirect pursuit from Mechili with the object of intercepting the enemy south of Benghazi would involve a march of 150 miles by a little-known track through Msus to the coast and, as only a small force could be supplied, tactical risks would have to be accepted. On the other hand, this course could lead to quick and decisive results. On 3rd February, O'Connor, with Wavell's approval, decided to continue the direct pursuit with the Australians and to initiate a parallel pursuit with the 7th Armoured Division.<sup>3</sup>

At first light on 4th February, the Division began to leave Mechili; early on the 5th, the main body was just east of Msus with advanced elements 30 miles ahead at Antelat. The going had been very bad indeed. About midday, part of the Support Group reached the coast road near Beda Fomm, stopped an enemy column moving towards El Agheila, and established itself across the road.<sup>4</sup> The Italians continued to pile up, and at 1700 hours, the 4th Armoured Brigade arrived and attacked the blocked column on the road some miles to the north. In the meantime, the 7th Armoured Brigade with the rest of the Support Group had reached Sceleidima. Later the armour was diverted to join in the action at Beda Fomm, leaving the Support Group to push on to the coast road next day.

The action continued all through 6th February, along a 14-mile stretch of road between Beda Fomm and the sea, but the Italians made no concerted attack. That night the Australians, after a splendidly conducted advance, entered Benghazi and pushed on southwards. At daybreak on 7th February, the enemy attempted to

<sup>3</sup> The Division was now reduced to 50 cruisers and 95 light tanks out of a total establishment of 350. The 7th Armoured Brigade had only one Regiment mounted.

<sup>4</sup> H.Q. 11th Hussars, two squadrons armoured cars, 'C' Battery R.H.A., 8 anti-tank and 3 anti-aircraft guns, and 2nd Battalion, The Rifle Brigade, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Coombe, 11th Hussars.



break through Coombe's force with a column of lorries led by 30 tanks. But the Riflemen and their supporting artillery stood firm and the attempt failed. Mass surrenders followed. About 25,000 prisoners were taken and over 100 medium tanks and more than 100 guns were captured or destroyed. Tired and vastly outnumbered, the 7th Armoured Division had completed its task after moving 150 miles in 29 hours. It had been a close thing; at the end the Division had only 12 serviceable cruisers and 40 light tanks.

#### CONCLUSION

Not only does this campaign illustrate the successful application of the principles of war, but it shows how much, given courage and determination, a great general can achieve with inadequate means. Limited resources at the outset of a war—one of the usual handicaps for a British general—did not cause Wavell to adopt a passive attitude. His scanty resources, even after the reinforcements arrived in August and September, 1940, compelled careful application of *economy of force*. Nevertheless, while keeping in view the requirements of the *security* of his base, he was determined to assume the *offensive* as soon as circumstances were at all favourable. Strategic *surprise* was gained at the outset and this was a vital factor in the successful *concentration* at the Enba Gap. Without the local command of the sea and the close *co-operation* of the Royal Navy, the Libyan campaign would have been impossible. *Co-operation* between ground and air forces was excellent, and the policy of attacking enemy aircraft on the ground led to the virtual destruction of the hostile air force and the resulting air superiority which contributed to *surprise*, *security*, and the success of the *offensive*.

*Surprise* was gained in all phases of the offensive. This was achieved by good staff work, *mobility*, secrecy, concealment, deception, or by the adoption of an unlikely course of action such as assaulting from the rear at Sidi Barrani or the dash to the sea from Mechili. Even in the deliberate attacks on Bardia and Tobruk some degree of surprise was attained by the use of a different method and concealment of the time and place of the assault. There was also the unexpected immunity of the "I" tanks whose presence had been kept secret. Strangely enough the *mobility* which was a significant feature of these operations was to some extent due to the fact that transport, etc., was not on the luxurious scale of the later war years.

Risks, strategic, tactical, and administrative were taken. Administrative risks can be more surely calculated than the others, but Wavell and O'Connor had been able to estimate the enemy's capabilities; and their morale, never high, had fallen rapidly after the first contacts. The Italian command was singularly inert and trusted to passive defence which can never result in victory. On the other hand, the British leaders were notable for their initiative, skill, and daring, while the speed with which decisions were acted upon was most marked throughout. Surely the qualities and skills displayed by all ranks in this campaign are those which will be of the greatest importance in a future war in which tactical atomic weapons are used.

The hard and thorough training of the troops before the war and during the period of waiting bore fruit. From the outset they were superior to their opponents in every way and could always be relied upon to respond to any call made on them. The *co-operation* between the three arms and the resulting combination of mobility and fire power was one of the reasons for our tactical successes. The final pursuit was a remarkable performance and is an outstanding example of the effect of the will power of the commander and of the decisive result of an indirect pursuit. The risks may appear at first sight to have been too great; but not if the state of the Italian

morale and the inefficiency of their leadership be compared with that of O'Connor's force. In fact, this pursuit is a practical illustration of the doctrine laid down in our pre-war manual.<sup>5</sup>

As the campaign drew to a close, the offensive in the south was already gaining momentum. The transfer of the 4th Indian Division to the Sudan had been a masterly stroke, though it threw a heavy burden on O'Connor at the time. In spite of his small resources Wavell had succeeded in controlling events and in removing the threat to Egypt, and was then in the process of destroying another large Italian army.

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<sup>5</sup> See *Field Service Regulations*, Vol. III, 1935, Section 28.

## THE HOME FLEET VISITS LENINGRAD

By "EYE-WITNESS"

**I**N the Summer of 1914, Beatty's battlecruisers went to Kronstadt. Although in 1946 the *Triumph* visited this Russian naval base, and in 1947 the *Liverpool* visited Sebastopol, more than 40 years were to elapse before a British squadron again entered a Russian port in peace-time.

In 1953, the Soviet Government responded to the invitation issued by Her Majesty's Government to all maritime nations by sending the *Sverdlov* to Spithead for the Coronation Review. Thereafter the possibility of an exchange of naval visits between Britain and the U.S.S.R. appeared on the agenda of both the Admiralty and the Soviet Naval Command. Informal approaches which indicated that such an exchange would be welcome on both sides culminated in an agreement to this end between Sir Anthony Eden and Mr. Bulganin at Geneva in July, 1955. And about a fortnight later, the British Naval Attaché, Moscow, was instructed to propose to the Soviet Naval Command that the C.-in-C., Home Fleet, should visit Leningrad with a sizeable squadron in the middle of October. The Soviet Naval Command countered with a proposal that the C.-in-C. of the Soviet Baltic Fleet should simultaneously take a squadron to a British port, so that a little time necessarily elapsed before it was settled that the C.-in-C., Home Fleet, should take the *Triumph*, *Apollo*, *Diana*, *Decoy*, *Chevron*, and *Chieftain* to Leningrad, whilst the C.-in-C., Baltic Fleet, would take two *Sverdlovs* and four *Skory* class destroyers to Portsmouth.

### OUR SHIPS ARRIVE

On the morning of 12th October, the B.N.A., Moscow, and his two assistants boarded the Soviet destroyer *Odyaronny* and proceeded to rendezvous with the visiting squadron to seaward of the Leningrad light vessel. Here, at 1400, the *Triumph* loomed ahead out of the afternoon mist of a calm Autumn day. The captain of the *Odyaronny* was quick to realize that the British ships were approaching in two columns and to act accordingly. Increasing to 25 knots, with his ship's company fallen in and a band playing, with a signal of welcome flying at his masthead and his guns firing a 17-gun salute to the C.-in-C., he steamed between the two columns, put his wheel hard over, and as the British ships stopped engines, stopped his own in a position astern of the *Triumph*. As an impromptu manoeuvre it was well executed and provided a stirring sight. Three small patrol boats were then used to transfer attachés, press—Russian and British—liaison officers, pilots, and signalmen to the various British ships. After which the *Triumph*, flying the flag of the C.-in-C., H.F., proceeded in the wake of the *Odyaronny* towards Leningrad while the remaining vessels anchored.

Having fired the national salute,\* which was returned by a battery on Kotlin Island, the *Triumph* steamed close past the breakwaters of Kronstadt harbour, one of the Soviet Navy's principal bases. Here was a foretaste of the welcome awaiting the British ships, some 20,000 men fallen in ashore and afloat whilst the *Triumph* saluted the flag of the Admiral Commanding Kronstadt-Leningrad area. Some 10 miles further on the *Triumph* entered the narrow Morskoy canal, in due time to turn 80 degrees to port into Leningrad's commercial harbour. This leads into the principal mouth of the Neva where, with the aid of tugs, the *Triumph* was just able to make the tricky turn into the river against a two-three knot current, probably the largest ship ever to do so. Passing the shipyards, the most important in all the

U.S.S.R., as dusk was falling, the *Triumph* reached her buoys just below the Schmidt bridge at 1900, to see both the bridge and the embankments each side black with the largest crowd that can ever have greeted a visiting British man-of-war in any port in the world.

That evening the other British ships in turn weighed, steamed into the Neva, and during the middle watch passed through the Schmidt bridge to their respective buoys. The whole squadron was thus anchored in the heart of the city—as if in London they had been berthed off the Festival Hall—where all the wonderful buildings of Peter the Great's capital, and of the Tsars who followed after him, make it one of the most beautiful cities in the world. And only then did the vast crowds on the embankments disperse; thinned would be a better description since they seldom did more during the visit.

#### IN LENINGRAD

The only other ships berthed with ours in the Neva for the occasion were the *Odyaronny* and three other Soviet destroyers to play the role of host ships. The visit was supposed to last from 13th to 16th October inclusive, the ships sailing in the early hours of the 17th, the *Apollo* only—to which at sunset on the 16th the C.-in-C., H.F., was to transfer his flag—remaining until the early hours of the 18th, four all too short days or, for the C.-in-C., H.F., and the *Apollo*, five. One writes all too short because there was so much for everyone to do.

The C.-in-C., H.F., personally, bore the brunt of the programme. Official calls had first to be exchanged with H.B.M. Ambassador, the Admiral Commanding Kronstadt-Leningrad area, the Garrison Commander, and the Mayor, all with proper protocol and, on the Soviet side, in the glare of cinema arc lights. Receptions and dinners followed, given by the Soviet Admiral, by the Mayor, and, in return, by the C.-in-C., H.F., on board the *Triumph*. It is impossible to mention or describe them all; a few memories must suffice: the civilized way in which all the Soviet parties were conducted and the welcome absence of the vodka treatment; the wonderful rooms in which the parties were given; the spontaneous way in which the audience at a performance of *Swan Lake* rose and applauded the C.-in-C., H.F.; and the gratification with which two felicitous touches at the parties in the *Triumph* were received, the British and Soviet naval ensigns emblematically sewn together to form the principal decoration, and the silver centrepiece for the table which had been presented to a former *Triumph* near the beginning of the century by the citizens of St. Petersburg.

Officers, cadets, and ships' companies were as well entertained. There were parties given ashore by the Soviet authorities, amongst which the concerts by the Baltic Fleet Song and Dance Ensemble ranked high, and others aboard the host ships. There were conducted tours of Leningrad and its museums and art galleries, notably the Winter Palace of Rastrelli and the adjacent Hermitage, which house a collection of international art without rival except in the National Gallery and the Louvre. And there were visits to the ballet, rightly described by many a British guest as 'out of this world,' the circus, and the cinema.

The extent to which everyone was occupied by the official programme should not be taken to imply that any difficulties were placed in the way of officers and men going ashore on their own: the reverse was the case. They were virtually mobbed by the eager, curious, friendly crowd as anxious to obtain photographs and souvenirs.

notably anything bearing the Queen's head such as a penny or a uniform button, as they were to be hospitable and helpful. Russian teachers and students of English were sufficiently plentiful to surmount the language barrier. This led, not to a profusion of Communist propaganda (which was, in fact, distinguished by its absence throughout the visit), but to a plethora of questions about England. The British sailor had little difficulty in replying that *contra* the generally held Soviet impression, XXth Century England is different from that portrayed by Dickens; but he was rather out of his depth, to say the least, when asked to give his views, not only on this author's works, but those of such writers as Byron, Galsworthy, Wilde, and Shaw.

Other occasions which must be mentioned, were the exchange of visits between the cadets of H.M.S. *Triumph* and those of the Frunze Naval School (the Soviet 'Dartmouth'), the party for 400 Soviet children on board the *Triumph* when the C.-in-C. was presented with a large doll dressed in national costume by a wholly self-possessed, five-year-old Russian girl with greetings expressed in impeccable English, and the football match in the vast Kirov stadium where the British team, as expected, lost to a Soviet naval team by four goals to nil, a defeat which was quickly effaced by the subsequent ceremony of Beating Retreat by the Royal Marine band, whose marching and counter-marching were greeted with enthusiastic applause by some 30,000 spectators.

Amidst all this only one item went astray. The number of visitors when the ships were open to the public was regrettably small. Aware of the intense interest which would be shown by the people of Leningrad in the visiting ships, the Soviet authorities had decided that it would be impracticable to control them, especially when boat transport was involved, if this was made a free-for-all. In adopting the alternative of issuing passes to selected citizens they were much too conservative.

Each night the beauty of the Neva scene was enhanced by the floodlighting of the British ships. The Soviet host ships added their own outline illuminations. But for some never explained reason, the Soviet authorities refused permission for a firework display.

Last but not least, the C.-in-C., H.F., and 30 officers were invited to visit Moscow travelling down one night in the luxury of the Red Arrow, and back 24 hours later. A full programme included a visit to the architectural and artistic splendours of the Kremlin, an admirable lunch by the acting C.-in-C. of the Soviet Navy, a cocktail party at the British Embassy, and a performance at the Bolshoi. One day later 30 ratings responded to a similar invitation of which the high light was the Moscow cup-final.

On the night of the 15th the enemy of all seamen, the weather, which in the form of fog had somewhat delayed the arrival of the Soviet squadron for its simultaneous visit to Portsmouth, transferred its attention to Leningrad. Around 1900 a westerly gale funnelled up the Gulf of Finland into the Neva and, acting against its current, quickly raised the level of the river by more than six feet. The streets of the city were flooded to an extent not known since 1924. More important, the *Triumph* dragged her stern mooring buoy. Swinging in against the Schmidt embankment, the carrier was fortunately cushioned against damage by wooden landing stages; and, after a period of some anxiety—for it was always possible that the level of the river might drop as quickly as it had risen, leaving the carrier's stern on the mud—tugs succeeded in pulling the *Triumph* back into position and securing her to a freshly laid buoy



Meanwhile, the other British ships were having a somewhat anxious time with the moorings of their buoys. Fortunately the wind, and consequently the river, went down during the middle watch without further incident.

#### DEPARTURE

To avoid interfering with the traffic of Leningrad, the bridges over the Neva are only opened during the night. It had therefore been arranged that the *Darings* and the destroyers should slip from their buoys during the middle watch and proceed down river and to sea. They were to be followed by the *Triumph* in the early hours of the 16th, but the weather intervened. On the evening of the 15th the S.N.O., Leningrad, informed the C.-in-C., H.F., that the meteorologists predicted a recurrence of gale and flood conditions in the Neva. It would consequently be impracticable for our ships to sail that night as arranged.

The expected westerly gale did indeed materialize during the middle watch. Once more the river rose in flood and all ships watched their buoys with no little anxiety, the *Triumph* again having trouble with her stern buoy. The morning of the 17th brought word from the S.N.O., Leningrad, that the British ships should sail as soon as the weather moderated. At 1000, for the first time for many years, the Schmidt bridge was opened during the day—and kept open for some five hours to the considerable disorganization of Leningrad's buses and trams. Between 1100 and 1500 the *Darings* and the destroyers sailed, followed by the *Triumph*. And, lastly, to avoid having to open the Schmidt bridge again that night, the *Apollo* was moved below the Schmidt bridge to the buoys vacated by the *Triumph*.

The S.N.O., Leningrad, had meanwhile warned the C.-in-C. that, following a gale in the Gulf of Finland, floating mines were to be expected; adding that a good look-out for them was essential, he recommended a daylight passage. The C.-in-C., H.F., therefore ordered the *Triumph* and her consorts to anchor for the night to the west of Kronstadt where, in the prevailing sea, they experienced some difficulty in disembarking their liaison officers and pilots. They finally sailed for the U.K. at 0800 on 18th in the wake of a squadron of Soviet minesweepers. At the same time the *Apollo*, now wearing the flag of the C.-in-C., H.F., slipped from her buoys in the Neva, to be escorted to seaward of Kronstadt by the *Odyaronny*, whence she sailed for Helsinki. Thus, with an appropriate exchange of signals between the C.-in-C., H.F., and the Admiral Commanding Kronstadt-Leningrad area, the visit came to an end.

There is no question but that it was a success. For some 2,000 British officers and men it was a unique experience. It was an astonishing display of goodwill on the part of the Soviet authorities and the people of Leningrad. One, therefore, hopes that it will not be long before ships of the Royal Navy, in their traditional role of ambassadors of Britain, again visit a Soviet port.

Here, in conclusion, are the views of one British rating, typical of the great majority:

"We liked our visit; we enjoyed the receptions. . . . We, in fact, had a wonderful time and we revelled in the respect and kindness shown to us. But we are glad to be back in dear old England."

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## THE CAMPAIGN IN SICILY, 1943

By "J. K."

THE campaign in Sicily in 1943 lasted little more than five weeks, and was soon to be overshadowed by much greater events elsewhere. Nevertheless, it is a campaign that is full of interest and which was to provide lessons that were immensely useful in subsequent operations during the war and which should not be forgotten now—particularly since the official history is not yet available to remind one of them.

It was in November, 1942, that British and American forces, operating for the first time under one Supreme Allied Commander, landed in North Africa. The British Eighth Army, a thousand miles away, had just fought and won the Battle of Alamein and were driving all before them. These two great Allied forces, the one in the desert and the other in North Africa, were soon to link up and to throw the Germans and Italians out of Africa altogether. The Allies were on the move and in a big way.

This was the background against which Sir Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt were to meet in January, 1943, for the Casablanca Conference. Things were going well. Troops and shipping would become free once we had cleared the enemy out of Africa and he must be allowed no let-up. What should be done next? It was too early yet to be able to muster forces formidable enough to be able to establish the 'Second Front' in France. The next move must be in the Mediterranean. Sardinia and Corsica had their advocates. Sicily was selected.

The purposes of the operation were laid down as :

- (a) to make our lines of communication in the Mediterranean secure ;
- (b) to divert as much German strength as possible from the Russian front during the critical Summer period ; and
- (c) to intensify pressure on Italy, and establish a base whence further operations could be directed against the Italian mainland.

General Eisenhower was again to be in supreme command and his deputy, General Alexander, as Commander, 15th Army Group, was to be in control of the operation as a whole with Admiral Cunningham and Air Marshal Tedder as the naval and air commanders. The American Seventh Army under General Patton and the British Eighth Army under General Montgomery, as he then was, were to carry out the assault. At this time, however, these commanders were all very busily occupied with their current battles in various parts of Africa, and so a special headquarters, known as Force 141, was set up to get on with the planning in the meanwhile.

### THE PLAN

The island of Sicily is a triangle with its two longer sides some 160 miles from east to west and its base in the east of about 120 miles. It is at its nearest points some 60 miles from Malta, 160 from Tunis, and about 1,000 miles from Port Said. It is dominated by Mount Etna in the north-east corner which rises to a height of over 10,000 feet. In some places there is a narrow coastal plain, but for the most part the island is rough and rugged with indifferent communications with roads that twist and turn and, near Etna, often have high walls of lava into the bargain. Movement off these roads, or deployment from them, was often going to prove a most difficult affair.

The forces available for the operation and the areas from which they would embark were :—

*British Eighth Army*

- Two infantry divisions from the eastern Mediterranean.
- One infantry division and one brigade from North Africa.
- One Canadian infantry division from the U.K.
- One airborne division from North Africa.

*American Seventh Army*

- One infantry division from the U.S.A. (via Oran).
  - Two infantry divisions
  - One armoured division
  - One airborne division
- } All from North Africa.

These were all that could be lifted in the first assault ; indeed, the airlift available was only sufficient to lift a part of each of the British and American airborne formations in the first instance. Each army was also allotted at least one infantry division as a reserve in North Africa which could be brought over later when needed.

The enemy garrison of Sicily at the time was :—

*Italian*

Four field divisions.

Five coastal divisions. (There were also two coastal regiments which may account for the figure of six of these divisions given in some accounts.)

*German*

One armoured division.

One panzer grenadier division. (A further panzer grenadier division and part of a division of paratroops were brought across the Straits of Messina while the fighting was in progress.)

The Italian coastal divisions were known to be widely spread out, each over 80 miles or so of coast. Their military value was rightly considered to be low. The field divisions were less easy to assess. Some divisions of this kind had fought in North Africa with determination, and those in Sicily might do the same. Their military value could certainly not be discounted. The German divisions would obviously be first-class.

As will be seen, the Allied forces had to be brought to their final rendezvous from widely separated areas extending from the U.S.A. and the U.K. to Port Said and Haifa. This great dispersion would obviously entail a great many problems in planning, in briefing, in timing, in the provision of shipping and escorts, and in the concentration and marshalling of the forces for the assault. However, there was at least one consolation in that this dispersion materially assisted the cover plan, which was designed to keep the enemy's forces dispersed and to make them apprehensive of landings in the wrong places and at the wrong moment. "The Man Who Never Was" played his part in it. A complicated and very thorough cover plan of this sort was highly necessary, not only to achieve surprise at the chosen points of landing but also to discourage the enemy reinforcement of Sicily ; to mislead such air reconnaissance as the enemy might be able to send out ; and to confuse and mislead the Italian fleet which, whatever its previous experiences, might still put to sea when its homeland was threatened.

In the plans for the assault the areas deemed essential for early capture were ports, for at this stage there had been little experience of maintenance over beaches,


and airfields, which would be essential if early air superiority were to be gained and rapid air support to be available. Based on these requirements the original plan of Force 141 envisaged British landings in the south-east and American landings in the north-west of the island. The resulting inability to provide mutual support if, as must surely be catered for, the enemy resistance was vigorous and immediate was unacceptable, particularly to Montgomery, and a revised plan was made which brought the two landings together. The Eighth Army was to land on a front of 60 miles from just south of Syracuse to the south-east corner of the island and was to drive forward with all speed to capture the ports of Syracuse, Augusta, and Catania and the airfields in the Catanian plain. The Seventh U.S. Army was to land immediately west of this in the Gulf of Gela, to capture the airfields nearby and the small port of Licata, and to protect the left flank of the Eighth Army's advance. Airborne forces were to land near Syracuse and near Gela. 'D' Day was to be the early morning of 10th July, 1943.

Preliminary operations included the capture in mid-June of the Italian islands in the Sicilian Narrows including Pantelleria and Lampedusa, both so as to clear the Narrows and also to provide additional airfields, since the only airfields close enough to provide fighter cover were in Malta and these were inadequate for the air forces required and available. Intense air attack on targets which included Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia began on 3rd July and further and wider strategical bombing was carried out in support of the cover plan.

#### THE ASSAULT

The first rendezvous for the convoys approaching from so many directions was near Malta. It was remarkable that there were practically no signs of their having been identified by enemy air reconnaissance. Certainly no dangerous bombing attacks were made. As the ships converged, the Canadians, who had embarked in the U.K., had already been at sea for 16 days while other units had begun embarking in the eastern Mediterranean on D-7. It is not easy to keep troops fit for battle in these conditions. To add to the general difficulties a considerable gale sprang up on the afternoon of 9th July which called for grave decisions from the High Command. Would it be possible to lower landing craft for the assault into such a sea? Would landings on the beaches be possible? Would there be fatal delays? Could a change be made so late in the proceedings? The decision made was to go right ahead. By good fortune the gale subsided in the evening though the swell remained and, in consequence, many of the troops were to be pretty seasick before they reached the shore. Thanks to the gale, however, while something between 2,000 and 3,000 craft were manoeuvring into position at sea on a dark and rough night, the enemy coastal units were resting peacefully in the belief that the weather was too bad, on that night at least, for anything unpleasant to occur.

By first light on 10th July the Allied landings were going ahead more or less according to plan. The XIIIth Corps of the 5th and 50th Divisions south of Syracuse and the XXXth Corps of the 231st Brigade, 51st Division, and 1st Canadian Division at the south-east corner of the island were overrunning the narrow coastal plain and pushing on to the higher ground so as to establish their bridgeheads prior to wheeling northwards and starting their drive up the coast. Farther west, the U.S. 45th and 1st Infantry Divisions, 2nd Armoured, and 3rd Infantry Divisions were likewise ashore. The airborne parties, aimed to drop a few hours earlier near Syracuse and Gela, had come in, but their navigation had been faulty, troops were too widely dispersed, and many of the British gliders had fallen into the sea. The seaborne





landings, though not all of these were wholly accurate, had gone well. Good surprise had been achieved and the enemy's resistance had been halting and unco-ordinated.

So far the Allied casualties had been small. Syracuse was occupied within 48 hours and Augusta fell on 12th July. Few German troops had yet appeared on the British front though a heavy armoured attack had been made on the American front which looked serious at first, but was brought to a halt after the Germans had lost 43 valuable tanks. Soon afterwards resistance on the British front began to stiffen rapidly as our advance pressed forward. A major attack by the 50th Division was planned for the night 13th/14th July in furtherance of the plan to break through to Catania as rapidly as possible. An airborne drop was to capture the Primasole bridge over the River Simeto and a commando landing was aimed at a second bridge south of it. The airborne landing was once again far too widely dispersed. Nevertheless, both bridges were captured intact and the demolition charges removed. The advance to join up by land, however, encountered increasing opposition, particularly south of Lentini where German reinforcements fought fiercely, but the few British airborne troops that were there held on grimly at Primasole and the eventual link-up took place on the 15th. This was possibly the most fiercely contested area in the whole course of the campaign.

The Germans on the whole front were fighting in battle groups rather than as divisions. They clearly intended to hold Catania at all costs while opposing the Allied advances farther west; and they succeeded. Resistance on the coast had so stiffened and our attacks were becoming so costly that, by 18th July, the 50th Division on the eastern seaboard was ordered on to the defensive while the main British thrust passed firstly to the 5th Division on their left and later to the XXXth Corps who were now pushing northwards to the west of Etna. Farther west the Seventh U.S. Army was pressing on well. Allied air superiority was becoming complete.

By 21st July the first phase of the land battle, the drive on Catania, had come to an end. From 22nd to 30th July the scene shifted to the second phase, the conquest of western Sicily. New orders from 15th Army Group required the Seventh Army to cut the island in two and to mop up the western half. On 22nd July Palermo was entered. On 23rd July the U.S. forces were ordered to transfer their areas of supply to that port, to thrust eastwards against the enemy's northern flank, and to maintain this pressure continuously. On 25th July Mussolini resigned. On the same day the British 78th Division, which had been ordered forward from North Africa by the Commander, Eighth Army, on 21st July, began landing on the beaches in the south. It was ordered to move forward to join the XXXth Corps on the left of the Eighth Army front.

Active fighting continued as the Americans pushed forward and the Eighth Army increased their pressure west of Etna. By 30th July the stage was set for the third main phase, the forcing of the enemy's last fully prepared position known as the Etna line which ran from Catania, south and then west of Etna, and thence northwards to the coast. The enemy were now being pressed everywhere. The 78th Division was in Centuripe by 3rd August, Catania fell on the 5th, and Adrano on the 7th. U.S. forces reached Cap Orlando on the 10th, and the fall of Randazzo on the 13th heralded the final disruption of the Etna line. The Germans had already started evacuating their own troops to the mainland, without worrying much about their Italian allies, and from 14th August onwards the speed of the Allied advance was largely dictated by their ability to deal with craters, obstructions, and demolitions in this difficult and rugged country. Messina was finally entered by the Americans late on the 16th August with the British coming from the south very close behind.

While all this was going on, progress had been such that by 6th August it had already been possible to withdraw from the battle those formations that were to prepare to carry the assault on into the mainland of Italy, for which the date of 1st September had already been selected.

The campaign in Sicily had lasted 38 days. Victory had been won after much skilful fighting under conditions which were often new and almost always difficult. In the latter phases the enemy's conduct of operations too had been skilful. Their evacuation now known to have been first ordered, so far as subordinate commanders were concerned, on 27th July—two days after Mussolini's fall—was started on 10th August and was maintained according to a time-table that the Allies were unable to upset. The last Germans left Messina at 0600 hours on 17th August.

The Allied losses in killed, wounded, and missing were of the order of 12,000 British and 7,500 Americans. The enemy losses, including prisoners, amounted to some 32,000 Germans and over 130,000 Italians together with large quantities of arms and material. A campaign of great significance was over. The main Mediterranean sea communications were once more open. The British and Americans were back on the soil of Europe. Mussolini had fallen. The Italian nation was on its way out of the war. In addition to all this the first scene for the opening of the second front had been played. The tide had turned and was beginning to flow. A new and complicated form of operation involving beach landings and beach maintenance had been undertaken and had been thoroughly successful. Lessons had been learned that were to remain of value for the rest of the war.

#### COMMENTS ON THE CAMPAIGN

Surprise is always difficult to achieve, and is particularly so when large forces have to be transported by sea to a new area of operations and very probably in the presence of enemy air reconnaissance. To conceal the assault on Sicily a very careful and detailed cover plan was worked out. Such a plan does not only require the passive provision of false reports and the seeds for wrong deductions but also needs active measures to support it. To this end strategical air activity including widespread bombing was extended over a wide front, and the variety of directions from which the attacking forces had to come was used to lend colour to the plan. Often, however, some preliminary action may be required for the benefit of the real operation which may prejudice surprise, and the decision has to be taken whether it can be carried out or not. A case in point occurred in the seizure of the island of Pantelleria. Sir Winston Churchill has written that, "there was no reason to suppose that this attack would prejudice surprise since the operation was also a necessary step in clearing the Sicilian Narrows."<sup>1</sup> Kesselring, on the other hand, writes that, "with the seizure of the islands of Lampedusa and Pantelleria (11th-12th June) our last doubts as to the objective of the invasion were removed."<sup>2</sup> This sort of risk has to be carefully considered and nicely balanced. Certainly while we as a maritime nation put great weight on the freedom of sea communications, Kesselring, as a German, was likely to examine any movement in the first place in terms of land attack. Surprise in war will only be fully gained if the enemy's outlook and mentality are so studied and known that his likely reaction to any particular event can be accurately assessed, even though our own reactions in a similar set of circumstances might be quite different.

<sup>1</sup> *The Second World War*, IV, p. 731.

<sup>2</sup> *Memoirs of F.M. Kesselring*, p. 162.

Kesselring is also critical of the Allies after the fall of Tunis for their failure to transfer the battle to the mainland of Europe "after the shortest possible breather." In fact, two months elapsed. It is true that the Germans themselves had little practical experience of the problems that we had to face in mounting a seaborne assault on a hostile territory which possessed prepared defences and active defending forces to support them, though their own difficulties over Operation "Sea-Lion" in 1940 should have taught them a good deal. For the assault on Sicily there were indeed a great many problems to be overcome. Higher commanders could not get down to a full and detailed examination of plans until the battle of Tunis was virtually over. Even then senior commanders of the three Services had their headquarters in widely separated places. Formations for the assault and the craft to carry them had to be brought over great distances from a variety of directions and then concentrated at the right place and time. The latter itself depended to a considerable extent on the outcome of the Tunis battle. Training was needed in the art of assault landings. No seaborne operation comparable in size and on to enemy-held territory over open beaches had ever been attempted before. French North Africa eight months earlier was quite a different proposition. Most detailed planning, co-ordination, and timing were essential. Experiments would have to be made and lessons would no doubt have to be learned. In the event, however, most of the lessons that were learned were to be invaluable in "Overlord" in 1944 and in lesser seaborne assaults meanwhile.

In spite of the validity of these arguments, however, Kesselring's criticism cannot be lightly brushed aside. Could the landing craft in fact have been available earlier in any case? Was the planning too thorough and detailed when it is borne in mind that the Germans were being thrown, lock, stock, and barrel, out of Africa and their ally was rapidly tottering to a fall? Could training for the assault not have been completed in a shorter time? Is there not at least one lesson regarding planning and personalities? A planning staff, Force 141, was set up in January to start planning the operation. The Eighth Army was to take part in the assault and higher authority must have been well aware that its commander would have strong personal views on how it should be carried out. Yet it would appear that no adequate steps were taken to ensure that Force 141 was kept in sufficiently close touch with General Montgomery, for it was not until 23rd April—three months after planning had started—that he appears to have been able to examine the plan in detail and come to the conclusion that it was unsound.

While the marshalling of the big ships went reasonably well, indifferent weather, strong Mediterranean currents, inadequate briefing, and insufficient training in the handling of small craft led to a number of the assault craft coming in to unexpected beaches; disappointing enough at the time, but with no serious results in the long run. The handling of the airborne forces was more serious. In the initial fly-in both British and American units were widely scattered and something like 50 per cent. of the British gliders fell into the sea, with the loss of life thereby entailed. This would seem to have been due to inadequate training of Allied pilots aggravated by bad weather and in a few cases influenced by our own A.A. fire. Even so these airborne operations, unnecessarily weakened as they were, remained of great assistance to British and American forces alike on the ground.

Fire support was provided at the landings and later along the coast by ships of the Royal Navy. A new feature was the provision of F.O.O.s on land to observe the fire from the ships at sea. The beach landings themselves and the complicated organization of subsequent maintenance over the beaches were everywhere most

successful. Beach bricks and beach groups were used for the first time. The lessons learned were of much value later and remain of value now, in this nuclear age, when the continued maintenance of forces overseas through well-defined ports must become increasingly problematical and precarious; at least until freight transport by air in quantity and without large airfields has become much more highly developed.

Once our advance had passed beyond the bridgeheads the fighting was to take place over most difficult country. This early showed the importance of seizing and holding road centres, bridges, and defiles. A contaminated area in the future will, for a vital period, canalize movement just as effectively as a volcano did in Sicily. The successive changes in the Allied plans once the enemy, in this difficult country, blocked the drive on Catania are worthy of note. By 15th July it was clear that the enemy intended to hold Catania at all costs. The axis of our attack was quickly extended westwards, first of all within the XIIIth Corps and then within the Eighth Army. By 21st July the Americans farther west were moving in a great left hook preparatory to driving on Messina round the north flank of Mount Etna. Both the Americans and the British used small amphibious landings to help in keeping their coastwise advances on the move. None of them was spectacular and some were more accurate and efficient than others, but they all helped to maintain the momentum, particularly in the later phases when the speed of the Allied columns on land was so often determined by their ability to deal with craters and demolitions.

Air support was excellent and the Allies established a high degree of air superiority at an early stage. To this end much was contributed by the speed with which captured airfields were made serviceable. In Sicily this was of particular importance because of the limited number of airfields within fighter aircraft range of the battle which existed elsewhere. Moreover, the knowledge that air forces are on the spot is always good for morale even though the movement of their constructional equipment and supplies through ports, over beaches, and along already congested roads may add considerably to the overall maintenance problem.

The selection of targets and the bombing of towns and defiles through which one's own forces must pass later is always a controversial problem and may become more so in the nuclear age. Sicily was by no means the only place where the bombing of towns while occupied by the enemy was to prove an embarrassment to our own advance later, on account of the damage and confusion caused.

#### THE ENEMY

If Kesselring really did have his doubts as to the place of assault removed by the attack on Pantelleria, it is remarkable that he did not organize a more efficient air search to discover what was going on in order to be able to take steps to meet the blow with speed and vigour when it fell. It is true that we had produced a cover plan designed to mislead him but, even after our landings had begun, the enemy seemed surprisingly slow in appreciating what was afoot and in reacting to what had occurred. Certainly the Germans had not yet learned the lesson that was to be rubbed into them in Italy later, that the first 24 hours is vital if there is to be any chance of throwing a hostile landing back into the sea.

Once the enemy had steadied themselves and been thrown back on the defensive with no other choice but to save what they could from the wreck, they handled the situation well. They quickly strengthened the places whose retention was vital to their plan. Defensive lines and points of resistance were organized in depth and

with speed. Once they had made a plan for the withdrawal at least of the German troops, they set a time-table for their withdrawal and nothing that the Allies were able to do materially altered it.

In Sicily the Germans fought mainly in battle groups which were formed or re-formed with speed and usually handled with skill. During the war the Germans were usually more flexible in this respect than we were. They extricated themselves from tricky situations in Sicily, Salerno, and elsewhere by this form of improvisation. Nevertheless, as we had found earlier in the desert, it is basically unsound to break up the normal organization in which troops have been trained—unless of course the basic organization has been shown to be thoroughly wrong.

In this connection it is of interest that the new division in the British Army is to be capable of being split into self-contained groups not wholly unlike the German battle groups. There is, however, at least one very important point of difference. The Germans fought in battle groups because they had been caught at a disadvantage and had to improvise quickly if they were to recover their balance. We, on the other hand, believing that nuclear war will call for the ability to decentralize widely while still being able to concentrate rapidly when required, are making the necessary arrangements now so that, if we ever have to fight a nuclear war, our commanders will be handling something that they are accustomed to handle and the soldier fighting in a type of organization in which he has been trained in peace.

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## ICELAND : KEY TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC

By MAJOR-GENERAL H. L. DAVIES, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.

**A**T the beginning of 1940, Britain stood foursquare behind her sea ramparts. Her vital sea routes were covered on the south by her French and Belgian Allies and on the north and east by friendly neutrals in the shape of Iceland, Norway, and Denmark. The usual hazards caused by submarines and surface raiders, operating from distant bases in Germany, threatened her convoys converging on the English Channel and the north-west approaches, but the threat, though vexatious and unpleasant, was not vital.

Within five short months the strategic situation had completely altered to our extreme disadvantage. The southern shores of the English Channel were in enemy hands. Shore-based aircraft and submarines operating from the French ports had to all intents and purposes closed the southern approaches. The German occupation of Norway and Denmark had advanced the position of enemy naval bases by hundreds of miles. Only one thing was needed to complete the Nazi aim of effectively blocking our north-west approaches. This was the occupation of Iceland. With Iceland in their grasp Germany could develop aerodromes, seaplane and submarine bases, and naval anchorages athwart our convoy routes leading to our north-western ports. Is it too much to say that, at this moment in time, May, 1940, the ultimate decision in the 1939-45 War hung in the balance?

The vital nature of the threat had not escaped the notice of the combined staffs and immediate steps were taken. A small force of Royal Marines first landed in Reykjavik, the capital city and port of Iceland, in May, 1940. They were followed almost immediately by a force from Canada comprising an infantry brigade and termed 'Z' Force. These troops were again reinforced in early June by an infantry brigade from the 49th (Yorkshire) Division, which had just returned from the fighting in Norway. Initially, the only area occupied was Reykjavik itself, but in late June the rest of the 49th Division arrived, less one brigade sent to Northern Ireland, and steps were taken to complete the occupation of the whole island.

The decision to occupy Iceland was taken at a time when vast events were convulsing the world. It is probable that very few people even realized that the decision had been taken, or what it implied. But the historian may well point to this event as one of the vital decisions of the war, for it is certain that without it Britain could never have emerged successful from the struggle. Had the enemy reached Iceland first we were in no position to throw him out. At that time we had none of the resources necessary to conduct an overseas opposed landing operation. Alternatively, once we had gained a footing, any attempt by the enemy to invade the island must have been a highly speculative and exceedingly dangerous task, for Britain still possessed command of the sea with all that that entailed.

In the terrible event of a third world war, the western nations would do well to remember the lesson of Iceland in 1940. It is probable that, despite the implications of the H-bomb, the same general principles must continue to apply, including the vital need for free movement of sea traffic into the British ports from across the Atlantic. If these islands are to survive, the ships and convoys must continue to come in and the north-west approaches are not likely to decrease in importance. This Country, therefore, has a particular interest in the security of Iceland, and it is worth recapitulating some of the experiences of the 49th Division during those

hazardous years of 1940-41, when this formation denied to Nazi Germany the key to the north-west approaches.

Nobody knew very much about Iceland in those days. Certainly the War Office did not, for the only maps they were able to produce for the use of the division when it sailed from Glasgow at the end of June, 1940, were black and white outline maps, on a very small scale, showing a great black line running straight through the centre of the island which might have been taken as either a first class highway or a railway. In fact, as we discovered when we got there, the only road that existed was a very narrow shingle track which ran round the coast and connected up Reykjavik with Akureyri in the north and Seydisfjörður in the east. There was no road communication at all with the north-western area of the island, where the jagged and mountainous head of the seahorse, which Iceland resembles, juts out into the Denmark Strait. Nor was there any through road communication along the south and south-east coasts. These areas could only be reached by sea.



The whole centre of the island is a mass of mountains, lava deserts, and icefields. The greatest icefield of all, the Vatnajökull, covers an area of some four thousand square miles in the south-east part of the island. Through the ice, hundreds of feet thick, jut the peaks of innumerable volcanoes, dormant but still very much alive, and this region presents an indescribable picture of primeval chaos.

The volcanic forces which gave birth to Iceland in the comparatively recent past, speaking geologically, still rage beneath the surface and have their outlet in strange

geysers, boiling springs, and mud volcanoes as well as in the great active volcano of Mount Hekla which exploded into fresh activity only a few years ago. In Winter the entire centre of the island is an enormous mass of solid snow and ice and all the habitable areas of the country crouch along the narrow rim of coastal plain which separates the sea from the mountains. On the shores of the deeply indented fiords lie the fishing villages, places like Akureyri in the north, Seydisfjörður in the east, and Vik in the south. Apart from these villages and Reykjavik the capital, with its population of 30,000, there are only isolated farms and small hamlets, containing a few hundred inhabitants, cut off by snow for many months of the year.

The first task which confronted the 49th Division and the Canadian brigade which had preceded it, apart from positioning itself to resist any attempted invasion, was to accommodate itself for the forthcoming Winter. Billets were quite out of the question. There was scarcely room for the local population of 130,000 without the sudden addition of 20,000 British troops. Tents were all right for the brief Summer, but quite useless for the Winter with temperatures below zero and gales which might attain velocities of 100 miles per hour.

The entire force had to be placed under reasonable cover within three months, and every single item needed for this accommodation had to be sent out from the United Kingdom. It was decided to house the force in Nissen huts but, to withstand the gales, these huts had to be given cement foundations and walls. Fortunately, cement could be made on the spot, given an adequate number of mixers, but everything else was imported.

Before work could start on this very considerable project the final distribution of the garrison had to be settled. The vital area centred round Reykjavik itself. Here was the main centre of habitation, the one reasonably equipped port, the base area, and the potential aerodromes and seaplane bases. But one could not afford to leave the north and east portions of the island without protection. Akureyri was a considerable place in a sheltered and important bay which might well offer a suitable landing place to any potential invading force. Seydisfjörður was rather similar and faced directly on to the coast of Norway where 10 divisions of German troops were practising invasion exercises only a few hundred miles away.

Thus it was decided to establish three self-contained fortress areas. The bulk of the division occupied the Reykjavik area in which was sited also the force mobile reserve comprising initially the Canadian brigade, completely motorized. One brigade less one battalion was allotted to the Akureyri fortress area, and the third battalion of this brigade established itself at Seydisfjörður.

Defences were based on pill-boxes and trench systems covering the potential landing places. With immense effort a number of somewhat antiquated coast defence batteries were set up, and exercises were held to practise the movement of the motorized force reserve along the exiguous communications between the fortress areas.

A matter of immediate priority was the selection and preparation of an aerodrome capable of taking a squadron of single-engined Fairey Battle light bombers, which were the only aircraft that could be spared from the Battle of Britain. The only area flat enough to warrant development without a major levelling project was in a swamp south-east of Reykjavik at a spot named Kaldadarnes. It was a miserable place, the haunt of wildfowl and sheep, but there was a ruined and broken-down farmhouse in the vicinity which could be repaired to function as an operations room and mess. A 1,500-foot runway was built in this morass. It was fashioned from lava rock and peat and shelters were constructed, also of peat, to protect the aircraft from gales.

Into this travesty of an airfield there flew, one lovely day in August, 20 Fairey Battles, which settled down as best they could in the mud, protected only by bell tents and duckboards.

Meanwhile the search went on for bigger and better airfields and two sites were selected, one in Reykjavik itself and one on the Keflavik peninsula, a grim lava stretch which juts out as the claw of Iceland into the Atlantic, south-west of Reykjavik. But these airfields could not possibly be ready before late in 1941, and meanwhile the gallant aircrews of the Fairey Battle squadron operated their flimsy single-engined machines over the vast icefields of the interior and the ice-fringed waters of the Denmark Strait from the makeshift landing ground at Kaldadarnes. Faced with the greatest difficulties of maintenance and without any of the normal aids to flying, such as reliable weather forecasts, emergency landing grounds, etc., they carried out their lonely flights over hundreds of miles of sea and ice where any mishap meant complete and final disaster to the crews.

The home authorities were anxious to maintain a permanent watch over the dozens of sheltered fiords which indented the Icelandic coastline. So the 49th Division established a coast-watching service. Small detachments of six or seven men under a selected non-commissioned officer were taken, by sea in most cases, and billeted on any convenient fishing village in the various fiords. They took a month's reserve of rations and, by arrangement with the Icelandic Posts and Telegraphs, established telephonic communication with Force Headquarters's operations room at Reykjavik.

Iceland was justly proud of its telephone service. Every farm and hamlet had its telephone, often on a party system, and the service was marvellously efficient. By means of special code words it was possible to get in touch with any of these coast-watching posts in under five minutes. It was a queer experience for these boys from Yorkshire to find themselves parked at a moment's notice in a tiny Icelandic community. But it was remarkable how smoothly things worked out and how they assimilated themselves to the life of the community.

I think they enjoyed the experience and I think also the Icelanders with whom they lived enjoyed their company. Certainly when the time came for their relief, there were sincere regrets at parting, on both sides. In a few cases romances developed and quite a number of men who served with Iceland Force took back with them wives from that country. These coast-watching duties were eventually taken over by a special naval detachment sent out from the United Kingdom.

As the year 1940 wore on, the building project gradually reached completion and by the beginning of October everybody was under cover. This was only accomplished by drawing very largely on local labour. In many ways this was a good thing. It brought good money into the country and threw the local inhabitants and the troops together in a big job of work. As a result of these two factors the feeling between the Icelanders and the troops of occupation, which had been very frigid initially, improved greatly, to the benefit of all concerned.

The strategic situation was again changing. Immediate danger of the invasion of the United Kingdom had receded and the Battle of the Atlantic had taken its place as threat number one. The importance of Iceland in countering this threat was beginning to be realized. Great projects were in mind. Aerodromes and flying-boat bases were being constructed. An advanced fleet base in the Hvalfjörður was projected. Small combined operations in Arctic waters to eliminate Hitler's weather

stations in Greenland and Jan Mayen Island were being planned for the Spring. Iceland was earmarked as one of the stepping stones in the air reinforcement scheme from America. It was evident that it was no longer just a question of denying Iceland to the enemy. The island was being built up as a potent factor in the winning of the Battle of the Atlantic.

But in the meantime the occupation forces had to face the Winter and there is no doubt that the Winter of 1940-41 was hell for the troops. For four months or so the sun was completely invisible. A pale twilight lightened the sky between about 10 a.m. and 2 p.m., during which time everyone was chased out to take exercise. But for the most part, it was black night relieved only in clear weather by the shimmer and sizzle of the Northern Lights, which blazed in the skies like multi-coloured ribbons being shaken by some celestial hand. The cold was intense. The sea froze in the fiords and along the fringes of the coastline. The lakes were solid ice and motor transport movement along the snow-piled roads became hazardous in the extreme. Then there were the gales. It is difficult to imagine the ferocity of these winds. Men were picked up and tossed about like straws. Lorries were overturned. Anything not securely anchored was blown into the middle of next week.

It was essential to keep the men occupied during these winter months. Massive programmes of educational study, lectures, debates, amateur theatricals, and sing-songs were laid on by the units. And all through the Winter work was continued on the Reykjavik aerodrome and other projects. Elementary training in skating and skiing replaced the more normal sports of football and hockey, and, despite all the difficulties, the troops maintained their morale and spirits admirably. The force will always remember, with admiration and gratitude, the E.N.S.A. concert party, of both sexes, which braved the horrors of winter sea travel in these arctic waters and visited even the isolated camps in the north and east of the island. Every member of this party deserved a decoration.

Slowly the Winter passed. I was conscious of the return of the sun one morning in late February when I chanced to look up on my way from the mess to my office. High up in the frosty air three swans were flying. Their plumage was caught by the yet invisible sun, lurking somewhere beneath the horizon. They flamed blood red against the purple of the sky and they looked like rubies framed on a blue velvet setting. They were so beautiful that they caught at one's breath.

With the return of the sun came the news that American forces were coming to take over the occupation of Iceland. That was a memorable moment. Britain, alone for so long in her struggle with the man-eating tiger that was Hitler's Germany, was at last receiving the beginnings of the support that was her due. At least it implied success in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Perhaps the relief of that moment, with the promise of greater benefits to follow, should stir again in our memories when we plan for that horrid possibility of yet another world war, with all the grim potentialities of the H-bomb included. N.A.T.O. is nowadays a reality. Never again should an opportunity be permitted for some enemy, hostile to the western world, to seize Iceland, the key to the North Atlantic. That way lies the death by starvation of Britain and all that goes with it.

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## THE CAMPAIGN IN BURMA, 1943-45<sup>1</sup>

### PART I. THE TURN OF THE TIDE AND THE DECISIVE BATTLES

By BRIGADIER M. R. ROBERTS, D.S.O.

#### THE SITUATION AT THE END OF 1942

**T**HE early stages of the war in the east had followed a pattern unpleasantly familiar to us as a beginning to our major wars. Defeat, retreat, and a more or less 'last ditch' stand during which we took stock and put our affairs in order.

In the middle of 1942 we had reached the 'last ditch' stage and we were back on the India-Burma border, having been driven out of Hong Kong, Malaya, and Burma. Fortunately, as so often happens when the loser has fought his rearguard actions with spirit and courage, the winners were by this time in no state to press home their advantage, so there was a lull.

An attempt by us in the beginning of 1943 to improve our position almost ended in disaster. A campaign to drive the Japanese out of Arakan and so remove the air threat to the huge industrial area round Calcutta ended in making the situation worse rather than better; the first Chindit expedition achieved a measure of success with some of its columns, but it is evident from the despatches on the subject that the results were on the whole disappointing. We learned some lessons from both efforts and it is perhaps true that as a result of them the Japanese confidence in their ability to beat us grew to the extent of causing them to make the fatal mistake of underrating their opponents.

The causes of the early disasters are self evident. We were not prepared and were surprised by the speed and direction of the enemy's assaults. Our forces were still expanding and contained a high proportion of young, half-trained soldiers with inadequate equipment and, more often than not, controlled by hastily formed headquarters faced with making the best of an almost hopeless situation. Last, but by no means least as far as Burma was concerned, was the fact that all India's strategic resources and communications had been for centuries built up to deal with invasion from the north-west.

The deficiencies in equipment and training were being remedied as fast as possible and all available resources were being set to work to improve communications to the north-east by G.H.Q., India, but early in 1943 it had become quite evident that the Commander-in-Chief in India could not act as commander of the forces in the field in addition to his other duties.

#### THE FORMATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA COMMAND (S.E.A.C.) AND ITS POLICY

It was decided at the Quebec conference, in August, 1943, to set up a supreme headquarters<sup>2</sup> in South-East Asia to control all Allied forces in the theatre. Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten was selected to be the Supreme Allied Commander.

At the same conference the arguments in favour of amphibious attack on the Japanese in South-East Asia were pressed by the Prime Minister, who wished to confine the British land offensive in Burma to operations by strong long-range penetration groups to co-operate with the Chinese-American and Chinese forces in

<sup>1</sup> A map faces page 250.

<sup>2</sup> The setting up of such a headquarters had been approved in principle at the Washington Conference of May, 1943.

north Burma and on the Salween, while the British main forces struck the Japanese in flank or rear by seaborne and airborne offensives. The American Chiefs of Staff on the other hand were insistent that large-scale operations must be undertaken into north Burma to open the road to China, who, they feared, might make a separate peace with Japan unless she were closely supported. The discussions on this subject were continued at the Cairo conference three months later and they are described in Volume V of Sir Winston Churchill's *Second World War*.

In the event, lack of resources for large-scale operations by seaborne forces ruled out amphibious operations in S.E.A.C., because all available landing craft were required in European waters until the defeat of Germany. Planning for large-scale amphibious operations, however, was continued even after the withdrawal of craft to Europe because it was thought, not without reason, that Japan might continue the fight after the defeat of her allies.

Thus it came about that the reconquest of Burma was brought about by a land campaign.

It is not necessary here to go into the details of the arguments of the land versus sea approach, only the main issue need be stated. The American view was that it was only necessary to secure as much of north Burma as would enable a road to be made via Ledo and Myitkyina to connect up with the old Burma-China road, where it crosses the border to the south-east of Bhamo, and give adequate cover to the air route between Assam and Kunming. The British view was that the quickest and most efficient way to reopen the road to China was to clear the whole of Burma and regain Rangoon as a port from which supplies would be fed on to the Burma-China road. To regain Burma, it was thought, an amphibious attack in flank or rear of the Japanese forces in north and central Burma would be more likely to achieve rapid and decisive effect than a frontal assault across the jungle-clad mountains and mighty rivers of the India-Burma border. That was the main issue, but there is one point arising from it that is worthy of note. The British amphibious strategy was evident to the Japanese in that the Supreme Commander was an admiral, and they knew that his headquarters had moved from Delhi to Kandy in Ceylon, and there can be little doubt that they expected an amphibious attack and therefore kept troops in position to guard their long exposed flank from Akyab to Sumatra. The threat, therefore, had to a certain degree the same effect as a deception plan.

#### THE ORGANIZATION OF S.E.A.C. FORCES AT ITS DISPOSAL

Under the Supreme Allied Commander there were commanders-in-chief of the sea, air, and land forces. The last named was the Commander of 11th Army Group, General Sir George Giffard, who moved his headquarters to Calcutta to be near the battle front, instead of to Kandy. It remained there until late 1944, when 11th Army Group became Allied Land Forces South East Asia (A.L.F.S.E.A.) and the command of it passed to Lieut.-General Sir Oliver Leese.

Naval forces (Admiral Sir James Somerville) consisted of the 4th Cruiser Squadron, of which five cruisers were based on Ceylon and the rest were in East African or even Home waters; the 4th Submarine Flotilla; coastal forces; and escort vessels.

Air forces (Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse). Eastern Air Command consisted of the 3rd Tactical Air Force of 221st, 224th Groups and Northern Air Sector Force; Strategic Air Force; Troop Carrier Command; and Photo Recce Force—in all some 600 aircraft.

Land forces consisted of the Fourteenth Army recently formed and under command of Lieut.-General W. J. Slim; the Chinese Army in India under command of Lieut.-General J. W. Stilwell; and the Chinese Yunnan Force (Yoke Force) over which General Stilwell had what might be termed 'remote control' in his capacity of Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

These forces were deployed in four distinct groups each separated from its next group by roadless and almost trackless mountain barriers—in fact exterior lines in their most aggravated form. These groups were, from right to left:—

1. XVth Corps (Lieut.-General A. F. P. Christison) of three divisions in process of deploying in Arakan, based on Chittagong.
2. IVth Corps (Lieut.-General G. A. P. Scoones) of three divisions in process of deploying on the Central Front, based on Imphal.

These two corps were under the Fourteenth Army and shared an armoured brigade and were supported by the 224th and 221st Groups R.A.F. respectively. Northern Air Sector Force supported N.C.A.C. (see below).

3. Northern Combat Area Command (N.C.A.C.) (Lieut.-General Stilwell) of three (later five) Chinese divisions, each of which was about 10,000 strong, American trained and organized; plus an American combat group of brigade strength (known as Galahad Force and sometimes Merrill's Marauders), trained for a long-range penetration role. This force was starting southwards from its base at Ledo in the extreme north-east corner of Assam.

4. Chinese Yunnan Force (Yoke Force) under a Chinese general responsible to the Generalissimo. Its strength was about 72,000 and it consisted of 12 Chinese divisions, each equivalent to one of our brigade groups. It was firmly ensconced on the upper Salween where it remained until well into May, 1944. The Japanese watched it with one division from which they sometimes took away detachments to reinforce other areas.

In Fourteenth Army reserve there was a fully trained division. In 11th Army Group reserve there was the XXXIIIrd Corps of three, not fully trained, divisions; a commando brigade; and the 3rd Indian Division (Chindit).

Excluding Yoke Force there was available the equivalent of 14 divisions. At no time was the line of communication capable of maintaining that number of divisions in the forward areas, the peak being between 10 and 11 in May, 1944, while the Imphal and Kohima battles were at their height and the siege of Myitkyina by Stilwell's forces was beginning.

#### THE JAPANESE FORCES

The Japanese equivalent to S.E.A.C. was their Southern Region under the supreme command of Field-Marshal Count Terauchi with headquarters at Singapore. Under him were several 'area armies'; the only one which concerns this narrative being Burma Area Army with headquarters at Rangoon.

In November, 1943, all operations in Burma were under their 15th Army<sup>3</sup> with headquarters at Maymyo. About six weeks later the 28th Army was formed to control operations in Arakan and, in early April, the 33rd Army came into being to take over the northern front, leaving the original 15th Army free for the Imphal operation.

<sup>3</sup> A Japanese Army was more the equivalent of our Corps. At this time the 15th Army had five divisions under command but the normal composition of an army was three divisions.

In the air it was believed that the Japanese had some 370 fighters and bombers. The formation in support of the forces in Burma was the 5th Air Division.

Japanese naval forces based on Penang and Singapore amounted to two heavy cruisers and four light cruisers, some submarines, and a considerable number of small craft such as submarine chasers and escort vessels. In addition to Japanese submarines there was a flotilla of German submarines operating in the Bay of Bengal.

On land the Japanese had five divisions deployed; one in Arakan; two and elements of a third on the central front; and something under two divisions divided between the northern and Salween fronts. Reinforcements were known to be moving in and, apart from garrison troops, five more divisions and three independent brigades were believed to be in Siam, Sumatra, and Malaya, making a total of some 350,000 troops in all, about half of which were thought to be in Burma.

To summarize. Except in the air there was no marked superiority in numbers on either side, and the air superiority was nothing like as great as it might appear, for of the 600 craft of all types under Eastern Air Command quite a considerable number were not available to S.E.A.C., and our Hurricane fighters were no match for the Japanese Zero. It was not till the Spitfire arrived that air superiority and then supremacy was achieved, and it was January, 1944, before the first of these were in action over the Burma front.

#### THE COUNTRY AND COMMUNICATIONS

Burma and the India-Burma border is a land of river communications. The rivers all flow south and the Japanese held the estuaries. Our forces were at the unnavigable ends and so when they reached navigable waters they had either to build craft on the spot, or transport them in bits overland and reassemble them. Moreover, roads and railways followed the river valleys, and lateral tracks became worse and fewer the higher up river one went. Lastly, the great river on the Indian side of the border—the Brahmaputra—was more of a hindrance than help for it was unbridged and unbridgeable, so that there was no through road or rail communication between Assam or East Bengal and the rest of India. To make matters worse, the road- and rail-heads in those two provinces were anything from 100 to 200 miles short of the areas in which we desired to deploy our forces.

The making of roads forward presented such diverse engineering problems as the shoring up of hillsides to the importation of coal into roadless areas to make bricks to be used as road soling and to be broken up for road metalling because no local stone existed—almost an *Alice in Wonderland* situation.

From this short description of the communications available to the opposing forces it will be evident that they were all in favour of the Japanese, and it was one of the main R.A.F. tasks to ensure that the Japanese were unable to take full advantage of this fact; a task which they carried out with skill and determination for the next two years. Fortunately, the Japanese confined their strategic bombing to Calcutta, Chittagong, and the Assam airfields and left our lines of communication alone.

It is no exaggeration to say that the greatest problem of the Burma campaign was that of getting sufficient forces into the battle areas to beat the Japanese and then to maintain them there. It involved the building of hundreds of miles of roads and petrol pipe lines over some of the most difficult country in the world, the doubling of long stretches of railway tracks, and the clearing of a great number of airfields,

some of which had to be hacked out of virgin forest. Should anyone feel inclined to ask why, in November, 1943, when the Japanese appeared to have only five divisions deployed in Burma and we had double that number available, did we not advance everywhere, the answer is in the foregoing paragraphs.

There are one or two general points about the country that must be borne in mind in addition to those recorded above.

Burma is not all jungle and rice fields. There is a dry belt which stretches from Shwebo in the north to a little short of Prome in the south, lying between the Irrawaddy-Chindwin and the Shan Hills. Here is open country in which tracked vehicles can go almost anywhere and wheeled vehicles can use almost any track, except in the Pegu Yomas which rise to over 2,000 feet and are covered in thorny scrub jungle. Here the annual rainfall is 20 to 40 inches<sup>4</sup> and the main crops are groundnuts, tobacco, cotton, beans, and grain with just enough rice for local consumption. From November to April it is a dry and thirsty land in which cultivation depends on irrigation, and it begins to get very hot in March.

Generally speaking all mountain areas are forest and jungle clad and, except in the dry belt, the undergrowth and jungle is dense evergreen, interspersed with large areas of bamboo or tiger grass, and movement except by tracks is impossible without cutting. Except in Arakan and the Irrawaddy delta the foothills are as a rule covered by teak forest which has little or no undergrowth so that infantry can move anywhere through it. Above the 7,000-foot level peaks and ridges are grass covered with rocky outcrops. Such areas are Kennedy Peak, a few miles south of Tiddim, and the 9,000-foot massif west of Kohima, and at such heights snow in Winter is not uncommon. All hill tracks whether in mountains or the small ridges which intersect the wider valleys are steep and have numerous knife-edged ridges, which present the difficult problem to infantry and its supporting artillery of getting at and hitting defences burrowed into the crests.

Lastly, in Arakan, large-scale operations in the monsoon *are impossible*. The narrow jungle-clad ridges, which intersect the flat-bottomed valleys between the mountain ranges, become islands surrounded by rice fields waist deep in water intersected by, often invisible, deep water channels. Its rivers are tidal to within a short distance of the Indian border and so are their numerous tributaries (chaungs), and the combination of tide and flood waters will sweep away anything in its path.

#### SITUATION, NOVEMBER, 1943. PRIME MINISTER'S DIRECTIVE

From early October as Headquarters, S.E.A.C., assembled in Delhi, its officers began working in with their corresponding branches in G.H.Q., India, whose plans, and arrangements for implementing them, for the dry season 1943-44 were well advanced. The new Supreme Allied Commander in addition to picking up the threads in Delhi was looking ahead in terms of the Prime Minister's directive, described later, in preparation for the Cairo conference. First of all, the extent to which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would participate had to be ascertained, so he flew to Chungking to find out and returned satisfied with the results of the discussions: unfortunately the satisfaction was destined to be shortlived.

On 16th November operational control passed from G.H.Q., India, to S.E.A.C. On that date the opposing forces were building up their communications and strength and, one might say, sparring for an opening. The plans of army and corps com-

<sup>4</sup> Compare the 200-inch rainfall of Arakan.



manders, based on the plans approved in the Summer by Eastern Army and G.H.Q., India, were being put into effect as they fitted in, as regards their opening phases anyhow, with the rather more ambitious proposals now under review.

In Arakan the 5th and 7th Indian Divisions of XVth Corps were beginning to push back the Japanese outposts covering the immensely strong Maungdaw-Buthidaung line across the Mayu peninsula, and the two-brigade 81st West African Division was moving across to the Kaladan to cover the left flank. In the Chin Hills the 17th Indian Division of IVth Corps had just been driven out of Fort White (20 miles south of Tiddim) while the 20th Indian Division in the Kabaw valley was pushing slowly east towards the Chindwin and south towards Kalembo at the road junction west of Kalewa. The ultimate objectives were Akyab in Arakan and Kalewa on the Chindwin.

The main points of the directive from the Prime Minister to the Supreme Commander were:—

- (i) To engage the Japanese continuously and closely to wear down his forces, particularly air, and force him to divert forces from the Pacific theatre.
- (ii) To maintain and broaden contacts with China both by air and by establishing direct contact through north Burma.
- (iii) To use his air and sea power to seize some point or points which "will induce a powerful reaction from the enemy" and at the same time give several options for a counter stroke to meet the enemy's reaction.

The directive went on to say that before the first amphibious attack he would be provided with a battle fleet based on Ceylon.

On the basis of this directive Lord Louis Mountbatten began, on arrival at Delhi to form his headquarters, to broaden the scope of the planning going on at G.H.Q., India, as a result of which troops were at this time moving into position as briefly described in the preceding paragraph.

Prior to the Supreme Commander's visit to Chungking, mentioned earlier, the question of the attack on Sumatra,<sup>5</sup> which the Prime Minister believed would be the most effective thrust possible, was examined to see whether it could be carried out with the forces available. It was found to be impossible and for the time being it was dropped and a less ambitious project, an amphibious assault on the Andamans,<sup>6</sup> was substituted and accepted by the Generalissimo.

By the third week in November, by which time S.E.A.C. had assumed operational control and before Lord Mountbatten went to attend the Cairo conference, seven separate but related operations had been decided on.

1. Capture of the Andaman Islands.
2. Advance in Arakan with Akyab as the ultimate objective.
3. Advance on central front across the Chindwin.
4. Advance by N.C.A.C. to capture Myitkyina-Mogaung.
5. Advance by Chinese Yunnan (Yoke) forces to Bhamo-Lashio.
6. Operations in support of 4 and 5 by Chindits.
7. Airborne capture of Indaw<sup>7</sup> followed by a fly-in of a division to hold it pending arrival of N.C.A.C. forces.

<sup>5</sup> Operation "Culverin." *Second World War*, Vol. V, p. 78.—Churchill.

<sup>6</sup> Operation "Buccaneer."

<sup>7</sup> Indaw is on the railway 15 miles north-west of Katha.

Within a fortnight information was received that the landing craft needed for 1 and 2 would have to be recalled to Europe and, as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had made a major amphibious operation a condition of the participation of Yoke Force, this meant that items 1 and 5 were completely out, item 2 would have to be modified, and that 7 would probably be too risky as the division at Indaw could be overwhelmed if the Japanese forces watching Yoke Force on the Salween were not firmly held.

A drastic modification of plans became necessary and, in spite of strenuous efforts to keep the whole programme in being, operations were finally whittled down to four :—

- (i) An offensive without landing craft in Arakan.
- (ii) An advance by N.C.A.C. from Ledo.
- (iii) A limited advance across the Chindwin.
- (iv) Operations by Chindits.

In short, operations in 1943-44 were to be land operations, supported of course by air, under General Sir George Giffard commanding 11th Army Group, the commanders of the field armies being Lieut.-General W. J. Slim and Lieut.-General J. W. Stilwell.

#### 11TH ARMY GROUP PLANS FOR THE 1943-44 CAMPAIGN

The Fourteenth Army's task was contained in an Army Group Operation Instruction of early January and that of N.C.A.C. in a Fourteenth Army Instruction<sup>8</sup> issued a few days later. They were :—

*Fourteenth Army.* In Arakan—to secure the mouth of the Naf River—Maungdaw—Buthidaung and exploit south.

On the central front—to clear the Chin Hills, to secure the line Tamu-Sittaung<sup>9</sup> in the Kabaw and Chindwin valleys and dominate the area south of it and contain and destroy as many enemy as possible in that area. To use the Chindits on a plan drawn up in consultation with General Stilwell and to exploit across the Chindwin if the Chindit operations created a favourable opportunity.

*N.C.A.C.* To advance through Kamaing to the general line Mogaung-Myitkyina to cover the construction of the road to China and secure the air route.

#### ORDERS TO THE CHINDITS (3RD INDIAN DIVISION OR SPECIAL FORCE)

The task given to the Chindits and issued in a Fourteenth Army Instruction in early February was that of helping the advance of N.C.A.C. on Myitkyina by drawing off and disorganizing the enemy opposing them and preventing reinforcements reaching them; secondly, to create a favourable opportunity for Yoke Force to advance westwards; and thirdly, to inflict the maximum loss and confusion on enemy forces in north Burma.

#### OPERATIONS OF FOURTEENTH ARMY AND N.C.A.C. TO CARRY OUT THEIR TASKS

The early operations fall into four distinct groups :—

- (i) The advance of XVth Corps in Arakan.
- (ii) The operations of IVth Corps in the Tiddim (Chin Hills) area and Kabaw valley in preparation for an advance on Kalewa.

<sup>8</sup> General Stilwell had refused to serve under 11th Army Group, but had agreed to take orders from Fourteenth Army until his forces reached Kamaing, after which he was to become directly responsible to S.E.A.C.


<sup>9</sup> Sittaung is on the Chindwin 20 miles south-west of Paungbyin.

- (iii) The beginning of the advance of N.C.A.C. and the 16th Brigade of the Chindits from the Ledo area southwards.
- (iv) The launching of the air transported Chindit Brigades' operation "Thursday."

It has already been recorded that in November, 1943, troops were moving into position to carry out the first two of these operations, and until January there were no developments of any great importance. There was hard fighting as our forward troops attacked the Japanese outposts, some of which were driven in and some of which clung tenaciously to their deeply-dug defences.

#### ARAKAN

The advance of the 5th and 7th Indian Divisions down the Mayu peninsula had, by mid-January, succeeded in driving in the Japanese outposts and in occupying the small port of Maungdaw which the Japanese, to most people's surprise, made little attempt to defend. By 19th January the West Africans had concentrated in the Kaladan and were ready to begin their advance down river to cover the left flank of the operations in the Mayu peninsula, where the 5th and 7th Divisions were now 'leaning up against' the immensely strong system of field works centred on the tunnels by which the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road burrowed through the summit of the 2,000-foot high Mayu Range, the crest of which formed the inter-divisional boundary.



The "MAYU FORTRESS"

These field works, described by a Japanese divisional commander in an order captured later as "the Golden Fortress of the Mayu Range," had three main bastions. Razabil covering the western entrance to the hills of the road from Maungdaw; the tunnels at the summit of the pass; and Letwedet covering Buthidaung, the head of the peace-time Mayu river steamer service. Both Razabil and Letwedet defended areas were based on a tangle of low hills covered in tiger grass and thick scrub jungle and were natural strongholds.

It was this position which the XVth Corps was about to assault. In the first phase, while the 7th Division exerted pressure on the Letwedet bastion and sent a brigade round its left flank east of the river to threaten it from the rear, the 5th Division attacked Razabil, supported by the corps artillery and armour (25th Dragoons with medium Grant and Lee tanks), and a West African reconnaissance regiment carried out raids down the Arakan coast with the help of an extemporized flotilla composed of an assortment of country craft and a few powered craft.

The attack on Razabil, though preceded by a bombardment by the Strategic Air Force, made little progress. The tanks found they could not get at the Japanese bunkers sited at the tops of the steep small hills, and it was perhaps here that they got the first inklings of the new technique<sup>10</sup> in jungle fighting which was developed during the next few weeks.

At the end of the third week of January the brigade of the 7th Division, in its infiltration round the Japanese right flank in the hills east of the Mayu river, obtained identifications of the 112th Regiment, which was known to have been on the coast south of Maungdaw a short while before. The coastal raiding force was told to get fresh identifications at all costs and at the end of January they succeeded. The identifications were of the 144th Regiment, last heard of in the Pacific, whose place in the 55th Division had been taken by a regiment of the 33rd Division.

Up to now it had been thought that the Japanese might not offer very strenuous resistance on the Maungdaw-Buthidaung line, but it was now certain that they would, and that they might even attack. Meanwhile, the armour had been told to move across the Ngakyedauk pass by the newly opened road and join the 7th Division for a deliberate assault to break into Buthidaung while the 5th Division made fresh plans to take Razabil, which had proved to be tank proof.

At the same time the Japanese were pushing forward their preparations to forestall the attack which they knew we would launch very soon. What we did not know was that the Japanese reinforcements in addition to the 144th Regiment of the 55th Division included the whole of the 54th Division.

#### CENTRAL FRONT

In the Chin Hills, south of Tiddim and Kennedy Peak, the 17th Indian Division's efforts to clear the Japanese positions covering Fort White met with stubborn resistance. As time went on Japanese patrols began to probe the division's line of communication to the north of Tiddim from the east,<sup>11</sup> thus forcing the 17th Division to keep a considerable covering force to the east of the road between Tiddim and the vital Manipur river bridge some 36 miles to the north. At the end of January the situation in the Tiddim-Kennedy Peak area was very much the same as it had been in mid-November after the loss of Fort White.

In the Kabaw valley sector the 20th Indian Division had pushed forward with one brigade to Witok, about 20 miles south of Tamu, and had two brigades watching

<sup>10</sup> Tanks acted as mobile pillboxes in close support of infantry using instantaneous H.E. to strip jungle, delay action H.E. to break down defences, and solid A.P. shot as the infantry closed up with grenade and bayonet.

<sup>11</sup> It is of interest to note here that the main attack on 17th Division's L. of C., which opened the Imphal offensive, came from the opposite flank, more than 50 miles north of Tiddim. It is referred to again later.

the Chindwin as far north as Paungbyin, in touch with 'V' Force<sup>12</sup> which took up watch and ward right up to and beyond Homalin.

In September, Lieut.-General Scoones, Commander, IVth Corps, had appreciated that the Japanese were not in a position to take the offensive, but from November onwards there were indications of reinforcements arriving on the Chindwin, and in January, Headquarters, S.E.A.C., received information indicating that the Japanese 15th Division was moving from Siam into Burma.

On 27th January, 1944, a patrol of the 12th Frontier Force Regiment (20th Division) ambushed a party of Japanese on the east bank of the Chindwin, obtaining identifications which turned out to be of the 60th Regiment of the 15th Division. The arrival of the Japanese 15th Division on the Chindwin changed the whole outlook, for now the enemy were in a position to take offensive action.

The most likely course was considered to be raids in force against the Imphal-Kohima line of communication, combined with a two-division attack on the 20th Division<sup>13</sup> in the Kabaw valley.

There were other positive signs of a Japanese build-up on the Chindwin and it became increasingly certain that they intended to launch an offensive. In addition to the reports of ground patrols, the R.A.F. reported an ever-thickening and widening mantle of dust along all the main tracks leading to the Chindwin from the east, showing that though the enemy dared not move by day, they were moving by night. It was now also thought possible that the enemy might attack in Arakan and that either, or both, of these offensives might forestall our own, particularly on the Chindwin where the timing of our advance depended on the speed with which our communications forward of Imphal could be developed.

#### SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY, 1944

At the beginning of February the Allied forces in Burma were in close contact with the Japanese from the source of the Chindwin to the mouth of the Naf river at Maungdaw in Arakan. The Chinese Yunnan forces on the Salween remained inactive in their mountain fastness east of the river.

On the northern front Stilwell's Chinese American force had secured the crossings of the Tanai river, as the topmost reach of the Chindwin is called, some 70 miles south of Ledo, and was reorganizing for its advance on the Mogaung-Myitkyina line.

On the central front, there was no possibility of an immediate advance by the IVth Corps; meanwhile the enemy were bringing up large reinforcements.

In Arakan, the XVth Corps was poised to strike at the Japanese main position covering the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road.

<sup>12</sup> 'V' Force consisted of friendly locals backed by detachments of Assam Rifles and officered by British officers. Their main task was the collection of information, with guerilla activity in enemy rear areas if opportunity offered.

<sup>13</sup> A month later there were unmistakable signs that it was more likely to be the 17th Indian Division in the Chin Hills which would be the one singled out for destruction, while the Kabaw valley division was pinned and the Imphal-Kohima road attacked. An appreciation by Commander IVth Corps on 29th February proved to be very accurate except for the underestimation of the force the Japanese would use to cut the road to Kohima. This was estimated to be at most a regimental group of four battalions, as a larger force could not be maintained there. The Japanese in fact used over a division, with disastrous results—to themselves!



At Headquarters, S.E.A.C., after much discussion and considerable opposition from General Stilwell, plan "Culverin," a major amphibious operation for the capture of northern Sumatra and the first step of a break-through to the Japanese rear, had been evolved, and the "Axiom" mission under General Wedemeyer (Deputy Chief of Staff) was about to start for London to place the plan before the Chiefs of Staff and to get the equipments needed to put the plan into operation.

At this juncture the Japanese launched their offensive.

#### THE JAPANESE PLANS

The Japanese had realized that an Allied offensive against Burma was inevitable and the problem was how best to hold the front which stretched in a vast arc from the Salween east of Myitkyina to Arakan. There was little doubt that the offensive, when it came, would be launched from Imphal; and eventually it was decided that the best way to hold Burma would be to capture Imphal, thus halting the offensive at its source; mop up the Imphal-Kohima area; and from there harass and cut the Assam line of communication on which the Chinese American forces in North Burma were dependent and along which were the numerous airfields from which supplies were being flown to China. Having achieved this the Japanese would have the additional advantages of a much shorter and more easily defended front; an area from which Bose's "Indian National Army" could infiltrate into Assam and Bengal and raise revolt; and control of the huge surplus rice crop of the Imphal plain.

As a prelude to the attack on Imphal there was to be an offensive in Arakan designed to destroy the forces in the forward areas there, followed by an advance towards Chittagong, which, it was calculated, would draw our reserves to that area and hold them there while the Japanese 15th Army attacked Imphal.

#### THE JAPANESE OFFENSIVE IS LAUNCHED

In the early hours of the morning of 4th February, when as usual the valleys were shrouded in thick mist, a column of Japanese consisting of five infantry and one engineer battalions passed through and round the left flank brigade of the 7th Indian Division east of the Kalapanzin (upper Mayu) river, making for the rear of the Division. Only the tail of the column was intercepted and destroyed, but the tail contained several hundred porters carrying food and ammunition and a complete medical unit.<sup>14</sup>

The task of this column was to attack the 7th Division in rear, cut the road over the Ngakyedauk pass, the only route across the Mayu range between the Japanese-held tunnels road and the Goppe pass with its mule track 15 miles by jungle track to the north, thus isolating the 7th Division, which was then to be destroyed by assaults from front and rear. Meanwhile, raiding columns were to cross the Mayu range farther north by jungle paths and cut the road behind the 5th Indian Division, to keep that division occupied until the main force had completed the destruction of the 7th Division, when it was to turn on and destroy the 5th Division before advancing north towards Chittagong, to meet and pin the reserves sent to deal with the situation.

From orders captured in the first few days of the battle of Ngakyedauk, as this fight is named, it was evident that the Japanese expected not more than a moderate resistance from the 7th Division, and expected to be able to concentrate against the

<sup>14</sup> The main column made no attempt to help, but carried straight on.

5th Division by the sixth day and destroy that even more quickly. They had quite rightly assessed that it would be a week before any assistance could reach the 7th Division area.

By the seventh day three things had happened which made the result a foregone conclusion. First of all the attack had not made any impression on the 7th Division, in spite of an anxious 48 hours after Divisional Headquarters had been overrun. Secondly, by that day air supply was established and the R.A.F. had gained air supremacy over the battlefield. Thirdly, the 26th Indian Division was beginning to close in from the north on the Japanese infiltration force, which found itself running short of supplies because 7th Division was intercepting its supply convoys; the 5th Division meanwhile had started operations to clear the Ngakyedauk Pass.

Though nobody at the time realized it, the Japanese least of all, the issue of the battle had been decided by 12th February. Moreover, the Japanese hopes of holding our reserves in the Arakan area disappeared with a signal sent by General Slim to General Giffard that day, in which he said the Japanese might attack Imphal as soon as they could switch their air force from Arakan to the Chindwin. One respite the Japanese offensive did gain for them was that it made any chance of an amphibious attack on Akyab before the monsoon impossible. We had just enough landing craft to enable an assault brigade of the 36th British Division to carry out a landing, but the operation was now cancelled.

At the end of February the Japanese offensive collapsed. On 5th March, XVth Corps was ready to resume the offensive and, as the attacks went in, orders were issued that on the capture of Buthidaung and Razabil, the 26th Division was to relieve the 7th Division which was to be rested and the 25th Indian Division was to relieve the 5th Division which was to reinforce the IVth Corps at Imphal.

\* \* \*

On this same day, from an airfield at Silchar in East Bengal, the fly-in of the Chindits began, the story of which is vividly described in Calvert's book *Prisoners of Hope*. By this time the 16th Brigade which was marching in from Ledo in the north, had been on its way for 17 days and was approaching the Katha-Indaw area from which the Chindit Division was to operate.

#### CENTRAL FRONT

On 7th March, after seeing the Chindits launched on their daring exploit, Lieut.-General Slim conferred with Lieut.-General Scoones at Imphal and approved of his plan to withdraw the IVth Corps to the Imphal plain if the Japanese attacked before the Corps was ready to advance on Kalewa in force. By withdrawing to the plain if attacked, the IVth Corps could bring its superior armour into action with maximum effect, which it was believed would be decisive, and even in the event of a stalemate the Japanese would be defeated because their lines of communication back to the Chindwin would dissolve in a sea of mud and the mosquitoes of the Kabaw valley would do the rest.

On this day (7th March) IVth Corps had the 17th Division in the Chin Hills based on Tiddim, the 20th in the Kabaw valley based on Tamu, and the 23rd on the Imphal Plain with a counter-attack role on the flank of any force trying to cut the Imphal-Kohima road.

Reinforcements moving in or promised were the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade, and the 5th Division from Arakan. The task of the former was to cover the approaches to Kohima in the Ukhrul area and it was on its way.

On 9th March a two-man patrol of the 10th Gurkhas reported that a column over 2,000 strong with guns had crossed the Manipur River on the 8th, some 20 miles south of Tiddim. Three days later a delayed local report gave news of a column, now 3,000 strong, well to the north-west of Tiddim, which meant that they were within striking distance of the vital Manipur River bridge 36 miles north of Tiddim. At the same time the enemy began to exert pressure on the lines of communication in the Tongzang area, some 25 miles north of Tiddim, from the opposite (east) flank.

On 13th March, the Commander IVth Corps gave the 17th Division permission to retire, sent a machine gun battalion to the Manipur River bridge, and warned the 23rd Indian Division to have a brigade ready to follow it.

In the Kabaw valley, Japanese armour began to appear in the first week in March and on the 12th attacked the forward troops in the Kabaw valley near Witok. The attack was repulsed, and while the forward troops held firm for a few days the large engineer and pioneer forces engaged in making roads and airfields in the Kabaw valley were withdrawn. On 16th March, 80th Brigade (20th Division) patrols reported the Japanese crossing the Chindwin in strength in the Paungbyin area, and the divisional commander then ordered the withdrawal to the Shenam Pass<sup>15</sup> to begin, in accordance with a plan which had been worked out some days before.

By this date (16th March), the 17th Division was fighting to clear the first block established behind it by the Japanese, at Tuitum some 30 miles north of Tiddim, and two brigades of the 23rd Division were hurrying down the Tiddim road from Imphal to deal with the 3,000-strong column of Japanese mentioned earlier and believed to be making for the Manipur River bridge. The enemy had established themselves at mile 109, some 50 miles north of Tiddim, seizing the large supply dump there, and it took the combined effort of a brigade of the 23rd Division attacking from the north and one of the 17th Division attacking from the south to break the block. Meanwhile, of course, the IVth Corps was left without a reserve except for a few tanks, for the third brigade of the 23rd Division was watching the long eastern edge of the Imphal plain. The only other troops on that flank were the two battalions of the 50th Parachute Brigade moving into position to cover Ukhrul, well to the north-east.

#### MOVE OF THE 5TH AND 7TH INDIAN DIVISIONS TO THE CENTRAL FRONT

We must now turn back for a moment to Arakan where, on 6th March, XVth Corps had resumed the offensive. By 14th March, the 5th and 7th Divisions had respectively taken Razabil and Buthidaung, the relief of the 7th Division by the 26th was taking place, and that of the 5th by the 25th just beginning. The 7th Division turned back to mop up enemy bypassed in the Letwedet bastion, while the 26th prepared to attack the tunnels from the east in conjunction with the 5th Division and its successor from the west. In the Kaladan the Japanese had counter-attacked the West Africans and driven them back some 40 miles, but this had no effect on the main operations.

By this time, as has been shown earlier, the IVth Corps had no reserve in hand, and General Slim felt it imperative to replace it as quickly as possible. He therefore ordered the relief of the 5th Division to be speeded up by using the 36th British Division<sup>16</sup> in the forward area west of the tunnels, pending the arrival of the rest of

<sup>15</sup> The Shenam Pass is the south-east entrance to the Imphal plain.

<sup>16</sup> The 36th Division was a two-brigade division specially trained and organized for amphibious operations. Up to now the policy had been to avoid getting it seriously involved in order to keep it available for its specialized task.

the 25th Division, and applied to the Supreme Commander for aircraft to fly the 5th Division to Imphal.

Such was the shortage of aircraft that the Supreme Commander had to order the diversion of transport planes from those allotted to carrying supplies across the 'Hump' to China, which strictly speaking he was not empowered to do without reference to the Chiefs of Staff, and so it was that the leading troops of the 5th Division landed at Imphal on 19th March. From then on for the next three weeks a continuous stream of troops was poured into Imphal and the Assam valley north of Kohima, by road, rail, and air, until the 2nd British, 5th and 7th Indian Divisions and 23rd Long Range Penetration Brigade had been concentrated in the required areas. Much to everyone's relief the Assam lines of communication did not break down under the strain.

There can be little doubt that this rapid concentration upset the Japanese calculations based on the fact that the four groups of Allied forces were completely isolated from each other by roadless mountain masses.

It is convenient at this stage to dispose of Arakan by saying that the tunnels were secured by the XVth Corps after much heavy fighting, before the monsoon broke, and that the low-lying Buthidaung was then evacuated, so that our troops were able to spend the monsoon in comparative comfort with the all-weather road back to Maungdaw as their supply line.

#### THE BATTLE FOR KOHIMA BEGINS

As the 17th and 20th Divisions withdrew to the Imphal plain and the 5th Division came in by air, it became clear that large Japanese forces were approaching Ukhrul from the south-east. From 18th to 26th March, the 50th Parachute Brigade fought gallantly to stem the advance, until ordered to break off the fight and withdraw on Imphal behind the two newly-arrived brigades of the 5th Division deployed north and north-east of the town. The Kohima outposts imposed a further delay, and it was not until 4th April that the garrison of Kohima got its first glimpse of the enemy moving along road and tracks from the south in single file with their characteristic forward leaning, quick, purposeful gait.

By this time a brigade of the 5th Division, flown from Arakan, had made contact with the garrison<sup>17</sup> and was in process of sending a battalion to join it, while the remainder of the brigade was taking up a position on a commanding height near by. Headquarters, XXXIIIrd Corps, had arrived at Jorhat<sup>18</sup> in the Assam valley north of the Fourteenth Army base at Dimapur and had taken operational control, and the leading brigade of the 2nd Division was moving into Dimapur from the divisional concentration area south of Jorhat.

#### THE JORHAT CONFERENCE

On 4th April, as the Japanese approached Kohima, a conference was held at Jorhat by the Supreme Commander at which Lieut.-Generals Slim, Stilwell, and Stopford (Commander XXXIIIrd Corps) were present, where it was decided that Chinese-American forces would guard railways and airfields in the north-east corner of Assam, and that the Chindits would continue to assist Stilwell's forces advancing

<sup>17</sup> The garrison of Kohima, after the arrival of the 4th Royal West Kents of the 161st Brigade, amounted to about 2,500 including hospital staff.

<sup>18</sup> About 70 miles north of Dimapur on the Assam trunk road.

on Mogaung-Myitkyina, less one brigade (23rd) which was allotted to the XXXIIIrd Corps. It was also decided to develop the track from Silchar in East Bengal to Imphal, via Bishenpur, into a jeep track. The possibility of a division operating up that track to Imphal was at one time under consideration, but the idea was discarded and, instead, the two-commando 3rd S.S. Brigade which had been carrying out raids on the Arakan coast was sent to Silchar to make sure that the Japanese did not use the track to infiltrate into East Bengal. A few days later a Japanese 'suicide' raid put the track out of action by blowing a suspension bridge over a deep gorge about 30 miles west of Bishenpur.

#### THE JAPANESE ADVANCE IS HALTED

Although by 7th April the situation seemed to be in hand, a lot still depended on whether the small Kohima garrison<sup>19</sup> could hold out against the greatly superior forces about to attack it, until the 2nd Division had fought its way through the road blocks on the Dimapur-Kohima road, to join up with the 161st Brigade in the Kohima area and break the Japanese stranglehold.

On 17th April the leading brigade of the 2nd Division made contact with the 161st Brigade which on the next day broke into Kohima, reinforced the garrison, and took out its sick and wounded. Two days later the defended area was taken over by a brigade of the 2nd Division while the other two began to attack the enemy strongholds round it.

By 20th April, the Japanese advance had been halted everywhere. At Kohima, the XXXIIIrd Corps, now being reinforced by the 7th Division, less one brigade, which had been flown to Imphal to join the 5th Division in place of that division's 161st Brigade at Kohima, was about to attack the enemy in the Kohima area while the 23rd L.R.P. Brigade worked wide to the east to try to cut the Japanese communications between Kohima and their base at Ukhrul. At Imphal, the Japanese advancing on the town from the north-east, along the Ukhrul road, had been halted perilously close—14 miles from their objective—but were now being pushed slowly but surely back. The force advancing from the Kabaw valley had been stopped on the Shenam Pass, 30 miles south-east, and that on the Tiddim road, some 20 miles away, to the south of Bishenpur where the track from Silchar joined the Tiddim-Imphal road. In between these widely separated points our fighting patrols were successfully dealing with enemy attempts to infiltrate into the plain to raid airfields and supply dumps.

For the next three weeks the grim fight went on without any appreciable gain on either side until, in the middle of May, the Japanese 31st Division in the Kohima area was driven from two of its four key positions. At the same time the IVth Corps began a drive up the road towards Kohima with the 5th Division and towards Ukhrul with the 20th Division. In the third week of May the Japanese delivered their most desperate attack, in the Bishenpur area, the orders for which, captured later, ended up with Admiral Togo's famous message to his fleet before Tsushima—"The fate of the Empire depends on this one battle." The monsoon was approaching and unless the Japanese had Imphal in their possession, with its reserves of food both military and civil, and its airfields, their defeat was certain.

<sup>19</sup> The garrison held the ridge which blocked the pass on which Kohima town stands and from which the road starts to wind down the hill to Dimapur. The road and main tracks from the Imphal-Ukhrul area converge on this pass, hence its importance.



Our own position was not without its anxieties. Reserves of ammunition and supplies in the Imphal area were falling, in spite of the fact that sick and wounded and surplus non-combatants were being flown out as fast as possible by returning supply planes. At the same time the Supreme Commander was being pressed to release a large number of aircraft on loan from the Middle East.

It had been calculated that by the end of June there might be a shortage of some supplies, but the calculation was never put to the test, for on 22nd June the advanced guards of the IVth and XXXIIIrd Corps met at a point some 25 miles north of Imphal and within 24 hours road convoys were running. The corps commanders met and agreed on immediate action which included a thrust on Ukhrul, which ensured the destruction of the retreating 15th and 31st Japanese Divisions. To the south of Imphal the 33rd Japanese Division, its attached troops amounting to seven battalions, and the bulk of the so-called 1st Indian National Army Division for a time, held on at the Shenam Pass and in the Bishenpur area till early July, to give the remnants of the 15th and 31st Divisions and the I.N.A. Division time to get away, but it was evident by the end of June that the Japanese 15th Army had suffered a disastrous defeat. Of the force of three and a half Japanese and one I.N.A. Division, over 50,000 perished in battle and from disease and exposure.

#### EVENTS OF THE NORTHERN FRONT

We must now follow the fortunes of the Chindits whom we left being flown and marching into north Burma as the Imphal battle began.

In spite of the fact that two brigades had been landed by air in the Katha area and a third was approaching that area on foot from the north, so that all three were in the heart of Japanese-occupied north central Burma just as the Imphal offensive was starting, the Japanese refused to be deterred from their object. In the words of the Supreme Commander's Report to the Chiefs of Staff (H.M. Stationery Office, 1951):

"Rightly appreciating that the battle was to be lost or won in Assam, he had continued to concentrate on his primary objective in the west, and had employed against 3rd Indian Division in central Burma only lines of communication troops and elements of divisions not allocated to the Assam offensive."


There is in fact reason to believe that one infantry and one artillery battalion of the 15th Division were held back for a short time, but were released to rejoin their division on the Imphal front on arrival of three battalions of the 24th Independent Brigade from Tenasserim.<sup>20</sup> At the same time the Japanese began to move the 53rd Division into Burma, the headquarters of which took over control of operations against the Chindits. One regiment plus one battalion of the first two regiments which arrived with the headquarters remained under command, and the other two battalions went to the Imphal front; the third regiment arrived much later.


Throughout April and the first half of May the Chindit columns raided and cut communications to the north, including the road and rail from Indaw to Mogaung and the road from Bhamo to Myitkyina, and destroyed Japanese supply dumps and their garrisons.

The 14th Brigade was flown in and relieved the 16th which had marched in, and a West African brigade was flown in to hold the Chindit bases, thus releasing the 14th, 77th, and 111th Brigades to advance in full force northwards on Mogaung and Myitkyina to meet Stilwell's forces driving south with the same objectives.

<sup>20</sup> The narrow coastal province of Burma bordering on Siam.







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On 17th May, two days after the IVth and XXXIIIrd Corps in the Imphal-Kohima areas began to make progress towards each other, Galahad Force, by a rapid and secret flank move, seized the Myitkyina airfield and Stilwell began to fly in troops for the attack on the town which it was expected would fall in a few days. Stilwell's troops were, however, about to experience for the first time a Japanese defence to the last man and round with which our troops had by now become familiar in Arakan and Assam, and it was to be two and a half months before Myitkyina fell, though its garrison of a little over 3,000 was outnumbered by over eight to one.

On this day—17th May—the Chindits, who were deployed in three groups, were placed under command of General Stilwell to ensure co-ordination of the attacks on Mogaung and Myitkyina.

The three groups were, from east to west, elements of two brigades south of Myitkyina, one brigade approaching Mogaung, and elements of two brigades blocking the 'Railway Corridor' south-west of Mogaung.

On 10th June the Chindits reached Mogaung, but it was another fortnight before it was finally cleared in co-operation with a Chinese force from the north. On 20th June, Kamaing having been taken, Stilwell's forces ceased to be under the Fourteenth Army and came directly under Headquarters, S.E.A.C.

Meanwhile, Yoke Force had at last started to move. In the second week of May when it was evident that the Kohima-Imphal battle had turned in our favour and that the advance of Stilwell's forces and the Chindits had the Japanese 18th and 53rd Divisions in a firm grip, Yoke Force began to cross the Salween.

#### THE SITUATION AT THE END OF JUNE, 1944

(i) In Arakan, the Japanese had lost their 'golden fortress' and had lost about half of the 30,000 fighting troops which had taken part in the offensive. Both sides had withdrawn to monsoon positions to which they would be more or less tied for four months.

(ii) On the central front, the Japanese 15th Army had suffered a disastrous defeat. Two Japanese divisions and the I.N.A. Division had ceased to exist as fighting formations and its fourth, and heavily reinforced, division was taking enormous losses holding on to the Shenam Pass to allow the remnants of the others to get away.

The Fourteenth Army was preparing to pursue and keep on pursuing throughout the monsoon.

(iii) On the northern front, the Japanese were holding on desperately to Myitkyina and the 'Railway Corridor' to keep the road to China closed and to cover the right flank of the withdrawal of the defeated 15th Army.

The campaign in Burma was about to enter a new phase.

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## THE ATMOSPHERE OF WAR

By "MUSKETEER"

*Activity in war is never directed solely against matter ; it is always at the same time directed against the intelligent force which gives life to this matter and to separate the two from each other is impossible.—KARL VON CLAUSEWITZ.*

WE are passing through a period of great uncertainty due not only to the world situation, but also to the introduction of immensely powerful new weapons. The conditions that govern both strategy and tactics are changing ; modified methods are being contemplated and with them the necessary alterations in organization and administration. But man is still the first weapon of war and will remain so in spite of scientific developments.

In the words of Jomini, Napoleon's disciple, " War, far from being an exact science, is a terrifying and passionate drama." The few principles which guide action in war are the digested experience of 2,000 years ; they are neither laws as in natural science, nor rules such as those of chess, though history shows that to disregard them is to court disaster. New ways of applying them will be necessary as, in fact, has been the case following previous changes in armament and other developments in the means of waging war ; but the principles themselves remain the unaltered and essential guide. As has been said many times, these principles are simple but in practice their application is difficult. Even in modern conditions, when the factors which have to be taken into consideration are numerous and complex, the application of these principles on paper presents no great problem to the trained mind. But in war the human factor and other imponderables intensify the difficulty of adhering to the principles in planning and far more so in actual execution.

An army is sometimes referred to as a mighty machine : it is, in fact, nothing of the kind. It is a living organism of a sensitive temper composed of individuals with human frailties, hopes, and fears. An army or subordinate formation cannot be properly directed or controlled except by those who understand its character, the causes of its impulses, and the art of command.

The effect of the conditions of war on the human element, usually given scant attention in peace-time studies and exercises, is seldom appreciated by those with no war experience. Much of the permanent value of the works of Clausewitz lies in his assessment of the moral and psychological factors and their effect on the conduct of war. He observes that four elements comprise the 'atmosphere' in which war moves, namely, *danger*, *physical effort*, *uncertainty*, and *chance*. All, from the commander-in-chief downwards, are individually affected by one or more in greater or lesser degree and by the cumulative effect of all four which, with other factors, produce what he terms *friction* in war. If the action of these elements be considered it will be apparent that the effects of one may be the cause of another. Between them they can and do produce an accumulation of difficulties mostly unforeseen. Furthermore, an examination should indicate that, while these elements and their effects cannot be entirely eliminated, the latter can to some extent be mitigated by leadership, knowledge, and training.

### DANGER

" War is the province of danger, and therefore courage above all things is the first quality of a warrior."<sup>1</sup> This may seem an old-fashioned platitude but is, nevertheless, of great importance, though seldom considered as it should be.

<sup>1</sup> *On War*, Vol. I, von Clausewitz, p. 47.

Danger produces fear or affects the nerves and causes strain according to the kind, intensity, and length of exposure. Reaction to danger is not the same in everyone; familiarity, habit, or concentration on the task in hand may lead to indifference but, generally speaking, courage or boldness, inherent or acquired by training and discipline, is the antithesis of fear.

In war we are concerned with two kinds of courage, first, that in face of danger to the person; and secondly, courage in face of responsibility. Both may be required at one and the same time by any leader who has to make decisions and enforce their execution in war. Courage in face of great responsibility is one of the essential qualities of a commander. It will be remembered that Marshal Ney, 'the bravest of the brave,' failed as an independent commander.

The intensity of the effect of danger on troops depends on their mental and physical condition, on their morale and training, and above all on the inherent qualities of the race from which they are drawn. It is not always the losses suffered by troops as those they expect to suffer that causes 'stickiness' or skulking, demoralization, or even panic. The last, and most dangerous, is a sudden, infectious, unreasoning fear which may be started by a few or by an incident and lead to units or whole formations taking to flight like a herd of terrified cattle. Panic can be stopped at the outset by first-class leadership and the habit of discipline, but once it gets a hold, control may not be regained for a long time. Panics are not confined to low-grade armies; they happened in some German formations in August, 1914. Physical and mental exhaustion, faults in command and staff work, surprise, lack of soldierly qualities, and a low standard of training are all factors predisposing troops to panic. Though our own troops may not be so subject to this deterioration of moral fibre as others, panics must be reckoned with and their origins eliminated. The sudden appearance of a new weapon may lead to panic or demoralization, examples of which are the German gas attacks of April, 1915, and their dive bomber-tank combination in May, 1940.

In the days of the longbow and later in the era of smooth-bore cannon and musket the danger area of a battlefield was small, troops were not exposed for long periods, and though casualties were heavy they occurred in a relatively short period. With the introduction of rifled weapons not only did the rate of fire increase, but the battlefield became larger and exposure to danger became longer until, in the trench warfare of the 1914-18 War, troops were under fire, or in the danger zone, for days and weeks at a time. The strain on the nerves increased and a new type of casualty appeared. Then aircraft spread the danger area over the whole theatre of war and later to the home countries as well. Thus combatant units even when not in contact with the enemy are in the danger zone, while all units are subject to worry as to the safety of their families at home. All this will be intensified in an unlimited war in which the new weapons of mass destruction are used in the theatre of war and elsewhere. If Clausewitz in his time considered a "correct idea of its influence necessary," how much more does the element of danger and its effects concern us today?

#### BODILY EXERTION

Clausewitz includes suffering as part of this second element and states: "In order not to be completely overcome by them, a certain strength of body and mind is required, which, either natural or acquired, produces indifference to them."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 48.

The state of being over-tired may arise from abnormal physical exertion and be increased by lack of sleep, or by prolonged strain arising from danger. This state can be increased to the point of suffering by climatic conditions such as the *khamisin* encountered in Libya, or mud, frost, and snow which so much affected the German operations in Russia during the Winter of 1941-1942. The frustration and fatigue caused by hanging about and achieving little or nothing due to indecision, bad staff work, or poor march discipline is a cause of unnecessary tiredness. Failure to supply adequate food and drink is a contributory cause.

It has already been noticed that over-tired troops are more liable to panic. On the other hand, history provides plenty of instances of tired troops of good morale achieving great results. Though this can be partly attributed to the experience and basic qualities of the troops, the major factor is the character of the commander dominating their minds. An example of this is the pursuit after Lord Allenby's victory of Megiddo in September, 1918. Again, the will of the commander is apparent in such achievements as Lord Roberts's march from Kabul to Kandahar during the hot season of 1880.

The fact that the functions of command are often carried out under great mental strain, probably aggravated by danger, exertion, or lack of sleep, has also to be reckoned with. It follows that commanders and staff officers must not only possess the will to overcome their own physical and mental fatigue, but also to stimulate others to fresh efforts.

All ranks need "a certain strength of body and mind," and exercises should be designed to give experience of conditions as like as possible to those which will be met in war. "This relates even to bodily fatigues. They should be practised less to accustom the body to them than the mind. In war the young soldier is very apt to regard unusual fatigues as the consequence of faults, mistakes, and embarrassment in the conduct of the whole, and to become distressed and despondent as a consequence. This would not happen if he had been prepared for this beforehand by exercises in peace."<sup>3</sup> It is true that memories of past exertions successfully overcome act as a spur to further achievements. On long exercises or in war one has often heard old hands boast, "This is nothing to what we did in the 19— manoeuvres," or in some operation in which the unit had taken part. The good marching of German troops has been noteworthy for many years; and since a large proportion of the troops employed at the outset of each successive war were reservists, this must have been largely due to the memories of hard training carried out in peace.

Notwithstanding modern developments in transport, fatigue remains an important element in war. Operations in which tactical nuclear weapons are used will call for great physical exertion, especially on the part of the Infantry. The same applies to limited wars, particularly in the undeveloped countries where they are most likely to occur: we have already seen the weaknesses of a road-bound army in Korea.

It appears certain that ability to endure exertion and hardship without loss of efficiency will be a much needed quality in a future war. Therefore habituation of the mind and body to cope with prolonged exertion is an essential part of training in peace.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 82.

## UNCERTAINTY

"War is the province of uncertainty: three-fourths of those things upon which action in war must be calculated are hidden in the clouds of great uncertainty."<sup>4</sup> This, of course, is due to lack of precise knowledge of what is happening on 'the other side of the hill.' It is almost invariably the case that information obtained by various means is either contradictory or false or, at least, of doubtful character. Air reconnaissance has not proved of such decisive value as was originally expected. On the other hand, modern means of inter-communication have done much to ensure the flow of timely information as to our own troops, the location and action of whom was formerly a source of further uncertainty. Nevertheless, commanders will usually still have to act on imperfect knowledge of enemy strength, morale, etc., and especially of his intentions.

Indecision due to uncertainty at the highest levels spreads downwards and leads to counter orders and confusion which in turn cause unnecessary physical exertion on the part of the troops and bad moral effect in all concerned. The French conduct of operations just prior to the battle of Sedan in 1870 furnishes a marked illustration.

Uncertainty is usually more acute in the case of the side on the defensive. In 1940, the French High Command considered there were three reasonable courses open to the Germans but assumed that the main thrust would come through the Liège Gap. The notorious Plan "D" was the result. In the event, the Germans adopted a fourth course and made their main effort between Namur and Sedan. Judging by their dispositions before the battle of El Alamein there was uncertainty in the German headquarters as to the time, place, and direction of the main attack. This uncertainty was prolonged and probably intensified by deception and stratagem. Further illustrations of this are the third battle of Gaza, 1917, the final offensive in Palestine, September, 1918, and the landing in France, June, 1944.

This uncertainty in war is considered by Clausewitz to be "one of the great chasms which separate *conception* and *execution*." It goes without saying that the staff must collect and sift information with discrimination, aided by knowledge of the enemy's methods and the characteristics of the opposing general, in a continued effort to break down the uncertainty which usually exists. The work of the staff in this connection is much heavier and more important than in the days of Clausewitz but, in the end, the commander's experience, judgment, and confidence in himself come into play in making decisions as the necessity arises.

## CHANCE

"War is the province of chance. In no sphere of activity is such a margin to be left for this intruder because none is so much in contact with him on all sides."<sup>5</sup> Chance in war may be defined as an undesigned occurrence which may hold possibilities favourable to one side and unfavourable to the other. The course of events may be deranged to a major degree by chance. For instance, the finding of a copy of Lee's orders wrapped round a few cigars during his withdrawal from Maryland in 1862 provided his opponent, McClellan, with a complete picture of his dispositions and intentions. Lee only escaped by mobility and hard fighting. The failure of the Germans to destroy the bridge at Remagen on the Rhine in March, 1945, is another example.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 49.



Abnormal weather has played a great part, even in recent times. After El Alamein the remains of the Afrika Korps were saved from capture by a rainstorm on 6th November, 1942, which bogged down the encircling mobile troops in the desert. In fact, history is full of examples where chance has had a major or minor effect. Experienced officers will usually be able to recollect unexpected events from which they have suffered or profited.

The elements of chance and uncertainty cannot be entirely eliminated, though knowledge, forethought, and skilful planning may achieve much in this direction. It should not be overlooked that a chance occurrence may be turned to his own advantage by a commander who has the quick brain and moral courage to recognize and act upon what may be only a fleeting opportunity. He may be lucky in that the chance occurred, but fortune must be grasped with both hands. For instance, Rommel made good use of the respite offered by the rainstorm referred to above.

There is interplay between the four elements that have been considered; the effect of one may be the cause of another. All have moral effect and are a test of character, knowledge, and experience of the leaders as well as of the spirit of the army as a whole.

#### FRICION

"Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a friction which no man can imagine exactly who has not seen war."<sup>6</sup> No experienced officer will deny that this is a fact, and it has become a maxim that sound and simple plans have the best chance of success either in strategy or tactics. But even simple plans are subject to the 'atmosphere of war' though less vulnerable to it than others.

The effects of the four elements referred to above may be the main causes of 'friction' in war. There are surely others which contribute to this state such as mistakes through stupidity, negligence, over-zealousness, or loss of time due to over-centralization and fear of accepting responsibility. The clash of personalities adds to normal friction. This was particularly the case in the German headquarters on the eastern front in 1914, mainly owing to the character of the Commander 1st Corps. Then there is the interference of politicians such as that from which our General Staff and Lord Haig suffered in 1917-1918.

Friction is at its worst in armies where discipline is slack and is usually at its lowest in a well-commanded, well-disciplined, and experienced force. There is no doubt that experience of war is of great value in this connection, especially in the higher ranks and staffs. Those who know what to expect are better prepared to act wisely, overcome the difficulties, and face the unexpected than those who only know war on paper. The latter tend to be dismayed if everything is different from what they expected and when hosts of petty circumstances arise to bedevil their efforts.

Friction occurs at all levels and in every sphere of activity in war. It is friction which distinguishes war on paper from the real thing and which intensifies the difficulty of adhering to that first principle of war—*maintenance of the aim or object*. There is no doubt that its incidence can be kept under control if staff work is good and there is a high standard of training, discipline, and morale throughout the Army. Nevertheless, it is upon the commander of any enterprise that the impact of these cumulative difficulties ultimately falls. Therefore, among the many qualities required of a commander, courage in face of responsibility, resolution in face of

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 77.

uncertainty, and determination or perseverance in achieving the object are of the utmost importance. Lord Haig, as Commander-in-Chief, displayed these qualities amidst a welter of difficulties, and his will to win was reflected in the determined spirit and morale of the British Expeditionary Force which finally achieved victory over the redoubtable German Imperial Army.

#### CONCLUSION

In the existing phase of subversive and psychological warfare, inappropriately termed the 'cold war,' the element of uncertainty is present. At the same time we are faced with the old problem of adapting new methods to established principles. But the fact that the four elements and friction will continue to exercise their influence must always be given due weight in planning.

The Army has to be prepared for a war of manœuvre in which commanders of all grades must be capable of initiative, of acting with speed, energy, and determination, and of grasping favourable chances. This will have to be done in the fog of uncertainty, probably in danger and when tired, and will need both types of courage.

The mobility and flexibility essential to successful manœuvre in the conditions of modern war will call for great endurance and the ability to 'live hard.' The present writer's experience in two world wars leads him to the opinion that troops who are 'good campaigners' as well as skilful soldiers are capable of greater endurance than those who are led to expect the amenities of civilization to follow them in the field. Not only is the endurance of good campaigners higher, but they can improvise, travel light, and live hard, while their morale is more easily maintained. It is suggested that we should make full use of past experience in this respect for training our young soldiers—brought up in a welfare state—and to impress upon them that hardihood is a necessary virtue in war.

In this brief sketch of a very big subject an attempt has been made to show how the four elements influence human nature in war and with other factors cause that 'friction' which is always present and has so much effect on the conduct of operations. The causes cannot be entirely eliminated; the effects can be mitigated by spirit, efficiency, and determined leadership.

A future war will, indeed, be a "terrifying and passionate drama" for which we ought to prepare the minds of all ranks. The spirit and skills of man are still the most important factor in war. The spirit must be able to overcome the weaknesses of the flesh, but to do so will have to be fortified by strong discipline and other military virtues.

This paper began with a quotation from Clausewitz; it concludes with another which has gained force since it was written just after the Napoleonic Wars and is appropriate to the existing situation. It is: "There is hardly any celebrated enterprise in war which was not achieved by endless exertion, pains, and privations; and as here the weakness of the physical and moral in man is ever disposed to yield, only an immense force of will, which manifests itself in perseverance admired by present and future generations, can conduct us to our goal."<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 192.

## THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1796 FROM THE AUSTRIAN STANDPOINT

By MAJOR E. W. SHEPPARD, O.B.E., M.C.

NAPOLEON'S first campaign of 1796 in Italy remains even today, after nearly 160 years, a classic of generalship. It has been the subject of numerous articles and books, the latest of which appeared in 1953. Nearly all these, however, study the campaign mainly if not entirely from the French side; the Austrian standpoint is rarely considered, and then only in critical, often indeed contemptuous, terms. Unfortunately, though understandably enough, little has been written about it from the Austrian side either, and the only noteworthy account is in crabbed Austrian German, difficult to read, and has never been translated into English. But this one history, *Geist und Stoff im Kriege* (Spirit and Matter in War), published in Vienna in 1896, by an anonymous Austrian officer who signed himself C. Von B-K., and whose full name was Von Binder Krieglstein, is so original and thought-provoking, and throws such a novel light on the events of the campaign, that a short resumé of it should be of value to students and of interest to the general reader.

At the time of Napoleon's arrival in Italy in March, 1796, command of the Austrian Army of Italy had just been taken over by General Beaulieu. His troops were still widely dispersed in winter quarters, and together with those of Piedmont, acting in conjunction with them, were preparing for the spring campaign when news came in that the French, in accordance with orders issued by the French Government, the Directory, to Napoleon's predecessor, Scherer, were advancing on the neutral city of Genoa along the coastal road between the sea and the Apennine mountains. The capture of this wealthy city and its great resources would enable the French not only to feed, clothe, and shoe their impoverished and starving troops, but also to advance into the Austrian province of Lombardy by good roads leading northwards from Genoa through the Apennines. But in this isolated advance on Genoa by a small French force exposing its left flank to the enemy, Beaulieu saw a chance to reply to the threat to Genoa by a still more telling threat from the Apennines, which would compel the enemy force to instant retreat and perhaps lead to its being cut off and destroyed. He therefore sent one column to head off the French force west of Genoa and another under Argenteau to come down from the Apennines at Montenotte and cut in on its rear. Having only just assumed command, he knew little of the ground or of his troops and was quite unaware that this new and untried French general opposed to him was a very thunderbolt of war, who was to be one of the greatest captains of world history.

Napoleon had, in fact, been much annoyed by his predecessor's move against Genoa, which prematurely alarmed the Austrians just at the moment when he himself was rapidly and secretly massing for an offensive to divide the hostile armies and drive the least formidable of the two, the Piedmontese, out of the war, so as to leave him free to deal with the Austrians alone. In fact, however, the premature move assisted his plan by inducing Beaulieu to disperse his forces and expose Argenteau's detachment at Montenotte to defeat by superior French forces. In a brief fortnight's campaign, carried through with extreme vigour and daring, Napoleon's troops crushed Argenteau's force, drove back the rest of Beaulieu's army to the north, forced the Piedmontese army away to the west, and compelled them to sue for an armistice. The Austrians had suffered a loss of some 10,000 men in a series of small

actions, all fought against a heavy numerical superiority; the balance of forces, which at the opening of the campaign stood in a ratio of four to three against the French, was turned into one favourable to them by the elimination of the Piedmontese army; and Napoleon acquired in Piedmont an admirable base for future operations against the Austrians in Lombardy.

From the point of view of the Austrian commander, however, all this was only a preliminary to the main campaign. There had been no set battle between the adversaries, only a series of partial combats; and Beaulieu and his troops still felt confident that in a pitched battle on equal terms they would prove themselves, as in the past, a match, if not more than a match, for their adversaries. So little was their morale and confidence affected, despite their heavy losses, that at the moment of the conclusion of the armistice by Piedmont, they were actually advancing to her assistance, and on hearing of her defection, they fell back slowly and in good order behind the line of the Po, ready to deliver a pitched battle under more favourable conditions. Unless he had fought and lost such a battle, no XVIIIth Century commander would consider that he had been defeated, however great his losses in isolated partial combats; and such was Beaulieu's view at this time. Neither he nor any of his XVIIIth Century colleagues would have accepted the possibility that a series of paltry defeats could so reduce the fighting efficiency of an army as to render it incapable of delivering the pitched battle which would decide the issue of the campaign.

"Bonaparte's merit" writes our author, "lay in his boldness and drive, and in his principle of always being in much the stronger force in each combat. Beaulieu's fault was that he failed to recognize in time the scale of the hostile attack, and let his troops be surprised and forced to fight on ground where they could do so only at a disadvantage."

In the next phase of operations, the French advance across the Po to the Mincio, Napoleon's purpose is usually misunderstood. His aim was not to round up and destroy the Austrian army, but simply to occupy Lombardy and Milan, so that his troops could halt there for rest, and the territory overrun could be consolidated and organized. This, and this only, he accomplished; and having done so, he let his enemy escape unmolested, and brought his army back into Lombardy. Here he was in a position to deal with threatened popular risings against the French method of supply by 'living off the country,' which in practice meant by plunder and rapine. This pause in operations was followed by the French forcing of the Mincio line, and then by the most interesting and most misunderstood period of the campaign, the prolonged and costly contest for the fortress of Mantua.

The most remarkable fact about this phase, and the key to understanding it, is that Napoleon always considered it impossible to advance beyond Mantua, leaving it uncaptured behind him. He therefore besieged it with 10,000 of his 40,000 men under Serurier and disposed the other 30,000 to cover the approaches to it from north and east. In this position at the end of July his army was attacked by a fresh Austrian army of 50,000 men, under the veteran Marshal Wurmser.

According to all the critics, from the great Clausewitz down to the author of *Attack in the West*, published in 1953, Wurmser committed a cardinal error by advancing in several separated columns on either side of the Lake of Garda. In this way, it is said, he allowed Napoleon an opportunity, which the latter was not slow to seize, of counter-attacking and defeating his divided columns in succession. But this criticism misses the whole point of the operation. Wurmser's purpose, a perfectly

reasonable and feasible one, was not to destroy or even defeat the French army in battle, but to bring aid to beleaguered Mantua, so that it could prolong its resistance. He was obviously more likely to achieve this by advancing in widely separated columns, one at least of which might be able to reach the fortress, drive off its besiegers, destroy their siege works, and replenish its supplies. These aims were not more but less likely to be achieved by an army advancing in mass and attempting to deliver a decisive battle against an enemy who would himself have concentrated to meet it.

In fact, Wurmser's plan, which included the despatch of a strong force by the west shore of Lake Garda to threaten the French line of retreat, fully achieved its purpose. Napoleon got so severe a fright that at one moment it was touch and go with him whether he should not order a general retreat of his whole army on Milan. Only by a series of desperate hand-to-mouth expedients and a display of remarkable energy and speed of movement, both by himself and his troops, did he manage to restore his severed communications and hold the Austrians in check. By the time he was ready to launch his counter-attack at Castiglione, Wurmser had attained his object and would probably have drawn off his army in any case. Mantua had been relieved and reprovisioned; the French had lost their siege train and their siege works had been levelled; and the fortress garrison had been placed in a position to resist for many more months to come. And so long as this resistance continued, the French Army of Italy was held fast before its walls.

Wurmser's campaign was no ill-conducted and discreditable failure, but a well conceived and complete success from the strategical point of view; and though tactical victory in the final combat rested with the French, it was barren of results.

Critics and historians have often cited these operations around Mantua as examples of the superiority of what are technically termed 'interior lines of operations' by an army, united in a central position, attacking and defeating in succession the separated columns of an army advancing on 'exterior lines of operations' with the object of outflanking or enveloping it. It was not however the system of operations which brought tactical victory, such as it was, to Napoleon. It was, in the first place, his resolution, fertility in expedients, and determination to bring up and use every unit available of his army, first to recover his lost line of retreat, and then to drive his enemy back into the mountains; and secondly, the high mobility and fine fighting qualities of the French troops, which enabled them to snatch safety out of apparently inevitable disaster.

The second phase of the campaign for Mantua followed in September. In considering the Italian campaign of 1796 it must always be remembered that it was only a secondary operation in a subsidiary theatre; the principal campaign was fought out in Germany between the Austrians under the brilliant young Archduke Charles, the only general in Europe in the same class as Napoleon, and two French Armies, under two second-rate generals, Jourdan and Moreau. By the end of August these had overrun central Germany and were approaching the western frontier of Bohemia and Lower Austria. The French Government therefore ordered the French Army of Italy to advance into the Tyrol and unite with Moreau's southernmost French Army by way of the Brenner Pass and Innsbruck. Napoleon expected to find Wurmser's army barring this route, but discovered to his surprise that it was in fact on his right flank in the Brenta valley; its mere presence there prevented him from continuing his northward advance into the Tyrol, as his flank and rear would be in danger of attack if he pressed on. He therefore swung his army eastwards into the Brenta valley, where a series of partial and indecisive combats took place.



Wurmser, knowing that the French must perforce follow where he led them, moved south and west into the valley of the Adige, and conducted his army, 30,000 strong, safely into Mantua, making it impregnable against assault, though of course increasing somewhat the rate of expenditure of its supplies, which however proved sufficient for four months to come.

This phase of the campaign may therefore be regarded as a drawn game, with honours easy. Neither side had achieved its purpose. Wurmser, by taking up position on the flank of Napoleon's line of advance into Germany, had prevented a junction with the main French armies there, and he had reinforced the garrison of Mantua and prolonged its power of resistance. Napoleon had been unable to fulfil the task set him by his Government, and had failed to destroy Wurmser's army before it could reach and reinforce Mantua; but he had shut it up there, so that the Austrians had to raise a new field army for a third attempt to relieve the fortress. Here again Napoleon's success, such as it was, was achieved not by his choice of strategical method, but by the superior mobility and fighting power of his troops.

The next Austrian attempt to relieve Mantua, made by a newly raised army of 43,000 men under a new general, Alvintzi, all but succeeded. The first part of the operations went badly for the French; the Austrians advancing as before in two columns, the one southward from the Tyrol along the east side of Lake Garda, the other westward against the French covering line on the Adige, both made progress and a French counter-attack in the Adige sector failed. The Austrian column from the Tyrol, however, advanced so slowly that Napoleon had time to concentrate at Arcola a force sufficient, after three days of bitter fighting, in forcing the Austrian main army to retreat. Here again it was not the form of the strategical operations, 'interior' against 'exterior' lines, which brought about the decision, but the fighting superiority of Napoleon and his troops over the raw and inexperienced Austrians, which more than counterbalanced the latter's two to one superiority on the battlefield of Arcola. Opposed to the hesitation and slowness of the Austrian leadership, the French resolution and determination redeemed all their previous strategical errors and enabled them to win against all the odds of unfavourable ground and inferior numbers.

Once again, in January, 1797, the Austrians attempted the relief of Mantua, now nearing the end of its powers of resistance. Alvintzi led forward 45,000 men in two columns, as before, but this time with the main weight in the Lake Garda sector, and the subsidiary effort against the Adige front. Napoleon, however, penetrated his adversary's plan in sufficient time to mass a superiority of force on the battlefield of Rivoli and crush Alvintzi's troops, which had deteriorated in fighting quality after so long and unbroken a series of tactical defeats. They escaped destruction because, immediately after Napoleon's victory, he had to hurry the bulk of his army southwards to deal with the subsidiary Austrian force on the Adige front, which was caught and destroyed only when within sight of Mantua, and which must have found safety there but for the failure of the garrison to do anything to help it.

The fortress fell at last early in February, 1797, after one of the longest sieges in history. It had effectively filled the true strategic role of a fortress, to economize time and forces for the benefit of the field armies operating elsewhere. It had detained Napoleon and his army in Italy and gained time for the Archduke Charles to win a decisive victory in Germany. Thus, despite the brilliance of Napoleon's campaign of 1796 in Italy, the overall balance of success in this year was on the side of the Austrians. Their repeated attacks, intended, not to defeat and destroy the French

army in Italy, but merely to prolong the resistance of Mantua and retain the French in front of it as long as possible, had cost much in losses but had fully achieved their purpose. The series of tactical victories won by Napoleon were in fact of minor strategical importance, because they brought the fall of Mantua no nearer; and indeed the results of Wurmser's two attempts were to postpone the date of its fall still further and prolong its total time of resistance to eight months.

The final campaign, in which Napoleon pushed his army boldly into Austria and induced the Vienna Government to sign the armistice of Leoben, is of minor interest only from the strategical point of view. The Archduke Charles, brilliant leader as he had proved himself to be, had insufficient troops at his disposal to be able to put up any effective resistance. The lengthening line of the French communications in a territory bitterly hostile deterred Napoleon from pushing beyond the Semmering Pass and launching an attack on Vienna, the spires of which he could see from his advanced posts; but the mere threat of such an attack sufficed to induce the Austrian Government to conclude hostilities. Napoleon had, in fact, once more shown himself bold and venturesome, but had he advanced on Vienna he could hardly have taken it by assault or effectively invested it. His army, which during its long advance had shrunk from 80,000 to 30,000 strong, was isolated in the heart of Austria, for the French Army of Germany had only just crossed the Rhine and could not reach him for many weeks, if at all. It therefore suited him to propose, and the Austrian Government to agree to, a suspension of hostilities which quickly brought the war to an end.

Most of the accounts of this 1796 campaign in Italy attribute to it, because it was the first fought by one of the greatest generals of all time, an importance which in the eyes of contemporaries it did not possess. Barely half a dozen books about it appeared before the end of the century when Napoleon again showed his military quality and enhanced his reputation as a general in Egypt and at Marengo and rose to supreme power in France. Even from the standpoint of today, we do wrong to regard it as a series of brilliant and inevitable victories by a young genius over a set of incompetent and pedantic commanders of an outworn school of war. Such a view does much less than justice to Napoleon's adversaries, who for a whole year baffled his endeavours to fulfil the mission set him by his Government, and more than once brought him close to a disaster which only his admirable qualities enabled him to escape. Indeed, the traditional view is equally unjust to Napoleon himself, for what merit is there in victories won over armies of clumsy and inefficient troops led by fools and dolts? That the Italian campaign of 1796 called forth, as it did, such an outstanding display of genius and valour on the part of the young French general and his young troops is also a tribute to the talents and high quality of the veteran Austrian commanders and the stubbornness and valour of their soldiers, who fought on non-daunted to the end under the shadow of repeated defeats and heavy losses.

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## THE ORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISION IN A NUCLEAR WAR

By BT. LIEUT.-COLONEL N. E. V. SHORT, 6th GURKHA RIFLES

**I**N recent years the plains of Western Germany have trembled time after time beneath the impact of large-scale atomic manoeuvres. "Grand Repulse," "Battle Royal," and "Full House," have all in their day unleashed the four divisions of Rhine Army in a determined search after nuclear know-how amongst the expanses of open country and water stretching from the Elbe to the Yssel. If the search has not yet proved entirely successful, it is not for want of trying. The organization of the division in the atomic age has been given a greater effort of research and trial than any comparable military problem in recent times. Somewhere, somehow, the answer will be found.

Since that answer may well govern our organizations for the next 20 years, it deserves unusually careful consideration, especially as time is limited. Whether or not we expect a hot war in Europe in the near future is not primarily the point at issue. The fact is that whatever the political atmosphere, armies cannot be kept in an experimental state indefinitely; the reasons are many and do not concern us here. Enough to say that we need to know, and know reasonably soon, the form in which we shall be expected to fight future wars.

Such progress as has already been made along this road is therefore highly interesting. Inasmuch as it may perhaps be the blue-print for the future, it is worth studying in some detail, though no one can predict the exact form it will eventually take. Whilst admitting that current thought on the subject is still far from crystallized, it can nevertheless be stated that the general trend is towards integration and specialization.

### INTEGRATION AND SPECIALIZATION

Integration in this context is the process of intermingling armour and infantry in one and the same brigade. It applies chiefly to the experimental infantry division, organized for trial purposes into three brigades, each of one armoured regiment and three infantry battalions. In the experimental armoured division, consisting probably of four armoured regiments and one motor battalion, all commanded directly by divisional headquarters, there will still be integration of a sort, even though the brigade organization is abandoned and the armour outnumbers the infantry by four to one.

The arguments supporting this policy are logical and perfectly clear. In the nuclear age, and against the considerable numerical superiority that we must accept in a European theatre, operations by brigade groups concentrated on the 1944-45 pattern will no longer be possible. If they are attempted, not only will there be insufficient troops to cover the very wide frontages expected, but the physical concentration in space of units up to brigade strength will invite destruction by atomic weapons. We should therefore consider operating in small, integrated battle groups of mixed armour and infantry, each based on a lieutenant-colonel's command, and each with sufficient artillery and engineer support to enable it to act independently when nuclear devastation renders normal methods of communication impossible. It is to make this tactical concept feasible that mixed brigades of armour and infantry are now proposed.

Specialization is the policy of organizing the infantry and armoured divisions on such widely differing establishments that they cannot possibly fulfil even approximately similar functions. The infantry division thus constituted would be predominantly defensive; strong in infantry and in light artillery, and possessing considerable fire-power when deployed defensively, but slow moving, with the armour tied to the pace of the marching foot-soldier. The armoured division on the other hand is the mobile force *par excellence*. It is designed for armed reconnaissance, flank protection, armoured counter-attack, atomic exploitation, and the like. It cannot hold ground and indeed is virtually defenceless when not on the move. Its artillery is likely to be limited to one medium regiment.

The practical effect of these proposals is therefore to enforce on a commander what for lack of a better term might be described as golf-bag tactics. Since his clubs are not interchangeable he will be obliged to select the particular one for the job. For defensive operations he will use the infantry putter, for the longer, more swiftly-moving shot, the iron.

On the face of it specialization sounds an attractive idea. The jack-of-all-trades complex that has existed in the Army for many years has had its critics, and certainly under the conditions likely to exist in the early stages of a war there is something to be said for reducing the number and complexity of the tasks confronting individual units. The fewer they are given, within practical limits, the better will they perform them. But the subject requires deeper study than that. Let us therefore examine these tentative organizations a little more closely.

In both divisions, the factor that emerges with immediate and startling clarity is the inflexibility of the armour-to-infantry ratio. It is 1 : 3 in the infantry division, 4 : 1 in the armoured division, and in neither case can this proportion be significantly altered. There is no means of concentrating the armour in the infantry division, since there is no headquarters provided to command it. Obviously there can only be one scale of infantry support in the armoured division—the minimum necessary to provide close protection for the tanks.

#### ROLE OF THE SPECIALIZED DIVISION

From this somewhat rigid mathematical formula the role of the armour—and therefore of the division as a whole—follows automatically. In the infantry division the armour will be employed as close support for the foot-soldiers; in defence, deployed in hull-down positions throughout the divisional front; in attack, moving at a walking pace alongside the assaulting infantry, and shooting them on to the objective. In the armoured division the converse will be true. The armour will only be able to operate in the mobile role—counter-attack, exploitation, and so forth—and will be highly vulnerable when not on the move owing to the virtual absence of supporting infantry.

Taking the process of deduction to its logical conclusion, the overall pattern of operations becomes plain. The infantry divisions will be employed to clear obstacles and hold ground, the armoured divisions to counter-attack and exploit. Once the infantry, using its own organic armour, has cleared the obstacle or established the bridgehead, the armoured division will pass through and exploit. When the infantry in their defensive positions suffer penetration on a scale that cannot be restored by the use of the divisional reserve, such as it is, the armoured division will come to the rescue. And as an atomic task force, whether to follow up a strike on an enemy target or to plug the gap when our own troops have been atomized, the services of the armoured division will be in wide demand.

That then is the tactical doctrine, and quite clearly it stands or falls by the ability of the two divisions to work together in double harness. If the one fails for any reason to fulfil its allotted role, the other is hamstrung. If the armoured division in particular is unequal to the demands made on it, the infantry division rapidly becomes powerless and the whole tactical structure collapses in ruins. Let us see how far the probable characteristics of a nuclear war are likely to encourage this very intimate form of co-operation.

#### HOW EFFECTIVE WILL THE SPECIALIZED DIVISION BE ?

First, there is the imponderable factor of atomic sufficiency. Recent pronouncements on this subject lead us to believe that atomic missiles of one sort or another will be freely used on the modern battlefield. It will not simply be a matter of one or two. Furthermore, we must assume that techniques of demanding and authorizing these missiles will eventually be simplified to the point where the whole process takes only a few hours. No doubt the specialized armoured division will be able to exploit the individual strike, and then, after a reasonable interval, another. But in conditions where atomic missiles are being used by both sides like tomatoes at an election, and with little more warning, the position is obviously different. Either we shall need far more of these divisions than we can ever expect to maintain, or the majority of nuclear calls will go unanswered.

Secondly, there is the question of speed. On the assumption that procedures can be simplified, demands for the use of the armoured division in an exploitation role will arise at short notice. No commander can possibly guarantee to foresee the tactical use of the atomic weapon in time to alert the armoured division, move it from its concentration area—which may well be widely dispersed—and deploy it to battle before the effects of the explosion wear off. The division would never get there in time, even if the enemy were lethargic enough not to interdict its move forward. Speed is equally vital in the counter-attack or counter-penetration role. Von Mellenthin has related how, on the eastern front during the last war, the situation was restored time and again by means of immediate counter-attacks launched by armour in strength. But the emphasis is on speed, otherwise the operation is likely to be a costly failure. Again, what guarantee is there under nuclear conditions that the armoured division will arrive in time ?

Finally, there is the ever-present factor of the unexpected. Even if the armoured division is committed to one or other of its roles successfully, there is still the certainty that events will not go entirely according to plan. Pockets of resistance will be encountered that should in theory have been pulverized by the atomic strike. The maintenance route will be interfered with and replenishment convoys will have to be fought through. For various reasons the division may have to stay out unsupported for longer than was originally planned. To meet such eventualities, the cry will inevitably go up for more infantry, since these are primarily infantry tasks. But the tactical conception of the specialized armoured division does not provide for such contingencies, and more infantry, when the time comes, will be exceedingly difficult to obtain.

#### DEDUCTIONS

From these rather general thoughts it is possible to draw certain broad conclusions regarding the organization of the division in modern war. Firstly, any division must be capable with its own resources of dealing with any normal operation of war likely to be met. This includes the holding of ground, either temporarily or in



protracted defence, the ability to exploit offensively, and the ability to counter-attack within given time limits. It is fundamentally unsound for a division to be organized solely to fulfil one or other of these functions, and to expect the remainder to be done for it by someone else. Secondly, and perhaps obviously, these resources must be so organized as to be adaptable to meet changing conditions. The mere possession of organic divisional armour is of little value in itself unless the armour can be readily concentrated and employed in a mobile role when the opportunity presents itself.

Where does this lead us? Surely to the conclusion that in the atomic age there can be no basic segregation of divisions into infantry and armoured types, but that all divisions will require infantry and armour in approximately similar proportions. We arrive, in fact, at the standard division.

#### COMPOSITION OF THE STANDARD DIVISION

As to what the exact proportion of armour to infantry should be in such a division, opinions will differ. But without becoming involved in professional argument, it can be said that unless the infantry preponderate, the many incidental tasks that arise, such as patrolling, defence of harbour areas by night, mine laying and lifting, and so forth, will either grossly overstrain such infantry as there are, or will be neglected altogether. For purposes of trial and discussion, two parts of infantry to one of armour might form a reasonable basis on which to start.

What does this mean in terms of actual regiments and battalions? Here we encounter the limitations imposed by Great Britain's membership of N.A.T.O. So long as divisions within the N.A.T.O. group of Powers are by and large standardized on conventional lines, it is obviously hazardous for any one nation to indulge in unilateral flights of fancy. The greater the degree of integration within N.A.T.O., the more closely must organizations and methods be standardized. The problems of grouping formations internationally require that the various divisions should at least approximate to the same general pattern of shape and size. To introduce into this organization a division of only six combat units (capable of holding no ground) together with one of sixteen (capable of little else) would be to complicate the N.A.T.O. structure beyond endurance. Despite the political and financial attractions of a 'pocket division,' it is probable that a more workable organization would be a force of about three armoured regiments and not less than six infantry battalions.

#### INTEGRATION OR NOT?

When considering whether these units should be organized functionally or in mixed brigades, the arguments on each side need careful study. It is true that in mixed brigades the opportunities for the commander to practise control of an integrated force are greater than in any other organization. It is also true that in such a formation the personnel of the various units have greater opportunities of getting to know each other, and of learning about the equipment and tactical methods which the other employs. In other words, there is closer integration of armour and infantry than would be possible in a homogenous organization.

But if the tactical doctrine is based on the armoured/infantry regimental group, the integration has still not gone far enough. It is the lieut.-colonel's command which is the integrated operational entity, and integration at brigade level, though it helps, does not carry the policy to its logical conclusion. Furthermore, it is possible to argue with some justification that the need for armour and infantry to speak the same tactical language does not demand that they be permanently organized into

the same brigade, with all the difficulties and complications that this entails. For difficulties there will be, let us make no mistake about that.

Tank-infantry co-operation, when all is said and done, is nothing new. It was practised successfully enough in the last war when the opportunities for combined training were more restricted than they are today. The rudiments can be learned in a fortnight, and a very polished team produced in six weeks. In 1943-44, tank-infantry training in S.E.A.C. normally lasted about three weeks. If in the course of such a period it was found possible to produce a battleworthy organization out of a British armoured regiment, a Gurkha infantry battalion, American tanks, and Australian wireless equipment, there should be few serious difficulties facing our Army even in this atomic age. Certainly the problem does not by itself justify the acceptance as a matter of course of the many difficulties raised by the integrated organization.

What are these difficulties in practice? In the first place, it is not reasonable to expect a brigade commander to assume the same responsibilities for the training of tank crews as he does for the infantry. It is, for example, not easy for him to judge the state of tank driver training and tank gunnery in his brigade unless he has had experience of these matters himself. And unless satisfactory standards in these and other aspects of training are reached beforehand, fusion of the armour and infantry into an effective fighting force—not in itself a difficult process—will be impossible. No doubt he can generally rely on the initiative and ability of his armoured regimental commander, and more often than not will be justified in so doing. But this is not a principle of command as normally practised, and where exceptionally the regiment is below the required standard, it can only get worse. It is interesting to note that already in the experimental infantry division there have been murmured requests for a commander R.A.C. on the establishment of divisional headquarters, largely for co-ordination of R.A.C. training.

Secondly, with the best intentions in the world it is impossible to avoid administrative complications when units of different arms are permanently grouped together under the same commander and staff. This is accepted at divisional level, and the divisional staff and service representation is adjusted accordingly. But a brigade headquarters is not an administrative headquarters in the divisional sense. It owns virtually no administrative resources, and has the minimum administrative staff and services necessary to control a homogenous brigade. Whilst it may have been possible for the staff of a conventional armoured brigade to administer the motor battalion after a fashion, the same will not hold good when the tables are turned. The impact on an infantry brigade headquarters of the whole range of domestic R.A.C. problems such as manpower, courses, inspections, and the like will inevitably lead, sooner or later, to increases in staff if not to outright administrative confusion.

The third and paramount drawback of the integrated organization has already been touched on. Once the armour is permanently decentralized to brigades, it becomes to all intents and purposes impossible to concentrate it for operations in a conventional armoured role. There is no armoured headquarters to command it, and indeed the armour, by reason of its prolonged misuse as infantry anti-tank protection, would be incapable of functioning in its proper role even if there were. So long as the armour remains homogeneously organized, it can be placed in support of the infantry if required, and at the same time retain the ability to operate when necessary in its primary role. Once this organization is broken down, the armour becomes nothing more than mobile anti-tank and close support artillery for the infantry.

For all these reasons therefore it becomes clear that the homogenous brigade, be it armoured or infantry, must form the basis of the divisional organization in modern war. Integration at brigade level cannot produce a fully integrated unit in the field, and in attempting to do so abandons the one organization that is capable of giving tactical flexibility in battle. It is a will-o-the-wisp flitting mischievously over complex and unmanageable ground.

#### DEPLOYMENT OF HOMOGENOUS BRIGADES

We are left then with three functionally organized brigades, two of infantry, one of armour. The grouping can be varied according to operational requirements. No doubt it would sometimes be necessary to dissipate the armour into three identical brigades, each of one armoured regiment and two infantry battalions. More often one would hope that at least two-thirds of the armour would be left with the armoured brigade, to form a reserve having the punch necessary to exploit or counter-attack. There are other alternatives as well, for the basic ingredients can be compounded in a variety of ways. The principle remains that the training, administration, and tactical handling of armour when concentrated are the responsibility of the armoured brigade commander, whilst all brigade commanders must be capable of employing mixed forces of armour and infantry in normal operations.

#### RECONNAISSANCE, PROTECTION, ETC.

What of the other, secondary tasks that fall to certain of the combat units to perform? There will be the inevitable demands for reconnaissance, protection, traffic control, as well as for infantry for the close support of armour operating in a mobile role. How are these and similar demands to be met? Is there to be a divisional armoured car regiment, or a motor battalion, or both, or is the requirement to be met in some other way?

Before attempting to answer this question in detail, it will be as well to take note of two factors which may in the end prove decisive. The first of these is the plain fact that under present-day conditions of manpower and finance, the Country cannot afford to maintain a fighting unit unless that unit can in fact fight. In the last resort its value to the taxpayer must be judged by its capacity for ground-holding, or for punching. Efficiency in the performance of secondary tasks such as reconnaissance and protection must not be achieved at the expense of the ability, when needed, to fight a pitched battle. The second factor worth bearing in mind is that the flexibility of the division will be seriously reduced if the divisional commander is forced to call on the organic units of the brigades to carry out tasks such as those outlined. The resources needed for such tasks must come from somewhere else.

The logical deduction is clear. There must be at least one unit—possibly more—provided from sources outside the brigades themselves, and so organized that when the tactical situation demands, it can fight as well as any other unit in the division. How does the armoured car regiment measure up to these requirements? Certainly it forms no organic part of any brigade organization, but can it when the time comes fight a battle? Can it even do the limited amount of fighting necessary to secure information in the reconnaissance role?

Let us save needless argument and admit at once that with present equipment it can do neither. The gun, even in the Assault Troop, is no match for the weight of armour likely to be met on reconnaissance, and the cross-country performance of the present armoured car is inferior to that of the jeep. The unit cannot hold ground even in emergency, and in a counter-attacking role its value is negligible. By present-day standards it must be concluded that the armoured car regiment is an expensive anachronism.

What are the alternatives? Before studying them in detail it may be helpful to consider the characteristics of the particular tasks likely to be undertaken. Reconnaissance and flank protection demand the ability to move quickly over wide frontages, or in considerable depth, sometimes across country, with sufficient offensive power to be able to press home an engagement against initial opposition. Good wireless communications over long distances are a *sine qua non*.

These requirements do not necessarily dictate a specialized unit. Indeed, they are perfectly straightforward tasks for conventional armour and infantry, mixed according to the demands of the situation. In a rapid advance, for instance, the armoured element of the reconnaissance force would predominate. In more deliberate progress against stiffening opposition, the proportion of infantry might well be higher. The same considerations apply to flank protection and even to rearguards. The essentials are that the force should be of mixed armour and infantry, and that the infantry should be suitably mounted. What appears to be required, on the face of it, is an additional armoured regiment, and an additional infantry battalion equipped with cross-country vehicles. The infantry battalion thus organized could also meet the requirement for close support of armour operating in a mobile role. Equally it should be quite capable, when not otherwise committed, of carrying out traffic control duties within the division, for which efficient wireless communications are the prime necessity.

The grouping of these two units raises certain problems. Clearly they will for the most part be operating under the direct control of divisional headquarters, and as such might logically be treated as divisional troops. On the other hand the infantry battalion will generally be operating with the armoured brigade whenever it is possible to concentrate the armour for a mobile or offensive role, and there will be times when the armoured regiment too will be grouped under the armoured brigade headquarters. Taking into consideration the difficulties of training and administration when units are separated from their functional headquarters, it seems best on balance for these two units to form part of the armoured brigade, though for most of the time they may well be operating independently.

The armoured regiment should be organized identically with the regiments of the armoured brigade, and indeed on occasions may well operate as conventional armour. The infantry battalion, whilst retaining the same basic organization as the remainder of the infantry—so that it can dig in and hold ground if required—must be equipped with its own half-tracks or similar vehicles. The temptation to increase flexibility by positioning the half-tracks in the divisional column, where they are theoretically available for any infantry battalion that cares to use them, must be resisted. The role of the unit is largely specialized, and cannot be undertaken at a moment's notice by another battalion, nor for that matter will communications with the armour work if the wirelesses are constantly interchanged. The limited inflexibility of the organization must therefore be accepted, since the alternative of equipping all infantry battalions in the division with half-tracks is not, for administrative reasons, worth serious consideration.

We have thus arrived at a division that is smaller and less cumbersome than the proposed infantry division, but larger and considerably more flexible than the experimental armoured division. The organic resources of the division are sufficient to meet any normal requirement of war, and they are so organized as to be capable of deployment to battle in any tactical grouping that the situation demands. In defence, the normal grouping might well be two brigades committed, each of three infantry battalions and a regiment of armour. The remaining two armoured regiments and



the motor battalion would be grouped under the armoured brigade commander for counter-attack and atomic exploitation. On wider frontages or where greater depth was needed, it might be necessary to deploy the division in three identical brigades, each of two infantry battalions and up to a regiment of armour. In such an operation the remaining armoured regiment and the motor battalion would still form the nucleus of a powerful reserve. The organization is flexible enough to permit of many variations, and the command of such a force in war should not prove beyond the capabilities of the G.O.C. provided his brigade commanders possessed the fundamental ability to handle mixed forces of armour and infantry in battle. It may perhaps call for higher qualities of command and administrative ability than have been needed in the past. So, for that matter, will warfare under nuclear conditions whatever organizations are employed.

#### ARTILLERY, ENGINEERS AND LOGISTICS

The make and shape of the artillery, engineer, and logistical components of the division, as well as the signals organization, are highly interesting subjects in themselves, but are outside the scope of a paper dealing only with the two major issues of integration and specialization. Whatever the equipment and tactical methods decided on, the basic organizations cannot, at the present time and for the next few years, be other than conventional.

#### CONCLUSIONS

To summarize and perhaps over-simplify the conclusions reached in this paper, we can say that :—

(a) The character of nuclear war, as well as the obvious limitations imposed by manpower and finance, rule out a policy of specialized divisions. Each division must within practical limits be capable of undertaking any normal operation of war with its own organic resources.

(b) To integrate armour permanently with the infantry brigade organization places unnecessary and unacceptable restrictions on its ability to function in its primary role. Armour must therefore be organized homogeneously, and decentralized to infantry brigades only when necessary.

(c) The only divisional organization compatible with the above requirements is one consisting of homogeneous brigades of armour and infantry. To provide tactical flexibility and to conform to N.A.T.O. conceptions of size, the division should consist basically of one brigade of armour and two of infantry.

(d) The ability of combat units to fight when necessary must not be sacrificed to efficiency in the performance of secondary duties such as reconnaissance and flank protection. These and similar tasks can best be carried out by an additional armoured regiment, and an additional infantry battalion mounted in half-tracks or comparable vehicles.

(e) The technique of tank-infantry co-operation in war is not difficult to learn, and all armoured and infantry commanders must be capable of handling mixed forces on the battlefield.

And still the search goes on. "Grand Repulse" and "Battle Royal" are all but forgotten now, but bigger and better manoeuvres are planned for the year ahead. Perhaps in the Autumn, when for the umpteenth time since the Luneburg surrender the Centurions roll out on to the sour Westphalian plain and the cobblestones start to fly in the little villages along the Weser, the magic formula will be found—the answer to the atomic riddle.



## THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION<sup>1</sup>

By A. K. CHESTERTON, M.C.

### CHANGING WORLD PATTERNS

**D**URING the last few months the face of the political world has been changing at a swifter speed than at any other time in history. Soon most of the landmarks familiar to all except young people will have vanished. "The old order changeth, yielding place to new," but whether the new order will be better than the old, or whether 'order' will even be the right word to describe the dispensation now coming into its own, remains to be seen. I write that the world has been changing, but the process is not haphazard or simply inherent in the post-war situation. The pattern of change has repeated itself often enough to suggest that it is directed, the effect of a purposeful policy.

Although the result must be to weaken the European nations through the weakening and sometimes the complete abandonment of their overseas interests, as yet the change is not apparent in Europe. The untidy and unhappy state of our continent remains much as it has been since the war ended. Germany remains divided, there is no more than a nominal Franco-German *rapprochement*, and, although there has been a vast improvement in material conditions, thoughtful men are uncertain of the future and all but the most sanguine will admit in private that their hearts are full of foreboding.

#### RUSSIA'S NEW LOOK

Superficialists would have us believe that the one certain change in Europe is the Russian 'New Look.' This is a thesis which owes more to propaganda than to fact. The very term indicates a titivating of the appearance of something which otherwise remains as it was. When the first titivations began, Mr. Krushchev affirmed the simple truth when he said: "Anyone who mistakes our smile for a withdrawal from the policies of Marx and Lenin is making a mistake. Those who expect this will have to wait until Easter falls on a Tuesday." The Marxist-Leninist line is certainly not a straight one. It "alters where it alteration finds," but only to facilitate the approach to its fixed objective. The 'New Look' would be the more convincing had those who don it not been the enthusiastic and by no means the gentlest of Stalin's lieutenants.

Indeed, properly considered, what has been done to Stalin's memory is part of Stalin's own technique. He would make a show of taking the people's part against those who carried out the purges, which he himself ordered, by purging the purgers. And after the second purge had gone too far he would purge the second lot of purgers so as to continue the preposterous pretence of guardian of the Russian people. At last the purger-in-chief has himself been purged, albeit posthumously, for precisely the same purpose. There is now the added inducement of wearing a liberal face for the benefit of the western nations. The communist regime in all essentials nevertheless remains what it was, and so does the communist objective of subverting the non-communist world. Its new look is more deadly than the old.

#### ASIA

##### FRANCE QUILTS INDO-CHINA

The agreement on Indo-China reached at the conferences held at Geneva provided for the withdrawal of French troops by the end of June if so required by the Southern

<sup>1</sup> As deduced from reports up to 16th April.

Viet-nam Government. The withdrawal has been carried out a month ahead of schedule and a fortnight after these notes have been written there will be no remnant of the French Union's expeditionary force left in the country. There are those who argue that the evacuation will leave Southern Viet-nam in a stronger position to meet the communist challenge than when France supplied the bulk of the containing power. I must confess that their thought-processes baffle me.

The holding of joint general elections in Northern and Southern Viet-nam was to have been co-terminous with the ending of French military occupation, but there is no possibility of this part of the agreement being carried out by the end of June or at any other time while the present dispensation obtains. Should communist plotting succeed in disposing of the Diem Government, no doubt an 'election' would then be staged to give an appearance of legality to the absorption of the whole area within the Chinese Communist Empire. The gloomy prognostications made in this review before and after the battle of Dien Bien Phu have been all too faithfully fulfilled, and it would be irresponsible to predict that the road ahead is destined to lead to the sunlit uplands.

#### MALAYA AND SINGAPORE

Although Malaya, as distinct from Singapore, is not often in the news these days, it would be a mistake to think that little is happening in that country. Preparations for 'independence' are being pushed forward, the establishment of a central bank is being given close attention, and there is a never ending search for some formula which will make possible a South-East Asian Federation. Pulling in a contrary direction, though as yet without much force, are the movements in Penang and Malacca which desire to contract out of the Malayan political orbit and become attached to Singapore. It may be that the South-East Asian Federation formula, if found, will give these movements their quietus.

Whether or not the separatists of Penang and Malacca would fare any better in association with Singapore is, to say the least, doubtful. Mr. David Marshall, its Chief Minister, predicts that he will be assassinated within two years, which does not indicate any very rosy hope for law and order in the dispensation which he is helping to establish. British residents and loyal Straits Chinese in Singapore view the future with the gravest concern. They predict a period of anarchy and chaos and of mounting terrorism—terrorists are already active in the city—followed by a communist *coup*. I spoke of these matters at some length with a prominent Straits Chinese business man the other day and asked him why the desire for British control to remain, which he assured me was strong in many hearts, had not been organized to better effect. "There is fear," he replied. I suggested that there would be worse things to fear if the Communists gained the upper hand, but, while he agreed that this was undoubtedly true, I gathered the impression that the Straits Chinese have come to rely so greatly on British leadership that its withdrawal has left them confused and unable themselves to take the initiative.

As I write, Mr. Marshall is again in London preparing to negotiate a final settlement for the granting of full independence to Singapore. The only problem reported to be outstanding is the question of internal security. While Great Britain under the terms of the projected agreement will be entitled to maintain forces on the island for external defence, the Chief Minister has declared that the London talks will break down if there is any insistence by the British Government that internal security, which is an intrinsic part of external defence, should remain in any degree under British control. Various compromise proposals have been mooted, such as

granting of the right of intervention to British forces to stop a riot if so requested by some joint authority, but realism demands a recognition of the fact that any such arrangement is likely to be outdated almost as soon as it is made.

How very insecure would be a settlement on these lines is indicated by the presence as a delegate at the London talks of Mr. Harry Lee, the Chinese leader of the People's Action Party, described as second only in importance to Mr. Marshall in the public life of Singapore. It seems improbable that he will long remain in the second place, as the forces which back him are dynamic, whereas the forces which back Mr. Marshall are temporising. Mr. Lee is not only adamant on the internal security issue, but he has made known his unwillingness that Britain should even retain a base at Singapore. Unless a dynamism as powerful as that which animates the People's Action Party can be generated, there can be no doubt that Great Britain will be squeezed out of South-East Asia, including Singapore, as effectively as the French have been squeezed out of Indo-China.

#### CEYLON

The left-wing triumph in the Ceylon elections has resulted in another disaster to the British and pro-British cause. Before the final results were known the indication of what they were likely to be led to the swift removal of portraits of The Queen from hotel walls and of the Union Jack from the flag-poles. Two Trotskyite Communists, sworn in as Cabinet Ministers, lost no time in explaining how much reliance could be placed in their pledged word. "We took the oath of allegiance to The Queen as a mere formality to avoid complications, and to ensure that Ceylon becomes an independent Republic as soon as possible." To swear to do one thing for the purpose of doing its exact opposite might have appeared to past generations an exceedingly queer proceeding, but we live in queer times and the Trotskyites would be able to cite many precedents, not all of them in Europe. There is no doubt that the purpose of their false oath-taking will speedily be realized.

Among the first actions of the new Ceylon Government was the requesting of Her Majesty the Queen to bestow no more honours on the citizens of that country. We may next expect the establishment of close relations between Colombo and Moscow and between Colombo and Peking. There have also been demands by Government spokesmen for the evacuation of the British base. Meanwhile the British planters in Ceylon foresee that their future is likely to be made as impossible as that of the Dutch planters in Indonesia proved to be. They expect that they will have to clear out, not because of any deterioration in the good-will borne them by the people, but because that will be the policy of politicians susceptible to international influences from both the Far East and the Far West.

#### MIDDLE EAST

The most significant recent happening in the Middle East, at any rate as far as Great Britain is concerned, was the dismissal from the Arab Legion and from the Kingdom of Jordan of Glubb Pasha, followed swiftly by the expulsion of other British officers, seconded or on contract, from positions of command. Despite the crushing blow to British prestige—made the more humiliating by the manner in which the change was effected—there is an evident disposition on the part of Jordan to retain as much British good-will as possible. This is not surprising. The British subsidy was paid regularly: any replacement of it by Arab League countries might prove less reliable. Moreover, a general withdrawal of British interest might leave the Jordan throne very much at the mercy of the Egyptian Prime Minister. The British Government for its part is willing to retain as much influence in Jordan as the situation may allow.

What precipitated the crisis was the attempt made to secure Jordan's adherence to the Bagdad Pact, an alliance looked upon askance by all the Arab countries with the exception of Iraq. The Pact has come to be generally regarded as an attempt by Great Britain to keep the Arab world divided. In fact, however, the alignment was devised by the State Department, and it seems probable that the military idea on which it is based—the concept of a northern tier defence in the Middle East—was evolved in the Pentagon. However that may be, the membership of Pakistan and Turkey, both of which countries receive very considerable financial help from the United States, provides clear evidence of America's continuing approval of the arrangement. Yet Washington's lack of sympathy for the British position in Jordan has been most marked, even though the trouble there was precipitated by the efforts of the Foreign Office to carry out State Department policy.

The explanation of the American attitude is that the United States has acquired very substantial economic and political interests in those Arab League countries which hold the Bagdad Pact accursed. Washington is thus well content that the odium of visibly upholding the Pact should fall upon London. The Americans have to consider not only Aramco's oil monopoly in Saudi Arabia but the actual and potential value of Egypt as a market for American export-capitalism. Much has already been done to exploit this market and much more is about to be done, as the financing of the Aswan Dam suggests.

One curious feature of the situation is the ease with which Colonel Nasser appears to be able to play off the East against the West. One of his favourite boasts is that he carries around in his pocket a Russian offer to carry out the Aswan Dam project. If the Kremlin were serious in making this offer, surely it would insist upon a decision, instead of allowing the offer to be used as a sort of blackmail against the West.

There is much that is mysterious in the contemporary Middle Eastern complex and nothing more mysterious than the question as to whence the international support for Colonel Nasser really comes.

#### ISRAELI-ARAB CLASHES

Border clashes have become endemic at every Israeli-Arab point of contact. Although what is known as "the Gaza strip" has been the scene of some fairly sustained skirmishing, the pattern there does not really differ from the position on the other frontiers. There is tension everywhere, and a stronger passion for vengeance than for peace. One British Member of Parliament, more outspoken than most, has said that the only way to end the turbulence in the Middle East is for all Israelis to return to the lands whence they came. Although as a solution that is not practical politics it does serve to throw light on the intractable nature of the problem.

Some optimism about the future was expressed after President Eisenhower's statement that the United States would not tolerate aggression in the region. The grounds for such optimism are not all self-evident. It would seem that the aggressors must unfailingly be the side which has the weaker international propaganda machine. The Russian call for a settlement within the United Nations does not necessarily represent fixed policy. If they are seriously backing the Arabs, the giving effect to the American President's statement could set off the third world war. As it is almost certain that the Soviets' aims in the Middle East are strictly limited, a more sober estimate of the probabilities would be an expectation that the border clashes will continue into the indefinite future. Although not a pleasant prospect—this particular

sore causes inflammation all over the world—it does at least give promise that something more than fighting between Arabs and Israelis will be needed before H-bombs are set to work upon the liquidation of the world.

#### CYPRUS

The political situation in Cyprus remains unchanged. Archbishop Makarios has been exiled, but no other Cypriot leader able and willing to negotiate has appeared in his place. British troops and police are now able to cope with most contingencies, but sporadic acts of terrorism still occur.

Our difficulties in the island have not been lessened by critics in other lands. That the Head of the Russian Orthodox Church should have expressed his sympathy with the Greek Government was no surprise, because communism is deeply involved in the Cypriot troubles. But the sympathy expressed by the U.S. Ambassador in Athens was another matter. It could be interpreted as an indication that elements in the State Department are not averse to the formation of a sort of Popular Front against America's principal ally. In the vanguard of this tacit alliance is the Greek Prime Minister, who has thanked the United States for saving his country from communism. This is history re-written upon the best Marxist model.

#### EAST AFRICA

The security forces in Kenya have so far got the better of Mau Mau that it has been possible to withdraw all but one battalion of United Kingdom troops. Old Africa hands are wondering whether the moral of the rebellion has been sufficiently taken to heart, thus ensuring that henceforward district officers are relieved from the massive load of office work which they have had to shoulder to an ever increasing extent during recent years and set free to move continuously on safari among the people for whom they are responsible. Rebellions, say the old hands, are easier to prevent than to root out, and no rebellion has ever been prevented by administrative officials signing a mountain of papers in triplicate.

While the future for Kenya looks brighter, that of Tanganyika has been darkened by the demand of the United Nations Trusteeship Council that the British Government set target dates for the territory to move towards 'independence.' As the welter of tribes which make up the bulk of the population are not a nation, and are never likely to be a nation, this demand is in the highest degree irresponsible. Great Britain opposed the resolution: the United States supported it. If the Africans of Tanganyika are not to be handed over to savagery and lawlessness it would seem clear that the British Government must either repudiate the Trusteeship Council outright or forestall its further moves, as the Union has done with South-West Africa, by integrating the region with a contiguous British territory. Kenya would be an obvious choice.

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## CORRESPONDENCE

(Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the JOURNAL, or which are of general interest to the Services. Correspondents are requested to put their views as concisely as possible, but publication of letters will be dependent on the space available in each number of the JOURNAL.—EDITOR.)

### TO ARM OR NOT TO ARM

To the Editor of the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL.

SIR,—Those who observed the *Sverdlov* at Spithead will have read Captain Sharman's article<sup>1</sup> with close interest.

Little prospect exists of building any more 16-inch gun battleships to protect convoys.

Another solution is possible for the armament of merchant ships themselves.

Eminent authorities of experience now believe that rocket projectors can be made of such accuracy that vessels with unstrengthened decks could be effectively armed with them, without that paraphernalia of guidance which is outside their resources. The sheer weight of salvos of 16-inch rockets discharged from convoys of 20 or 30 ships might be no mean deterrent. The crux would, of course, be the cost of providing the necessary fire control equipment and gunnery radar.

L. V. S. BLACKER,  
*Lieut.-Colonel (Retd.).*

15th February, 1956.

### FIRST USE OF AIR OBSERVATION OF ARTILLERY FIRE

SIR,—May I add a postscript to Mr. N. T. T. Murphy's appeal for the study of the American Civil War?<sup>2</sup> My advice here is that the student should not spend too much time on Stonewall Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign (as so many of us have done), but get on as fast as possible to the campaigns of 1864.

In the first year of the war we find amateurs pitted against one another in a painful contest of 'trial and error.' In the last year of the war we find veteran pitted against veteran, and as a consequence there is more to be learned.

It may sound a dreadful thing to say, but I hold that Early's Valley Campaign of 1864 in some respects equalled in brilliance that of Jackson, while there was nothing finer or more instructive in the whole war than the campaign in which Thomas Hood drove back the much vaunted Sherman from Atlanta. It was a campaign replete with sparkle, and with lessons.

ALFRED H. BURNE,  
*Lieut.-Colonel, R.A. (Retd.).*

29th February, 1956.

### THE LURE OF THE RED COAT

SIR,—Major Myatt is of course perfectly correct in saying that the Light Division embarked at Vigo<sup>3</sup>. But the point of my original letter was to query the statement that no woman survived that retreat, whether to Vigo or Corunna. Harris specifically states that he saw the child many years afterwards, also that the father and mother between them carried the baby to the end of the retreat "where we embarked." It seems to me a fair presumption that the mother also reached England, though I do not think Harris actually says so. I think also that it is common to take "The Retreat to Corunna" as including that part of the forces that went to Vigo.

C. F. C. LETTS,  
*Major.*

4th March, 1956.

<sup>1</sup> See JOURNAL for November, 1955, p. 579.

<sup>2</sup> See JOURNAL for February, 1956, p. 115.

<sup>3</sup> See JOURNAL for February, 1956, p. 115.

## PRECEDENCE OF REGIMENTS AND CORPS

SIR,—Major T. J. Edwards is I fear not quite right in his article appearing in the *JOURNAL* for February<sup>4</sup>.

He gives the reason for the position of the Royal Marines when serving under the Army Act that they were raised after the 49th Foot and before the 50th in 1775. But surely the Order in Council authorizing the raising of Marines in the City of London—by permission of the Lord Mayor—was dated 28th October, 1664, a gap of 90 years.

The Royal Marine Artillery always had precedence after the Royal Regiment and it would be interesting to know if anybody could throw light on why, on the amalgamation of the Artillery with the Light Infantry in 1923, the Corps were not, following normal practice, given the precedence enjoyed by the senior branch.

Further, today Royal Marines when paraded on shore with the other Services now come immediately after the Royal Naval Detachments, no matter what Act the former are serving under. This change was first notified in Admiralty Fleet Order No. 793, Army Council Instruction No. 911, and Air Ministry Order No. 793, all of 1949.

The same orders also recognized the right of the Honourable Artillery Company to enjoy precedence over all Auxiliary forces of any Service whenever the latter parade together—they also defined the position of the W.R.N.S. and the cadet forces.

All this resulted from the Review by the Lord Mayor of London of the Auxiliary Forces of the City on the Artillery Ground on St. George's Day, 1949. The R.N.V.R. were put to the right of the line by agreement with the H.A.C., but the newly formed R. Marine F.V.R., parading under the Army Act, were placed between The Royal Fusiliers and the London Rifle Brigade (R.B.). The Admiralty made vigorous protest, but the Major-General (R. F. E. Whittaker) detailed to command the parade declined to alter his order in the absence of some authority which neither the Admiralty nor the War Office would give. After the Review the orders before mentioned were issued; they are, I think historically noteworthy since they apply to combined parades of the Services, Regular and Auxiliary, anywhere. I was Chief Staff Officer of the Review and write from personal knowledge.

Queen Victoria by General Order No. 85 of 1883 gave the H.A.C., in consideration of its antiquity, precedence next after the Regular forces, which was confirmed in Parliament in 1887—that the H.A.C. must be regarded as on a separate footing with precedence over Volunteer Corps of every description.

DONOVAN JACKSON,  
*Lieut.-Colonel.*

6th March, 1956.

SIR,—In your February, 1956, issue Major Edwards, in his interesting article on the intricate subject of military precedence<sup>4</sup>, states that the Royal Artillery has always taken "precedence of all Foot," etc.

An examination of the Army List of 1810 shows that the Royal Waggon Train, one of the predecessors of the R.A.S.C. was given precedence after the Foot but before the R.A. and R.E.

The 1817 Army List shows the Royal Waggon Train in front of all the Foot including Guards.

Much later, in 1855-56, the Land Transport Corps (another predecessor of the R.A.S.C.) is shown after the Foot but before the R.A., R.E., and Royal Marines, while its immediate successor, the Military Train is shown in the 1857-58 List between the Cavalry and the Foot Guards. It is not until the 1860 List that we find the R.A. and R.E. in front of the Military Train. This latter Corps had a short but striking career during which it frequently fought as Cavalry. It was not until the transport of the Army was fused with the Commissariat Branch in 1869 that the former lost its high position.

<sup>4</sup> Page 66.

It would be interesting to know on what grounds Major Edwards bases his statement regarding the position of the R.A. relative to other arms in view of the above somewhat conflicting information extracted from the Army Lists of the period. It is also to be noted that in the 1860 List the Chaplains come between "Veterinary" and "Military Stores," all of which are below both the Military Train and the Commissariat Department. Perhaps he could tell us the circumstances which led to their promotion?

C. McI. DELF,

16th March, 1956.

Brigadier.

### CYPRUS

SIR,—Your regular contributor on the international situation tells readers of the February issue that "the fact must be faced that militant communism has turned the island (Cyprus) into a field of battle."<sup>5</sup> Leaving aside the question whether a field of battle is an accurate description, this misleading statement about communism cannot be allowed to pass uncontradicted. Communism in Cyprus is well established and has taken advantage of every occasion to embarrass the authorities. But its programme has followed the classic communist line of the united front, the mass struggle. The terrorist organization known as EOKA, on the other hand, draws its inspiration and leadership from the extreme right wing and has on that account been careful to exclude communists from its ranks. It is this organization which is militant and which is responsible for turning the island, if not into a field of battle, into a place where terrorist outrages occur.

T. P. AUBREY,

22nd March, 1956.

Commander R.N. (Retd.).

SIR,—It is curious that up to date nobody seems to have commented upon the unusual armament of some British troops in Cyprus engaged in "duties in aid of the civil power." Until these disturbances had been going on for some time, it was, to the best of my knowledge, the invariable practice of troops so engaged to turn out for duty armed and equipped as soldiers, i.e. with rifles and ammunition. Indeed, there have been occasions in the past when officers in command of troops have received a rap over the knuckles, if nothing worse, for quelling disturbances with troops armed with hockey sticks or other non-military equipment.

Is there, therefore, a general change in the normal doctrine or is the use by troops of shields and staves peculiar to conditions in Cyprus, where so much of the rioting and stone-throwing, etc., is indulged in by children and youths?

C. R. A. SWYNNERTON,

2nd April, 1956.

Major-General (Retd.).

### DETERRING FUTURE AGGRESSION

SIR,—In the February JOURNAL, Admiral Sir Reginald A. R. P. Ernle-Erle-Drax contributed an article under this heading<sup>6</sup> in which he sought to establish a workable method of graduating the deterrent to the type of aggression so that, as he put it, "the tactics and weapons employed meet adequately the scale of attack in order to defeat each act of aggression in a minimum of time with the minimum of force necessary."

He then continues with an illustration of what he has in mind taken from the Korean War, of which he writes, "it would seem that no hydrogen bomb should have been necessary, but one or two atomic bombs placed near the Korea-Chinese border would probably have compelled the ignominious retirement of the whole Chinese army. It is perhaps a pity that this was not done, for circumstances were well suited for such action. . . . No one can make war without taking risks, and there was, of course, some risk that China or Russia might retaliate with similar bombs. Certain Governments, including the British, were unduly alarmed about this."

<sup>5</sup> Page 100.

<sup>6</sup> Page 36.

My impression is that they certainly were alarmed at the prospect, and with good cause. Let us consider, therefore, the likely effect on the two sides of attacks with atom bombs, taking first attacks against the North Koreans. Surely the outstanding feature of the campaign was the manner in which their soldiers were able to live off the country, so that despite the destruction of all the main road and rail communications by H.E. bombs, they were able to maintain a formidable army, and to provide it with ammunition brought down by primitive means of transport, including the backs of coolies.

It is exceedingly doubtful whether attack with A-bombs could have caused any greater interference with their communications, nor in view of the wide dispersion and provision of slit trenches would such attack have caused any greater casualties than were inflicted by the constant attacks of low-flying aircraft using napalm and other anti-personnel weapons. There might have been some moral effect, but materially it is hard to see how the results could have been other than slight.

Turning now to the Allied side, we find a totally different picture. Here every man and every item of equipment had to enter the country through a port or an aerodrome. A great mass of material had to be forced through a few grossly overloaded ports. Had these ports been destroyed by atom attack it is hard to see how the Allies could have maintained their position ashore.

The lessons surely are :—

- (i) In the atomic age an army which draws its supplies from a land area, and whose soldiers can live off the country, is very much less vulnerable than a western army supplied by sea.
- (ii) In the circumstances of the cold war, it is the West which must always approach by sea.

Unless, therefore, some method can be devised which does not entail an expeditionary force of the Korean type, it would seem unwise to accept the author's proposals to fight the cold war with limited atom weapons, more especially at a time when there are at least signs that the East appreciates the risks involved in the military cold war, and is seeking an alternative form in which to prosecute communist objectives.

R. A. COCHRANE,

*Air Chief Marshal.*

22nd April, 1956.

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## GENERAL SERVICE NOTES

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### DEFENCE ESTIMATES, 1956-57

The Government's annual statement on defence, published as a White Paper on 17th February, provided for an expenditure of £1,548,700,000, compared with £1,537,200,000 for 1955-56. After deducting U.S. aid, this figure becomes £1,498,700,000 (£1,494,200,000 in 1955-56).

Allocation of the Defence Budget was as follows :—

	<i>Excluding U.S. Aid</i> £ million		<i>After deducting U.S. Aid</i> £ million	
	1955-56	1956-57	1955-56	1956-57
Admiralty ... ..	347	351	340.5	346
War Office ... ..	484	479	474	472
Air Ministry ... ..	540.4	517.5	513.9	479.5
Ministry of Supply ...	147.5	185	147.5	185
Ministry of Defence ...	18.3	16.2	18.3	16.2
<b>Totals ...</b>	<b>1,537.2</b>	<b>1,548.7</b>	<b>1,494.2</b>	<b>1,498.7</b>

The figures above include the cost of the increases in Service pay and emoluments which were announced shortly after the publication of the White Paper. The reduction in the Air Estimates is due mainly to underspending in recent years.

Included among the main announcements made in the White Paper were that work on the development of a variety of nuclear weapons continues to expand and that progress will permit two further series of tests in 1956; that the advent of the hydrogen bomb has enormously strengthened the power of the deterrent and, provided the deterrent is maintained, the likelihood of global war has decreased; that our forces must be prepared against outbreaks of limited wars, wherein the possible use of nuclear weapons cannot be excluded; and that the level of our defence effort must be maintained, our forces becoming smaller but harder hitting and being deployed and organized to meet an altered threat.

Other items of particular interest given in the White Paper are summarized below :—  
*Strength of Active Forces.*—The estimated total strength of the forces as at 1st April, 1956, and 1st April, 1957, compared with the actual strength at 1st April, 1955, was shown as follows :—

	<i>1st April, 1955</i> (actual)	<i>1st April, 1956</i> (estimated)	<i>1st April, 1957</i> (estimated)
Regulars ... ..	518,119	465,500	464,600
National Service men	284,954	289,100	253,400
Women ... ..	20,557	17,400	17,000
<b>Totals ...</b>	<b>823,630</b>	<b>772,000</b>	<b>735,000</b>

The forces will be reduced to about 700,000 men and women by 31st March, 1958.

*Regular Recruitment.*—Actual male recruitment in the three Services in 1954-55 and estimated figures for 1955-56 and 1956-57 are shown in the following table :—

	<i>1954-55</i> (actual)	<i>1955-56</i> (estimated)	<i>1956-57</i> (estimated)
Royal Navy ... ..	7,700	7,500	9,000
Army ... ..	38,900	34,000	42,000
Royal Air Force ... ..	26,100	21,000	30,000
<b>Totals ...</b>	<b>72,700</b>	<b>62,500</b>	<b>81,000</b>



*Male Regular Strengths.*—The following table gives the male Regular strength of officers and other ranks at 1st April, 1955, and the estimated strengths at 1st April, 1956, and 1st April, 1957 :—

	1st April, 1955 (actual)	1st April, 1956 (estimated)	1st April, 1957 (estimated)
Royal Navy ... ..	114,200	106,500	104,800
Army ... ..	223,800	196,400	192,000
Royal Air Force ... ..	180,100	162,600	167,800
Totals ... ..	518,100	465,500	464,600

*National Service.*—Requirements in 1956–57 are put at 162,000 men, including those who undertake Regular engagements in lieu : Royal Navy, 4,000 ; Army, 106,000 ; Royal Air Force, 52,000.

*Reserve and Auxiliary Forces.*—The strength of these forces, including part-time National Service men, decreased slightly during 1955 from about 647,000 on 1st January, 1955, to about 634,000 on 1st January, 1956. The number of normal volunteers also decreased from 117,000 to 110,000. The total number of National Service reservists remained throughout the year at about 530,000 men.

*Colonial Forces.*—The present strength of the armed forces raised by the colonial territories is about 42,000. In addition, in certain colonial territories local personnel are enlisted in the United Kingdom forces, and these number about 16,000. About 4,000 United Kingdom officers and non-commissioned officers are providing the necessary leadership and cadres for the organized units of the colonial forces.

*Research and Development.*—An increase has been made in the financial provision for research and development in 1956–57 to provide for the new weapons of greater complexity and higher quality. A number of new and technically very complex projects, particularly those associated with the deterrent, will be making increasingly heavy demands on our resources. There can be little diminution in specific research aimed at solving our immediate problems, while the necessity for longer-term research increases as techniques become more complicated. It is on the success of research that the future effectiveness of our forces will primarily depend.

*Home Defence.*—All armed forces, whether Regular or Reserve, in the Country at the outbreak of war will have to be prepared to assist in the struggle for survival. The aim will be to support the civil authorities by all possible means.

The formation has begun of the first 25 reserve battalions of the Mobile Defence Corps, the flow of National Service men to battalions has started, the response to the plan for the enrolment of volunteers to provide the officers and non-commissioned officers of these units has been encouraging, and the strength of the units will be built up to a maximum in three and a half years' time.

#### REDUCTION OF FORCES IN KENYA

On 1st September, 1955, it was announced that the Military and Royal Air Force forces in Kenya were to be reduced. Accordingly, in the last quarter of that year, the Royal Air Force Bomber Squadron, two British battalions, and one King's African Rifles battalion left Kenya. In the last seven months the operational situation has again appreciably improved. As a result the C-in-C. has been able to recommend a further reduction in military forces. This has been approved by the War Council and Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. Consequently, the War Office has announced that two British battalions (the 1st Battalion The Gloucestershire Regiment and the 1st Battalion, The Rifle Brigade) and one K.A.R. battalion (the 26th Battalion, K.A.R.), together with certain ancillary units, will leave Kenya between April and June of this year, a reduction of about 2,200 fighting troops. This will leave one British battalion (the 1st Battalion, The King's Shropshire Light Infantry), four K.A.R. battalions (the 3rd,

5th, 7th and 23rd K.A.R.s), the East Africa Reconnaissance Squadron, and "O" Company, Kenya Regiment, engaged in operations in Kenya, a total of about 4,300 fighting troops.

This further reduction in military forces does not mean that the tempo of the campaign will slacken. Relentless pressure will be maintained against both militant and passive wings of Mau Mau until both are defeated. Sufficient forces are being maintained to ensure that this can be done.

#### EXERCISE "APPOINTMENT WITH VENUS"

A pantomime cow grazing on the Llwyn peninsula on the Caernarvon coast near Pwllheli was the 'target' in the largest combined exercise of naval, army, and R.A.F. reserve forces of the year held early in March.

It had the code-name "Appointment with Venus" after Jerrard Tickell's novel of that name and the film based on it, and, as in the book, Venus was a valuable pedigree cow to be captured from enemy-held territory.

Forces taking part in the exercise were coastal minesweepers of the Severn and South Wales Divisions R.N.V.R., a coastal minesweeper, seaward defence and harbour launch of the Mersey Division R.N.V.R., air squadrons of the Midland and Northern Air Divisions R.N.V.R., men of the Merseyside Centre of the Royal Marine Forces Volunteer Reserve, No. 613 Squadron of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, and contingents of the 4th South Lancashire, 5th King's, and Liverpool Scottish battalions of the Territorial Army.

Controlling the exercise from a headquarters set up in H.M.S. *Eaglet* in Salthouse Dock, Liverpool, which W.R.N.V.R. officers and ratings helped to man, was Captain A. V. Turner, D.S.C., V.R.D., R.N.V.R., Commanding Officer of the Merseyside Division R.N.V.R.

#### THE DUKE OF EDINBURGH TROPHY

H.R.H. The Duke of Edinburgh has decided to offer a Trophy for competition between units of which he is Captain General, Colonel-in-Chief, Colonel, Honorary Colonel, and Honorary Air Commodore.

The idea of this competition, which will be one of fire and movement, is to encourage corporate feeling among these units. Units which will be eligible to compete are:—

- The Royal Marines, 40 Commando.
- The Royal Marines, 42 Commando.
- The Royal Marines, 45 Commando.
- The 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars.
- The Leicestershire Yeomanry.
- 1st Battalion, Welsh Guards.
- 1st Battalion, The Wiltshire Regiment.
- 4th Battalion, The Wiltshire Regiment, T.A.
- 1st Battalion, The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders.
- 4th/5th Battalion, The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, T.A.
- 1st Battalion, The Liverpool Scottish, T.A.
- 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment.
- 2nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment.
- 3rd Militia Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment.
- 1st Battalion, The Hawkes Bay Regiment.
- 1st Battalion, The Otago and Southland Regiment.
- Edinburgh University Training Corps, T.A.
- No. 601 (County of London) Squadron Royal Auxiliary Air Force.

Each team will consist of: one officer over 26 years of age; one officer under 26 years of age; one warrant officer or sergeant, one corporal, and one private or equivalent over 26; one warrant officer or sergeant, one corporal, and one private or equivalent under 26.

The trophy will be held for one year and each member of the winning team will be given a small replica to retain. Medallions will also be given each year to each member of the winning team, to each member of the team making the highest total score in the marksmanship practices, for the highest individual score in all the marksmanship practices, and to each member of the best team in the three-mile race which will form part of the competition.

The competition will take place between 1st August and 31st October each year so that weather conditions in whatever part of the world the tests take place will be roughly similar.

Details of the conditions of the competition, which will be a test of marksmanship combined with a test of agility, strength, and endurance, will in due course be issued to all units eligible to compete.

#### KERMIT ROOSEVELT LECTURES

General Anthony K. McAuliffe, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, visited this Country during April to deliver the Kermit Roosevelt lectures. He lectured at the Imperial Defence College on 5th April, at the Staff College, Camberley, on 9th April, and at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, on 20th April. Lieut.-General W. P. Oliver was the United Kingdom lecturer in the U.S.A. this year and he left for America on 23rd March. (Mrs. Kermit Roosevelt established a fund in memory of her late husband, who served in the British Army in both the 1914-18 and 1939-45 Wars, to provide for a series of exchanges of military lectures for the purpose of fostering a better understanding and closer relationship between the military forces of the United Kingdom and the United States.)

#### CIVIL DEFENCE

##### RECRUITMENT

The United Kingdom Civil Defence authorities report that the strength of the Civil Defence and allied services in Great Britain on 31st January, 1956, was as follows: Civil Defence Corps, 368,840; Auxiliary Fire Service, 21,240; National Hospital Service Reserve, 50,697; Special Constabulary, 67,149.

#### CANADA

COMMONWEALTH ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE SCIENCE.—Approximately 100 senior defence scientists and senior Service officers of the Commonwealth countries took part in a series of closed sessions between 6th and 22nd February at Ottawa, Fort Churchill, and Toronto. The meeting provided leading scientists and Service representatives with opportunities to exchange views on matters of current defence importance and to visit scientific and Service establishments as well as some industrial plants in central Canada.

REPRESENTATION AT ATOMIC TRIALS.—In agreement with the United Kingdom and Australia, Canada is to participate in a series of atomic trials to be held in Australia late in 1956. Members of the Canadian Services and Defence Research Board will assist in the trials, and items of Canadian equipment will be exposed to the effects.

#### AUSTRALIA

EXERCISE "FIRM LINK."—Units of Australian naval, military, and air Services took part in this, the first S.E.A.T.O. demonstration of combined operations, near Thailand, recently. A small party from the 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, and a small force from the R.A.A.F. took part in the exercise. A full-scale contribution was made by the Royal Australian Navy.

PAY INCREASES FOR SERVICE OFFICERS.—The Acting Minister for Defence, Sir Eric Harrison, has announced pay increases for Australian Service officers. The increases will range from, for example, 16s. 5d. a day for brigadiers to 8d. a day for lieutenants

having at least two years' service in that rank. The new pay rates revised margins previously granted to Service officers in December, 1954. Citizen Force officers will also receive the higher rates, and the pay of commissioned officers of the women's Services will be adjusted on the existing proportion of male rates. The increases will be back-dated to the first full pay period in December, 1954.

### FOREIGN

#### FRANCE

##### NEW CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES

On 29th February, the French Cabinet approved the appointment of General Paul-Henri Ely as Chief of the General Staff of the armed forces.

#### WEST GERMANY

##### DIRECTING COUNCIL FOR THE ARMED FORCES

It was reported on 20th February that the new West German armed forces will have a Directing Council instead of a General Staff of the conventional type, which will be the highest authority advising the Minister of Defence and his State Secretary. The Directors of all departments will be members of the Council, which would advise on defence as a whole and on leadership, organization, and the use of the armed forces.

#### UNITED STATES

##### BUDGET, 1956-57

On 16th January, President Eisenhower submitted to Congress his budget proposals for the fiscal year 1957 (July, 1956, to June, 1957). Of the total estimated expenditure of \$65,865,000,000, 61 per cent. was for major national security programmes.

Expenditure on defence was estimated at \$34,575,000,000, sub-allotted as follows: Navy, \$9,435,000,000; Army, \$8,510,000,000; and Air Force, \$15,960,000,000. Military personnel on active duty would increase from an estimated 2,814,000 in June, 1956, to 2,838,400 in June, 1957. Expenditure on guided missiles would be about one-third more than in 1955-56. Expenditure on the mutual security programme was estimated at \$4,292,000,000, of which \$2,500,000,000 would be for military aid, about one-half in 1956-57 being for Formosa, Korea, Pakistan, and Turkey. The sum of \$90,000,000 was included in the commerce and housing budget towards Civil Defence.

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### NOTICE

#### ARMY ART SOCIETY

The Army Art Society, which exists to encourage art in the Army and sister Services, is holding its 25th Annual Exhibition in London during October, 1956.

All ranks of the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines, the Army, and the Royal Air Force, including the women's branches of these Services, past or present, permanent or temporary, may submit works for consideration. As the Society is non-profit making the entrance and hanging fees are kept as low as possible.

The Society is an entirely unofficial organization which for several years has held very successful exhibitions in London each Autumn. These afford an opportunity for Service artists to find out if their work is up to the required standard, and to compare their exhibits with others. This year the exhibition is being opened by the President of the Royal Academy.

Intending exhibitors are invited to apply for particulars to: The Honorary Secretary, The Army Art Society, 1, Durham Place, London, S.W.3

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## NAVY NOTES

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### H.M. THE QUEEN

**NIGERIAN TOUR.**—During the visit of The Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh to Nigeria, H.M. Ships *Daring*, *Defender*, and *Urania* were on patrol at various positions along the route taken by the aircraft of the Queen's Flight. H.M.S. *Magpie*, the frigate formerly commanded by His Royal Highness, visited Lagos and Port Harcourt during the period of the Royal engagements in those areas, and during the first part of the tour she wore the flag of the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, Vice-Admiral Sir Ian Campbell.

**ROYAL YACHT CRUISE.**—The Queen left London by air on 10th March and embarked in H.M. Yacht *Britannia* at Ajaccio for a week's holiday cruise. The yacht had left Portsmouth on 1st March with the Duke of Edinburgh on board to take part in the Spring cruise and exercises of the Home Fleet. The Queen and the Duke returned by air on 18th March.

**AIDES-DE-CAMP.**—The following officers have been appointed as Naval Aides-de-Camp to The Queen from 7th January in succession to the officers stated: Captain E. P. Hinton, D.S.O., M.V.O., in succession to Captain A. C. G. Ermen; Captain J. A. W. Tothill, D.S.C., in succession to Captain R. S. Wellby, D.S.O., promoted to Flag Rank; Captain P. D. H. R. Pelly, D.S.O., in succession to Captain E. H. Thomas, D.S.C.; Captain T. V. Briggs, O.B.E., in succession to Captain (Commodore Second Class) P. L. Collard; Captain A. C. A. C. Duckworth, D.S.O., D.S.C., in succession to Captain J. D. Shaw-Hamilton; Captain J. Holmes, in succession to Captain (Commodore First Class) A. H. Thorold, O.B.E., D.S.C.; Captain R. G. Tosswill, O.B.E., in succession to Captain S. J. S. Boord; Captain H. F. Bone, D.S.O., D.S.C., in succession to Captain J. E. Slaughter, D.S.O. Captain T. P. G. Bennett has been appointed a Naval Aide-de-Camp from 2nd January, 1956, in succession to Captain V. E. Rusby, C.B.E.

**HONORARY PHYSICIANS.**—Surgeon Rear-Admiral R. L. G. Proctor, Deputy Medical Director-General, has been appointed an Honorary Physician to The Queen from 30th November, 1955, in succession to Surgeon Rear-Admiral S. G. Rainsford, C.B.

Surgeon Captain H. M. Willoughby, V.R.D., R.N.V.R., has been appointed an Honorary Physician to The Queen from 6th March, 1956, in succession to Surgeon Captain J. B. Oldham, V.R.D., R.N.V.R.

**HONORARY DENTAL SURGEON.**—Surgeon Captain (D) C. J. Finnigan has been appointed an Honorary Dental Surgeon to The Queen from 23rd December, 1955, in succession to Surgeon Captain (D) R. M. Finlayson, C.B.E.

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#### FLAG APPOINTMENTS

**THIRD SEA LORD.**—Vice-Admiral J. P. L. Reid, C.B., C.V.O., to be a Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty, Third Sea Lord, and Controller of the Navy, in succession to Admiral Sir Ralph A. B. Edwards, K.C.B., C.B.E. (October, 1956).

**A.C.N.S.**—Rear-Admiral R. H. Wright, D.S.C., to be Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, in succession to the late Rear-Admiral M. G. Goodenough, C.B.E., D.S.O. (mid-January, 1956).

**MALAYA.**—Rear-Admiral G. A. Thring, D.S.O., to be Flag Officer Malayan Area, in succession to Rear-Admiral E. H. Shattock, C.B., O.B.E. (May, 1956).

**LIAISON STAFF, AUSTRALIA.**—Rear-Admiral R. S. Wellby, D.S.O., to be Head of the United Kingdom Services Liaison Staff in Australia and as Senior Naval Adviser to the United Kingdom High Commissioner (April, 1956).



**FLYING TRAINING.**—Rear-Admiral C. L. G. Evans, C.B.E., D.S.O., D.S.C., to be Flag Officer Flying Training, in succession to Rear-Admiral G. Willoughby, C.B. (February, 1956).

**DEPUTY CONTROLLER.**—Rear-Admiral P. Dawnay, M.V.O., D.S.C., to be Deputy Controller, in succession to Rear-Admiral L. F. Durnford-Slater, C.B. (February, 1956).

**MIDDLE EAST.**—Rear-Admiral A. C. C. Miers, V.C., D.S.O., to be Flag Officer, Middle East, in succession to Rear-Admiral P. W. Brock, D.S.O. (early March, 1956).

**TRAINING SQUADRON.**—Rear-Admiral G. B. Sayer, C.B., D.S.C., to be Flag Officer, Home Fleet Training Squadron, in succession to Rear-Admiral H. W. Biggs, C.B., D.S.O. (early May, 1956).

**FAR EAST.**—Rear-Admiral W. K. Edden, O.B.E., to be Flag Officer Commanding Fifth Cruiser Squadron and Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Far East Station, in succession to Vice-Admiral R. F. Elkins, C.B., C.V.O., O.B.E. (June, 1956). The appointments of Rear-Admiral Durnford-Slater as Flag Officer Commanding Fifth Cruiser Squadron and Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Far East Station, and of Rear-Admiral Edden as Flag Officer, Home Fleet Training Squadron, were cancelled. Another appointment for Rear-Admiral Durnford-Slater will be announced later.

**EAST INDIES.**—Rear-Admiral H. W. Biggs, C.B., D.S.O., to be Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, in succession to Vice-Admiral Sir Charles F. W. Norris, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. (early August, 1956).

**IMPERIAL DEFENCE COLLEGE.**—Captain W. G. Crawford, D.S.C., to be Senior Naval Member of the Directing Staff of the Imperial Defence College, in succession to Rear-Admiral M. L. Power, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., serving in the rank of Acting Rear-Admiral (April, 1956).

**VICE-CONTROLLER.**—Captain N. A. Copeman, D.S.C., to be Vice-Controller and Director of Naval Equipment, in succession to Rear-Admiral G. B. Sayer, C.B., D.S.C., serving in the rank of Acting Rear-Admiral (April, 1956).

**COMMAND SUPPLY OFFICERS.**—Captain J. S. Lancaster to be promoted Rear-Admiral with effect from 14th June, 1956, and appointed Command Supply Officer, Home Air Command, in succession to Rear-Admiral R. A. Braine, from 18th June, 1956. Rear-Admiral R. A. Braine to be Command Supply Officer, Portsmouth, in succession to Rear-Admiral L. A. Boutwood, C.B., C.B.E., from 5th July, 1956.

**CHAPLAIN OF THE FLEET.**—The Rev. F. Darrell Bunt, O.B.E., Q.H.C., to be Chaplain of the Fleet, in succession to the Ven. Archdeacon F. N. Chamberlain, C.B., O.B.E., Q.H.C., to date 15th May, 1956.

#### RETIREMENTS AND PROMOTIONS

The following were announced to date 29th February, 1956:—

*To be placed on the Retired List.*—Admiral Sir Alexander C. G. Madden, K.C.B., C.B.E.; Vice-Admiral Sir John F. Stevens, K.B.E., C.B.; Rear-Admiral G. B. H. Fawkes, C.B., C.V.O., C.B.E.; Rear-Admiral M. W. St. L. Searle, C.B., C.B.E.; and Rear-Admiral W. H. Selby, C.B., D.S.C.

*To be promoted to Admiral in H.M. Fleet.*—Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick R. Parham K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

*To be promoted to Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet.*—Rear-Admiral W. T. Couchman, C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., O.B.E.; and Rear-Admiral (temporary Vice-Admiral) B. I. Robertshaw, C.B., C.B.E.

The following was announced to date 20th March, 1956: Rear-Admiral G. Willoughby, C.B., to be placed on the Retired List.

#### THE NAVY ESTIMATES

The Navy Estimates, 1956-57, were presented to Parliament on 23rd February, with the usual Explanatory Statement by the First Lord (Cmd. 9697, 9d. net). The gross

provision is £401,670,000 and exceeds by £9,720,000 the comparable provision in 1955-56, as modified by the Supplementary Estimate of 1st July, 1955. Within this sum, however, provision has to be made for the increased cost of naval and civilian pay and pensions, and for higher prices of material and supplies, which together are estimated to amount to slightly over £31,000,000. After making allowances for these, the naval programme for 1956-57 will, in comparable terms, cost some £21,000,000 less than that of 1955-56. The net grant submitted for Parliamentary approval is £346,000,000, which is £5,500,000 more than was provided for 1955-56.

Provision is made for a maximum of 128,000 officers, men, and members of the W.R.N.S. and Q.A.R.N.N.S. This is a reduction of 5,000 on last year's figure and conforms to the Government's decision to reduce the overall armed manpower in the three Services to a total of 700,000 by 1958.

Dealing with the role of the Navy, the First Lord stated that the necessary changes to enable the Navy to meet the latest advances in science and the new developments in strategy are now taking place. The concept of the battle-group, centred round the modern carrier with its multi-purpose squadrons of aircraft, is nearing realization. The next stage in its development will be to add the new cruiser, defended by its anti-aircraft guided weapons, and the destroyer similarly armed. It is clear that nuclear energy may well become, in the future, the main source of propulsion for both naval and merchant ships. The Admiralty's intention will be to employ nuclear power in the first instance in submarines.

Introducing the Estimates in the House of Commons on 8th March, the Parliamentary Secretary, the Hon. George Ward, said he believed it was more thoroughly understood now than formerly that the advent of thermo-nuclear weapons had not changed the need for navies or their primary role. This conclusion had been drawn by the major Powers, including Russia.

#### INCREASES IN PAY AND PENSIONS

Following are the new rates of pay of officers in the Royal Navy and Royal Marines announced in the Ministry of Defence White Paper (Cmd. 9692, rs. 6d.) which came into effect on 1st April:—

Rank	Basic pay, yearly	Flying pay, yearly
Cadet at Britannia R.N. College, Dartmouth	£ 146	£ —
Cadet in ship of the Fleet ... ..	173	—
Midshipman at Britannia R.N. College, Dartmouth ... ..	219	—
Midshipman in ship of the Fleet and 2nd Lieutenant, R.M., on appointment ...	273	328
Acting Sub-Lieutenant and Acting Lieutenant, R.M. ... ..	365	328
Sub-Lieutenant ... ..	438	365
Lieutenant, R.N. ... ..	547-803	401
Lieutenant, R.M. ... ..	438-803	—
Lieutenant Commander and Captain, R.M.	1,022-1,277	401
Commander and Major, R.M. ... ..	1,441-1,660	401*
Captain, R.N. (with less than 6 years' service in the rank), and Lieutenant-Colonel, R.M.	1,825-2,007	292*
Captain, R.N. (after 6 years' service in the rank), and Colonel, R.M. ... ..	2,098-2,190	237*-219*
Rear-Admiral and Major-General, R.M. ...	2,920	—
Vice-Admiral and Lieutenant-General, R.M.	3,650	—
Admiral and General, R.M. ... ..	4,380	—
Admiral of the Fleet ... ..	5,100	—

\* Payable only in nominated flying appointments, otherwise the rate will be 10s. a day.

Regular ratings in the Royal Navy and other ranks in the Royal Marines also receive much higher rates of pay than they did before 1st April. An able seaman, aged about 20, will, for example, now receive basic pay of £5 19s. a week, as compared to £3 6s. 6d. under the old pay code.

The new rates of basic pay for officers of the W.R.N.S. are as follows :—

Rank				Yearly
				£
Third Officer	...	...	...	292-365
Second Officer	...	...	...	410-592
First Officer	...	...	...	766-967
Chief Officer	...	...	...	1,058-1,241
Superintendent	...	...	...	1,368-1,569

There are also advances in the pay of ratings in the W.R.N.S.

The new rates of retired pay and terminal grant are as follows :—

Rank	Retired pay, yearly	Terminal grant
	£	£
Lieutenant, R.N., and R.M. ... ..	500	1,500
Lieutenant-Commander and Captain, R.M.	625	1,875
Commander and Major, R.M. ... ..	800	2,400
Captain, R.N. (with less than 6 years' service in the rank), and Lieutenant-Colonel, R.M.	1,000	3,000
Captain, R.N. (after 6 years' service in the rank), and Colonel, R.M. ... ..	1,150	3,450
Rear-Admiral and Major-General, R.M. ...	1,400	4,200
Vice-Admiral and Lieutenant-General, R.M.	1,600	4,800
Admiral and General, R.M. ... ..	1,900	5,700
Admiral of the Fleet ("Half Pay") ...	2,300	6,900

#### EXERCISES AND CRUISES

**HOME FLEET SPRING CRUISE.**—Ships of the Home Fleet were again based on Gibraltar for the Spring cruise. Leaving Portland on 20th January, they took part in a N.A.T.O. exercise while on passage in which Coastal Command aircraft and French and Portuguese maritime aircraft co-operated. A N.A.T.O. maritime exercise known as "Dawn Breeze" took place during the return voyage between 20th and 25th March, conducted by the Flag Officer, Flotillas, Vice-Admiral R. G. Onslow, in the *Ark Royal*, and the Commander (Air) Central Atlantic, Air Vice-Marshal G. W. Tuttle.

**MEDITERRANEAN.**—The fast minelayer *Manxman* left Malta for Beirut on 19th March with stores for the relief of victims of the earthquake in the Lebanon. The frigate *Ursa* sailed from Cyprus for Beirut with further stores from the Middle East Command.

On completing refits the *Decoy*, *Diana*, *Diamond*, and *Duchess* left the United Kingdom in March to join the Mediterranean Fleet in place of the other group of "Daring" class ships which, under the general service commission scheme, will return to home waters. The *Diana* will be detached to join the Special Squadron in Australian waters during the atomic tests at Monte Bello.

**EAST INDIES.**—The cruiser *Gambia* returned to Devonport on 1st March from the East Indies Station, having steamed 33,000 miles since commissioning in February, 1955. On her way home she visited Massawa at the invitation of the Emperor of Ethiopia, who travelled in the ship for his State visit to Britain in 1954, and whose grandson, Prince Alexander Desta, is serving on board as a midshipman.

**SOUTH ATLANTIC.**—H.M.S. *Protector*, armed netlayer, specially converted for Antarctic use, was able in January to render assistance to the *Theron*, headquarters ship of the British Antarctic Expedition, when held up by ice in the Weddell Sea, and unable to fly her seaplane owing to lack of water. The *Protector*, which is equipped with two helicopters, carried out an ice reconnaissance on 23rd January, locating the *Theron* and guiding her through the leads in the ice.

**FAR EAST.**—Forces participating in a three-day S.E.A.T.O. exercise known as "Firm Link" concentrated at Bangkok, Thailand, on 15th February, under the command of Vice-Admiral R. F. Elkins, Second-in-Command, Far East Station. British, Australian, New Zealand, and United States ships took part. Following the exercise the Task Unit entered Bangkok Harbour and all forces, numbering 10,000 officers and men, took part in a march through the city.

Early in March the submarine *Thorough* carried out a daybreak bombardment of a terrorist area in the Malayan jungle lasting two hours. The *Thorough* is based at Sydney, Australia, and was expected to return there in April. This was probably the first time since the war that a submarine had fired its gun in anger.

**AMERICA AND WEST INDIES.**—The frigate *St. Austell Bay* completed a four-day visit to New Amsterdam, British Guiana, early in March. It was the first visit of a warship to this port for more than 100 years. About 5,000 local inhabitants visited the ship.

#### PERSONNEL

**OFFICER STRUCTURE.**—Far reaching decisions affecting the officer structure of the Royal Navy were announced in the House of Commons on 25th January by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, the Hon. G. R. Ward, M.P. An Admiralty Fleet Order, prefaced by an introductory message from the Board of Admiralty to all officers, was issued in ships and establishments on the same day. From 1st January, 1957, all officers with the exception of Instructor, Medical, and Dental officers will be placed on one of three lists, to be known as the General List, the Special Duties List, and the Supplementary List. The General List will consist of all cadet-entry officers of the present Executive, Engineering, Electrical, and Supply and Secretariat Branches, of all ex-ratings who have obtained commissions in one of these branches through the Upper Yardman scheme, and of University graduate entries into the Engineering and Electrical Branches. Details of entry, training, experience, specialization, and career prospects were given. The Special Duties List will replace the Branch List, formerly called the Warrant List. The Supplementary List will consist of officers entered initially on Short Service Commissions in the Fleet Air Arm and any other officers who may be recruited on a similar basis for certain specific duties. Owing to their special professional requirements, the Instructor, Medical, and Dental Branches will continue their separate existence. The Royal Marines will also remain outside the new structure, except that their career prospects will be aligned as far as possible with those of General List officers. Changes in the Instructor Branch were announced separately on 30th January. The Permanent List in this Branch will now be subdivided into two sections known as List "A" and List "B." The former will normally be restricted to those whose academic qualifications fit them for the highest appointments in the Branch. A limited number of permanent commissions will be available on List "B" for officers considered suitable for a full career in the Naval Service. There will not, however, normally be an expectation of promotion beyond the rank of lieutenant-commander on List "B."

**CENTRALIZED DRAFTING.**—It was announced on 20th February that a new central drafting and advancement authority to replace the local organizations now existing for these functions at the port divisions of Chatham, Portsmouth, and Devonport will be established. All men on Regular engagements will be able to state a preference for the region to which they wish to be drafted when serving in the United Kingdom. Since men will now be eligible to serve in any ship or establishment, the drafting authority will have more scope in trying to meet these preferences.

**NEW SEAMEN'S UNIFORM.**—A new and improved type of uniform for seamen of the Royal Navy has been approved and will come into use later this year. It retains the traditional 'square rig' of collar, jumper, and bell-bottomed trousers, but is given added smartness by the new coat-style, zip-fronted jumper and the smoother and harder wearing 'diagonal' serge cloth chosen. Trousers are also zip-fastened and have side and hip pockets. Uniform caps with crowns of white plastic have been introduced. From 1st May, naval personnel in all commands will wear white headgear throughout the year, instead of blue caps in the winter months.

**BOY RATING ABOLISHED.**—The rating of Boy in the Royal Navy was abolished on 1st April, when it was renamed Junior Rating. In approving this change of title, the Admiralty also decided that this method of entry into the Service, previously limited to the Seaman Branch, should be extended to include the Engineering and Electrical Branches and the Fleet Air Arm.

#### MATERIEL

**GUIDED WEAPONS.**—The Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, Admiral of the Fleet Sir George Creasy, on 27th January formally opened a Guided Weapons Group at H.M.S. *Excellent*, Gunnery School, Portsmouth. The Group consists of an office, lecture and model rooms, and a cinema, and has been formed in advance of the introduction of guided weapons into fleet service to teach officers and men the techniques, operation, and technical capabilities of these new weapons.

**INDUSTRIAL ATOMIC GROUP.**—A new group for atomic work was announced by Vickers, Ltd., on 23rd February. It consists of Vickers, Ltd., Rolls-Royce, Ltd., and Foster Wheeler, Ltd. The first task will be the application of nuclear energy to marine propulsion.

**NEW TYPE OF TURBINE.**—Orders have been placed for prototype propulsion machinery installations of a new and revolutionary type for use in frigates and fast escort vessels. The principle employed is that of highly efficient steam turbines and gas turbines geared to the same propeller shaft. The gas turbines provide a high concentration of power in a very compact form and will be used to boost the steam turbines for sustained bursts of high speed.

**RECOMMISSIONING EXERCISE.**—At the end of January, H.M.S. *Dainty*, in reserve at Barrow-in-Furness, was brought forward to be prepared for sea trials in the shortest possible time in the course of an exercise known as "Sleeping Beauty II." At the start of the exercise, which also tested the efficacy of modern preservative methods, the *Dainty* was in a de-humidified and cathodically protected state in which she had been maintained for two years. A similar exercise, "Sleeping Beauty I," took place in June and July last year with the "Hunt" class frigate *Eglington*.

**H.M.S. ASHANTI.**—A gold shield and embossed silver bell presented to the destroyer *Ashanti* in 1939 by the Asantehene, Chiefs, and people of Ashanti are to be loaned, by Admiralty permission, to the Gold Coast Regiment for display at Kumasi, the capital, until they are needed for a new H.M.S. *Ashanti*, the former ship of that name having been broken up in 1949.

#### FLEET AIR ARM

**BOYD TROPHY.**—The Boyd Trophy, premier award of the Fleet Air Arm, has been awarded for 1955 to No. 806 Squadron, the first Naval Sea Hawk jet squadron to be formed. It was presented to the squadron at Lee-on-Solent on 16th March by Rear-Admiral C. L. G. Evans, Flag Officer Flying Training.

**DECK LANDING AIDS.**—In reply to a Parliamentary question on 23rd February, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty stated that since the introduction of the angled deck and the mirror deck landing aid, the deck landing accident rate due to pilot error had been reduced to less than one-fifth of the previous figure.



**HELICOPTER RESCUE.**—The lifting of 41 men from the Norwegian ship *Douvreffjell* on 3rd February, after she had run aground in the Pentland Firth, was the biggest single rescue operation ever undertaken by helicopters of the Royal Navy. With the help of an R.A.F. Sycamore aircraft, two Dragonflies from the R.N. Air Station, Lossiemouth, succeeded in taking off the crew after earlier attempts by two lifeboats had failed.

#### WOMEN'S ROYAL NAVAL SERVICE VISIT OF QUEEN MOTHER

Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother visited H.M.S. *Dauntless*, the training establishment of the W.R.N.S. at Burghfield, near Reading, on 13th April, her first visit to the establishment since 1948. All W.R.N.S. drafting is controlled from this establishment.

#### ROYAL MARINES

**COST OF THE CORPS.**—In reply to a question in the House of Commons on 12th March the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty stated that the direct cost of the personnel of the Royal Marine Corps, including pay and allowances, victualling, clothing, medical attention, and travel is estimated at approximately £6,000,000 a year.

**COLD WEATHER TRAINING.**—Cold weather warfare training began in January for volunteer Royal Marines making their headquarters in a Norwegian hut at Glenmore Lodge, near Aviemore, in the Scottish Highlands, 1,100 feet above sea level. Much of the training, under Captain M. J. Baizley, R.M., was undertaken on a plateau of the Cairngorm range at over 3,000 feet. Courses for novices continued until the end of February, followed by an advanced course.

**R.M.F.V.R. EXERCISE.**—In the Guildford-Dorking area of Surrey, on 4th and 5th February, an exercise was held by the Commandos and Special Boat Section reservists of the Royal Marines Forces Volunteer Reserve in co-operation with the 6th Battalion, The East Surrey Regiment (T.A.), Kingston-on-Thames. Traditional friendship has been maintained between the East Surreys and the Royal Marines over 250 years, and both wear the same blue lanyard as an article of normal dress.

#### MEMORIAL UNVEILED IN PORTSMOUTH CATHEDRAL

In Portsmouth Cathedral, on 4th March, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope unveiled two stained glass windows in the Martyr Chapel as a Memorial to Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, K.C.B., K.B.E., M.V.O., and those who fell while serving under his command both as Vice-Admiral, Dover, and Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief. The Bishop of Portsmouth dedicated the windows and Admiral of the Fleet Sir George Creasy, who was Admiral Ramsay's Chief of Staff, gave an address. One window has as its theme "The Withdrawal," the evacuation from Dunkirk, and the other "The Return," the invasion of Normandy leading to the liberation of Europe.

The cost of the windows is being defrayed by subscriptions from relations and friends, and all ranks and ratings of the Allied Naval Forces who served under the late Admiral's command. The Memorial Fund remains open, not having yet reached its required total.

#### AUSTRALIA

**H.M.A.S. MELBOURNE.**—The Duke of Edinburgh wore his uniform of Admiral of the Fleet in the Royal Australian Navy for the first time on 24th February when he visited the new light fleet aircraft carrier *Melbourne* in Portsmouth. He piloted a naval Whirlwind helicopter from the grounds of Buckingham Palace and landed on the carrier's flight deck, where he was received by Captain G. G. O. Gatacre, commanding the *Melbourne*. The ship left Portsmouth on 5th March for the Clyde to embark her aircraft.

**VISIT TO LE HAVRE.**—After the completion of flying trials in the English Channel, the *Melbourne* paid an informal visit to Le Havre from 21st to 23rd January. She was the second Australian warship to have visited French ports in recent months, the other being the fast anti-submarine frigate *Queenborough* in June, 1955. Nearly 1,200 officers and men of the R.A.N. were fortunate enough to have visited France on these occasions.

**APPOINTMENT.**—Vice-Admiral Sir John Collins, K.B.E., C.B., who was Chief of Naval Staff and First Naval Member of the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board from 1948 to 1955, has been appointed Australian High Commissioner to New Zealand.

## INDIA

### NEW MINESWEEPER

A new minesweeper for the Indian Navy, the *Karwar*, was launched from the yard of Messrs. Camper and Nicholson, Gosport, on 28th January. Instead of the customary bottle of wine, rose water and a coconut were used to name the ship.

## PAKISTAN

### SALE OF R.N. SHIPS

Agreement was reached in March between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Pakistan for the sale of the "Dido" class cruiser *Diadem* and the destroyers *Gabbard* and *Cadiz* ("Battle" class), and *Crispin* and *Creole* ("CR" class). The vessels are needed to replace existing ships which are becoming obsolescent.

## FOREIGN

### FRANCE

#### ALLIED NAVAL COMMAND

On 20th February, Vice-Admiral Antoine Sala succeeded Vice-Admiral Robert Jaujard as Commander-in-Chief, Allied Naval Forces, Central Europe. Admiral Jaujard, who had held the post since 1951, has reached the retirement age.

## GERMANY

**NAVAL DEPARTMENT CHIEF.**—*The Times* correspondent in Bonn reported on 1st March that Vice-Admiral Ruge had been appointed Head of the Naval Department in the Ministry of Defence in succession to Captain Zenker.

**NEW NAVY.**—The Federal Government has asked for British and United States assistance in building up the new West German Navy. Britain has been asked to sell seven frigates for training purposes and the United States to lend twelve destroyers to help tide over the period until the Germans can provide themselves with the vessels they need. The new Navy is expected to be fully established within four years.

## JAPAN

### M.T.B. ORDER IN BRITAIN

Saunders-Roe (Anglesey), Ltd., of Beaumaris, announced on 23rd February that they had signed a contract with the Defence Agency of Japan for the construction of a fast torpedo boat powered by Napier Deltic diesel engines.

## INDONESIA

### VISIT OF CHIEF OF STAFF

Vice-Admiral R. Subijakto, Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy, arrived in Britain on 10th January for a short visit to Admiralty and naval establishments. He was accompanied by his wife and a staff of three officers. The admiral, who is 35, is no stranger to this Country, having been based at Falmouth during the war when serving with the Royal Netherlands Navy as a sub-lieutenant and lieutenant. He visited Britain again in 1949.

**PORTUGAL****TRANSFER OF HARVARD AIRCRAFT**

Fifteen of a total of 21 Harvard Mark III aircraft, which were in a state of preservation at the Royal Naval Air Station, Arbroath, have been made ready for service. The aircraft were originally supplied by the United States under the Lease-Lend Agreement, and the consent of the U.S. Government has been obtained to their transfer to Portugal as a free gift. A team of 39 officers and ratings arrived to prepare the aircraft for service and to ferry them from Lee-on-Solent to Portugal in three batches during March.

**UNITED STATES**

**NEW C.-IN-C.**—President Eisenhower in March named Rear-Admiral Walter Boone, Superintendent of the Naval Academy, to be Commander-in-Chief of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean areas. He succeeds Admiral John Cassady, who is retiring.

**NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAMME.**—Speaking before the Congressional Committee on the shipbuilding programme included in the recent budget message, Admiral Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, referred to the rapid rise of Russia as a naval power second only to the United States as the most significant development in Soviet grand strategy since the 1939-45 War. Because of this, he was convinced that a bold programme in nuclear propulsion was not only warranted but mandatory; and he asked for early approval of the proposed 1,500-million dollar shipbuilding programme, which would produce a sixth "Forrestal" class aircraft carrier, six more atomic-powered submarines, guided missile vessels, an atomic-powered cruiser, and a start on an atomic-powered aircraft carrier.

## ARMY NOTES

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### H.M. THE QUEEN

Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother, Honorary Colonel, The London Scottish, The Gordon Highlanders, T.A., was present at the Service of Dedication of The London Scottish Memorial Chapel at St. Columba's Church of Scotland, Pont Street, on 25th March.

The Duke of Gloucester, as Colonel-in-Chief, visited the 10th Royal Hussars (P.W.O.) at Bhurtpore Barracks, Tidworth, on 8th February.

The Duke of Gloucester, as Colonel-in-Chief of The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, visited the 2nd Battalion at Lichfield on 16th February.

The Duke of Gloucester visited the School of Infantry at Warminster on 13th March, and on 14th March His Royal Highness, as Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment, visited the 1st Battalion, The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, at Knook Camp, near Warminster.

On 14th April, the Duke of Gloucester, Colonel of the Scots Guards, attended a service in Glasgow Cathedral at which old Colours of the 1st Battalion, Scots Guards, were laid up, and unveiled a Memorial Window to the Regiment.

The Princess Royal, Colonel-in-Chief, visited Southampton on 4th February and met the 1st Battalion, The Royal Scots (The Royal Regiment), on the Battalion's return from overseas.

The Princess Royal, Colonel-in-Chief, visited the Depot of The Royal Scots at Glencorse, the Scottish Command (Mixed) Signal Regiment, T.A., and W.R.A.C. at the Drill Hall, Brandon Terrace, Edinburgh, and units of the Royal Corps of Signals and W.R.A.C. at Dreghorn Camp on 9th March. On 11th March, Her Royal Highness, Controller Commandant, was present at a Church Parade of the W.R.A.C. in St. Andrew's Church, George Street, Edinburgh, and subsequently took the salute at the march past.

The Duchess of Kent, Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment, inspected the 1st Battalion, The Dorset Regiment, at Bulford on 1st March.

The Duchess of Kent, Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment, visited the 1st Battalion, The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment, in Germany on 7th April.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to approve the following appointments:—

TO BE HONORARY PHYSICIAN TO THE QUEEN.—Colonel (temporary Brigadier) J. T. Robinson, O.B.E., M.D., late R.A.M.C. (6th March, 1956), vice Major-General E. P. N. Creagh, C.B., Q.H.P., M.B., M.R.C.P., retired.

TO BE GOVERNOR OF ROYAL HOSPITAL, CHELSEA.—General Sir Cameron G. G. Nicholson, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C. (about December, 1956), in succession to General Sir Bernard C. T. Paget, G.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.

TO BE COLONELS COMMANDANT.—Of the 2nd Battalion, The King's Royal Rifle Corps, General Sir George W. E. J. Erskine, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C. (10th February, 1956), vice General Sir Evelyn H. Barker, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., tenure expired; of The Parachute Regiment, General Sir Richard N. Gale, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C. (13th March, 1956), vice Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G., G.C.B., D.S.O., resigned; of the Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Major-General S. W. Joslin, C.B., C.B.E., M.A., M.I.Mech.E., M.I.E.E., E.M. (28th January, 1956), vice Major-General Sir Eric B. Rowcroft, K.B.E., C.B., M.I.Mech.E., M.I.E.E., tenure expired.

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#### APPOINTMENTS

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE.—Brigadier W. G. Stirling, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Principal Staff Officer to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, with the temporary rank of Major-General (1st January, 1956).

WAR OFFICE.—Brigadier A. E. Campbell, Q.H.P., M.D., D.P.H., appointed Deputy Director-General, Army Medical Services, with the temporary rank of Major-General (26th March, 1956).

Major-General A. C. Shortt, C.B., O.B.E., appointed Director of Public Relations (April, 1956).

Brigadier R. F. Johnstone, C.B.E., appointed Director of Personal Services with the temporary rank of Major-General (August, 1956).

General Sir Charles F. Loewen, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Adjutant General to the Forces (October, 1956).

Lieut.-General Sir Richard A. Hull, K.C.B., D.S.O., appointed Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Autumn, 1956).

UNITED KINGDOM.—Major-General P. N. White, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Commandant, Joint Services Staff College (1st March, 1956).

Brigadier D. Bluett, O.B.E., M.B., appointed a Deputy Director, Medical Services, with the temporary rank of Major-General (10th April, 1956).

Major-General G. P. D. Blacker, C.B.E., appointed Chief of Staff, Headquarters, United Kingdom Land Forces (April, 1956).

Major-General C. F. C. Coleman, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E., appointed G.O.C.-in-C., Eastern Command, with the temporary rank of Lieut.-General (May, 1956).

Brigadier W. H. Hulton-Harrop, D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., 50th Infantry Division, T.A., and Northumbrian District with the temporary rank of Major-General (August, 1956).

GERMANY.—Brigadier (local Major-General) R. H. Hewetson, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., 11th Armoured Division, with the temporary rank of Major-General (2nd March, 1956).

Major-General F. D. Rome, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., Berlin, British Sector (23rd March, 1956).

Colonel (temporary Brigadier) J. W. Hackett, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., appointed G.O.C., 7th Armoured Division, with the temporary rank of Major-General (24th March, 1956).

Brigadier C. A. R. Nevill, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., 2nd Infantry Division, with the temporary rank of Major-General (April, 1956).

Major-General J. D'A. Anderson, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Northern Army Group and B.A.O.R. (April, 1956).

MIDDLE EAST LAND FORCES.—Brigadier P. F. Palmer, O.B.E., M.B., appointed Director, Medical Services (9th December, 1955), with the temporary rank of Major-General (22nd February, 1956).

Major-General D. H. V. Buckle, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Major-General i/c Administration, G.H.Q., Middle East Land Forces (June, 1956).

FAR EAST LAND FORCES.—Lieut.-General W. H. Stratton, C.B., C.V.O., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Commander, British Forces, Hong Kong (31st December, 1955).

Major-General R. H. Bower, C.B., C.B.E., appointed G.O.C., Malaya Command, with the temporary rank of Lieut.-General (May, 1956).

Lieut.-General Sir Francis W. Festing, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., appointed C-in-C. (July, 1956).

ALLIED FORCES, NORTHERN EUROPE.—Major-General K. C. Cooper, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., appointed Chief of Staff to the C-in-C. (24th March, 1956).

WASHINGTON.—Major-General V. Boucher, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Commander, British Army Staff and Military Member, British Joint Services Mission, Washington (June, 1956).

#### PROMOTIONS

*Lieut.-Generals.*—Temporary Lieut.-General to be Lieut.-General :—W. H. Stratton, C.B., C.V.O., C.B.E., D.S.O. (27th December, 1955).

Major-General to be temporary Lieut.-General :—W. A. D. Drummond, C.B., C.B.E., F.R.C.S., L.R.C.P. (4th April, 1956).

*Major-Generals.*—Temporary Major-Generals, Brigadiers, or Colonels to be Major-Generals :—J. D'A. Anderson, C.B.E., D.S.O. (5th December, 1955) ; G. P. D. Blacker, C.B.E. (20th December, 1955) ; J. R. C. Hamilton, C.B.E., D.S.O. (27th December, 1955) ;



W. A. D. Drummond, C.B., C.B.E., F.R.C.S., L.R.C.P. (6th March, 1956); A. E. Campbell, Q.H.P., M.D., D.P.H. (10th April, 1956).

Brigadiers or Colonels to be temporary Major-Generals:—W. G. Stirling, C.B.E., D.S.O. (1st January, 1956); R. W. Urquhart, D.S.O. (10th January, 1956); R. W. Jelf, C.B.E., A.D.C. (11th January, 1956); L. H. O. Pugh, C.B.E., D.S.O. (14th January, 1956); E. D. Howard-Vyse, C.B.E., M.C. (31st January, 1956); R. W. Ewbank, C.B.E., D.S.O. (22nd February, 1956); P. F. Palmer, O.B.E., M.B. (22nd February, 1956); R. H. Hewetson, C.B.E., D.S.O. (2nd March, 1956); J. W. Hackett, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (24th March, 1956); A. E. Campbell, Q.H.P., M.D., D.P.H. (26th March, 1956); D. Bluet, O.B.E., M.B. (10th April, 1956).

#### RETIREMENTS

The following General Officers have retired:—Major-General E. P. N. Creagh, C.B., Q.H.P., M.B., M.R.C.P. (6th March, 1956); Major-General A. Sachs, C.B., C.B.E., Q.H.P., M.D., M.R.C.P. (10th April, 1956); Major-General J. Scott-Elliot, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (12th April, 1956).

#### ARMY ESTIMATES, 1956-57

The Army Estimates for 1956-57, as published in a White Paper (Cmd. 9688) on 21st February, provided for a gross expenditure of £580,000,100 reduced by appropriations in aid and £7,000,000 to be granted as mutual defence assistance by the United States to the net figure of £472,000,100 (£474,000,170 in 1955-56, including supplementary estimate).

In accordance with the statement made by the Prime Minister in October, 1955, the strength of the active army will fall during 1956-57 from 405,000 to 374,500. The reduction in pay and allowances due to smaller numbers has, however, been more than swallowed up by the increase in emoluments announced recently.

The gross estimates for the main items of expenditure, with net estimates given in parentheses, were as follows:—Army pay, etc., £155,170,000 (£100,380,000). Reserve Forces, Territorial Army, Home Guard, and Cadet Forces, £17,170,000 (£16,370,000). Civilians, £93,000,000 (£91,340,000). Movements, £34,770,000 (£33,250,000). Supplies, £68,430,000 (£55,030,000). Stores, £126,300,000 (£99,850,000). Works, buildings, and lands, £42,980,000 (£37,630,000). Miscellaneous effective services, £15,160,000 (£12,690,000). Non-effective services, £22,110,000 (£21,860,000).

Other points of particular interest in the White Paper included the following:—

**Organization.**—One independent infantry brigade has been selected to be in constant readiness to support civil governments in overseas territories for which the United Kingdom is responsible. The Air Ministry has agreed to provide a flight of light aircraft to support this brigade as soon as it becomes available.

It has been decided that there is no justification for retaining the existing coast artillery organization. Regular batteries will go into suspended animation. Territorial units will be converted to new roles by amalgamation with other units.

**Weapons and Development.**—The need for equipment to be air portable and to be able to move easily across country is receiving special attention. The results of recent trials are now being studied.

Issues of the Conqueror tank are continuing to units in B.A.O.R. and are expected to be completed by the end of 1958.

Troop trials will take place this year of the new armoured car, the Saladin.

'Corporal' equipment will be received from the United States and training in handling and deployment will take place this year.

The FN rifle has passed its trials and production plans have been made. The new sub-machine carbine, now in general production, is a great improvement on the war-time Sten.

Troop trials on the latest signal equipment will commence in the Middle East during 1956 and further trials will be held in 1957. The introduction of a full range of these equipments for regimental communications will be planned as a result.

An Army/Royal Air Force joint experimental helicopter unit has been set up. The first flight of six helicopters is now carrying out preliminary trials and a second flight will be formed during 1956. The whole unit will take part in trials with troops in Germany this year.

A complete range of instruments to measure radiations from both nuclear explosions and radioactive fallout has been developed, and production of instruments for training is complete.

*Movement.*—Air trooping has continued to be the main means of movement of Army personnel to and from the Middle East, the Mediterranean area, and East Africa. It has also been used for movement to and from the Caribbean and West Africa. Another development has been the movement of Gurkha personnel and families to and from leave in Nepal by air between Singapore and Calcutta.

*Manpower.*—A comparison of the total male recruiting results on normal Regular and short service engagements for 1952, 1953, 1954, and 1955 is as follows:—

	1952	1953	1954	1955
Men (Normal Regular Engagements)	49,389	39,139	35,675	32,337
Enlisted Boys ... ..	2,488	2,656	2,784	2,258
Men (Short Service Engagements)...	1,328	885	436	223

During 1955, 23 per cent. of those due to be called up enlisted on Regular engagements compared with 24.8 per cent. in 1954. Of all the Regular enlistments from civil life during the year, 55 per cent. were on the 22-year engagement compared with 61 per cent. in 1954.

The selective pay increases introduced in April, 1954, continued to have a beneficial effect in 1955 on the number of prolongations by men who enlisted before 1952 on the older types of engagements. But this source of prolongations is drying up and from the end of 1956, apart from boys, we shall have to rely for initial prolongations on Regulars who enlisted on the new three-year engagements. Of men on the three-year engagement, only some five per cent. of those who completed three years' service in 1955 have remained in the Army. For the 22-year engagement the figure is rather more encouraging. Nevertheless, due to the small numbers who enlisted on the 22-year engagement in 1952, the combined prolongation rate at the three-year point is only about seven per cent., about 40 per cent. of these having extended to 12 years rather than to six years.

The Army's share of National Service men called up in 1955, including those of call-up age who enlisted on Regular engagements, was some 130,000. The reduction in the size of the forces outlined in October, 1955, will result in a reduction to 115,000 in 1956.

Recruiting for the Women's Royal Army Corps has been disappointing and the strength is insufficient to meet requirements.

*Pay and Pensions.*—Against the background of the manpower position the Government have now decided to increase substantially the pay, retired pay, and pensions of Regular officers and men.

*Works.*—Since the war, nearly 10,000 new married quarters have been built and 1,800 old ones have been modernized or are in the process of modernization. A number of those still in use are far below modern standards and it is intended this year to start on the programme to re-provide these quarters, some 1,600 of which are needed. Good progress is being made in the construction of the new cantonments in Cyprus.

*Reorganization of the Active Army.*—It is necessary to make the infantry division capable of being split into strong, hard-hitting, self-contained groups. To give real flexibility, to simplify administration, and to reduce the danger of vehicle congestion, the multiplicity of weapons within the division will be reduced, and continuing efforts will be made towards simplification. Armour is now to be integrated in the infantry brigade and medium artillery is to be added to the division to provide increased range in shell

power. Territorial Army divisions required for early reinforcement of the Regular Army will be organized on the same lines.

The present armoured division has shown itself to be too cumbersome. It is necessary to have a formation quick to move, unencumbered by transport, and dependent principally on the fighting capacity of skilfully used armoured regiments. Such a formation must be small and specialized, comprising armour and only the minimum supporting units. Further trials are being carried out before a final decision is taken on the composition of an armoured division.

*Reorganization of the Reserve Army.*<sup>1</sup>—Study of the probable conditions in nuclear war has led to the conclusion that the Reserve Army must be reorganized. Its initial role, apart from the divisions and supporting units earmarked for SACEUR and the essential reinforcements to meet our other overseas commitments, will be home defence in its widest sense. It has therefore been decided to reorganize the Territorial Army on its present divisional structure, making full use of its existing territorial affiliations and linking it with the Civil Defence regions. It will be necessary also to reorganize the supporting arms and services both in the Army Emergency Reserve and the Territorial Army. It is hoped that very few Territorial Army units will be disbanded, but it will be necessary to dispense with a number of units in the Army Emergency Reserve. The Mobile Defence Corps will continue as now constituted, except that it will have rescue battalions only; the fire fighting role has been taken over by the Civil Defence organization.

#### INCREASES IN ARMY PAY AND PENSIONS

Increases in pay, pensions, and terminal grants for the Services which came into effect on 1st April are given in a White Paper (Cmd. 9692) which was published on 20th February. A selection of those for the Regular Army is given below.

##### Officers

##### Pay (normal daily rates)

	s.	d.
2nd Lieutenant...	21	0
Lieutenant on appointment	26	0
After 1 year in the rank	28	0
" 2 years	30	0
" 3 "	32	0
Captain on appointment	38	0
After 1 year in the rank	40	0
" 2 years	42	0
" 3 "	44	0
" 4 "	46	0
" 5 "	48	0
" 6 "	50	0
Major on appointment...	58	0
After 1 year in the rank	60	0
" 2 years	62	0
" 3 "	64	0
" 4 "	66	0
" 6 "	68	0
" 8 "	70	0
Lieut.-Colonel with less than 19 years' service	78	0
After 19 years' service or 2 years in the rank	81	0
" 21 "	84	0
" 23 "	87	0
" 25 "	90	0
Colonel on appointment	100	0
After 2 years in the rank	105	0
" 4 "	110	0
" 6 "	115	0
Brigadier	120	0

<sup>1</sup> For a more detailed account of this reorganization, see JOURNAL for February, 1956, p. 140.

## Retired pay and terminal grants

Ranks for Retired Pay	Standard Service Periods (years)	Standard Retired Pay Rate £	Terminal Grant £
Captain or below ... ..	20	500	1,500
Major ... ..	22	625	1,875
Lieut.-Colonel ... ..	24	800	2,400
Colonel ... ..	26	1,000	3,000
Brigadier ... ..	28	1,150	3,450
Major-General ... ..	30	1,400	4,200
Lieut.-General ... ..	30	1,600	4,800
General ... ..	30	1,900	5,700
Field-Marshal (half pay) ...	—	2,300	6,900

## Warrant Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Men

## Pay

Rank	Weekly rates for those committed to serve for :				
	Less than 6 years	6 years but less than 9 years	9 years or more	15 years, having completed 9 years' service	21 years or more, having completed 15 years' service
	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
Private :					
Recruit ... ..	63 0	77 0	91 0	—	—
Rising to ... ..	119 0	129 6	150 6	150 6	150 6
Lance-Corporal ... ..	84 0	98 0	115 6	115 6	115 6
Rising to ... ..	133 0	143 6	164 6	164 6	164 6
Corporal ... ..	98 0	112 0	129 6	140 0	140 0
Rising to ... ..	147 0	157 6	178 6	189 0	189 0
Sergeant :					
Other than Class I tradesman ...	164 6	164 6	185 6	199 6	206 6
Group B, Class I ... ..		175 0	196 0	210 0	217 0
Group A, Class I ... ..		185 6	206 6	220 6	227 6
Group X, Class I ... ..		196 0	217 0	231 0	238 0
Staff Sergeant :					
Other than Class I tradesman ...	185 6	185 6	206 6	220 6	227 6
Group B, Class I ... ..		196 0	217 0	231 0	238 0
Group A, Class I ... ..		206 6	227 6	241 6	248 6
Group X, Class I ... ..		217 0	238 0	252 0	259 0
Warrant Officer, Class II :					
Other than Class I tradesman ...	217 0	217 0	217 0	238 0	248 6
Group B, Class I ... ..			227 6	248 6	259 0
Group A, Class I ... ..			238 0	259 0	269 6
Group X, Class I ... ..			248 6	269 6	280 0
Warrant Officer, Class II (R.Q.M.S.) :					
Other than Class I tradesman ...	224 0	224 0	224 0	245 0	255 6
Group B, Class I ... ..			234 6	255 6	266 0
Group A, Class I ... ..			245 0	266 0	276 6
Group X, Class I ... ..			255 6	276 6	287 0
Warrant Officer, Class I :					
Other than Class I tradesman ...	231 0	231 0	231 0	252 0	262 6
Group B, Class I ... ..			241 6	262 6	273 0
Group A, Class I ... ..			252 0	273 0	283 6
Group X, Class I ... ..			262 6	283 6	294 0

## ARMY NOTES

## Pensions

Service Element.—For each year's reckonable service :—

	s.	d.
From 1-22 years ... ..	1	6 a week
" 23-27 " ... ..	5	0 "
For 28 years and over ... ..	4	0 "

Rank Element.—For each year of reckonable service in the rank of :—

	s.	d.
Corporal ... ..	0	8 a week
Sergeant ... ..	1	3 "
Staff Sergeant ... ..	1	10 "
W.O. II ... ..	2	2 "
W.O. I ... ..	2	8 "

## Terminal Grants

	Basic rate after 22 years' service	Increment for each year's service over 22
Private ... ..	£ 125	£ 12
Corporal ... ..	175	15
Sergeant ... ..	225	20
Staff Sergeant ... ..	275	24
W.O. II ... ..	300	28
W.O. I ... ..	330	32

*Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps*

## Pay (daily rates)

	s.	d.	s.	d.
Lieutenant ... ..	22	0	—	26 6
Captain ... ..	29	0	—	37 0
Major ... ..	43	0	—	53 0
Lieut.-Colonel ... ..	58	0	—	68 0
Colonel ... ..	75	0	—	86 0
Brigadier ... ..	90	0		

*Women's Royal Army Corps*

## Pay (daily rates)

	s.	d.	s.	d.
2nd Lieutenant ... ..	17	0		
Lieutenant ... ..	20	0	—	24 0
Captain ... ..	29	0	—	37 0
Major ... ..	43	0	—	53 0
Lieut.-Colonel ... ..	58	0	—	68 0
Colonel ... ..	75	0	—	86 0
Brigadier ... ..	90	0		

## C.I.G.S. EXERCISE

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Gerald Templer, will hold an exercise at Camberley from 8th to 10th August. Senior officers of Commonwealth countries have been invited to attend. The exercise will be known as "Snowfire" and will include, among other matters, the study of military problems involved in the cold war and the study of tactical problems in a limited war.

## ARMY REORGANIZATION IN GERMANY

It was announced by the War Office on 28th March that as from 1st April, 1956, British troops in Germany would be reorganized into two new pattern infantry divisions and two trial armoured divisions.

To implement this decision the following changes have been authorized :—

(a) The formation of an infantry division headquarters to be designated Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division.



(b) The reorganization of Headquarters, 31st, 61st, and 91st Lorried Infantry Brigades as Headquarters, 10th, 11th, and 12th Infantry Brigades.

(c) The placing in suspended animation of Headquarters, 11th Armoured Division, and Headquarters, 33rd Armoured Brigade.

(d) A reorganization among Corps troops.

#### REGULAR ARMY RECRUITING

The Regular Army recruiting statistics for February show that the total number of enlistments from civil life during the month were 2,512 men and 408 boys compared with 1,737 and 53 in December and 2,885 and 137 in January. The figures for re-enlistments were 2 from Short Service (December, nil; January, 2) and 273 from National Service (December, 210; January, 292).

#### THE MOBILE DEFENCE CORPS

The Mobile Defence Corps is part of the Army Emergency Reserve but, unlike the majority of A.E.R. units, is raised on a territorial basis, drawing its manpower from particular counties. The Corps will eventually consist of 36 Rescue Battalions, each of which will include one ambulance company.

The bulk of the personnel are National Service men who are trained for the Mobile Defence Corps at the end of their whole-time service, but all the leaders, both officers and other ranks, are volunteers.

So far there have been formed volunteer cadres, mostly from former T.A. personnel of Anti-Aircraft Command, for 25 battalions.

These battalions include the following former fire fighting battalions which have been redesignated and have had their role changed to rescue and ambulance duties:— 3rd (Sussex and Surrey), 4th (Middlesex), 10th (Wiltshire), 13th (Cheshire), and 19th (West Riding) Fire Battalions.

Although the number of volunteers who have joined the M.D.C. is encouraging, some of the cadres which have been formed, particularly those in Northern and Western Commands, are still under strength. They, as well as the 11 battalions still to be formed, need volunteers, particularly majors, captains, warrant officers, sergeants, and certain tradesmen.

It is hoped that the forthcoming reorganization of the Territorial Army will produce volunteers for the M.D.C., and individuals from the same unit for the M.D.C. will be kept together provided the necessary vacancies exist.

Volunteers to the M.D.C. will carry out an annual 15 days' camp with their units at the Millom, Watchet or Epsom M.D.C. Training Centres. In addition, most of them have attended an introductory fortnight's course, and special introductory training will be arranged for new volunteers.

The War Office has announced that in 1956 the Mobile Defence Corps will call up only volunteers for annual camps, which will all be held at Millom, Cumberland.

From 1957 onwards, battalions of the M.D.C. will be divided into two groups for training purposes. Each group will train in alternate years its National Service officers and other ranks who have not previously attended a camp. Thus, the M.D.C. will go to camp every year, but alternately with and without a National Service non-voluntary element.

In 1957, units of Group 'X' will consist of volunteers only; Group 'Y' units will include volunteers together with National Service officers and other ranks who, in 1956 and 1957, have a liability for part-time training and who have not already attended one camp. In 1958, Group 'X' will include National Service men with similar liabilities for 1956, 1957 and 1958, and Group 'Y' will be volunteers only.

After 1959, each group will train its National Service officers and other ranks in alternate years.

**CANADA**

**APPOINTMENTS.**—Brigadier K. A. Hunter, O.B.E., C.D., Q.H.P., M.D., has been appointed a Member and Co-ordinator of the Canadian Forces Medical Council.

Colonel S. G. U. Shier, O.B.E., C.D., M.D., has become Director General of Medical Services, Canadian Army, and has been promoted to the rank of Brigadier.

Colonel W. D. Wishart, O.B.E., C.D., has become Director of Electrical and Communications Development at Army Headquarters.

Lieut.-Colonel D. A. Kellough, C.D., has become Commandant, Canadian Army Signals Engineering Establishment, with the acting rank of Colonel.

**CADET CAMPS.**—Plans have been made to train 6,000 Royal Canadian Army Cadets at 10 camps in Canada this Summer. Over 5,000 attended these camps in 1955.

**CADETS FOR BISLEY.**—A team of 12 Royal Canadian Army Cadets has been chosen to represent Canada in rifle matches at Bisley this year.

**MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR N.A.T.O. COUNTRIES.**—Equipment shipped to N.A.T.O. countries by the Canadian Army since 1st January has included field and anti-aircraft artillery tractors, three-ton trucks, trailers, vehicle repair kits, ammunition, and explosives.

**AUSTRALIA**

**PROMOTION.**—Temporary Major-General A. H. Hellstrom, C.B.E., has been promoted to the substantive rank of Major-General (1st January, 1956).

**COMMISSIONS FOR ENGINEERING STUDENTS.**—Commissions in the Australian Regular Army Special Reserve are being made available this year to university students in civil engineering, mining, radio engineering, and science or applied science, and to young men in the final year of a technical college diploma course.

Successful applicants for commissions will be paid a salary and given full facilities to carry out their studies at a university or college. After completing their studies, for which the Army will pay a portion of the fees, students will serve as officers in either the Royal Australian Engineers, the Royal Australian Signals Corps, or the Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.

**TRAINING AT JUNGLE SCHOOL.**—Four hundred members of the New South Wales University of Technology Regiment (C.M.F.) and about 50 cadets from Queensland have undergone courses of training at the Army Jungle School, Canungra, Queensland, since 15th January.

The former were the first of the Citizen Military Forces to be trained at this School, and the cadets, selected from 350 who entered Greenbank Camp, near Brisbane, at the beginning of January for under-officer and intelligence training, had to have their parents' consent to undergo the jungle training course.

**SOUTH AFRICA****H.M. THE QUEEN**

The Queen has assumed the Colonelcy-in-Chief of the Royal Natal Carabineers and of the Imperial Light Horse Regiments in the Union of South Africa.

**NIGERIA**

**PRESENTATION OF NEW COLOURS.**—H.M. The Queen presented new Colours to the 2nd Battalion, The Nigeria Regiment, on Lagos racecourse on 30th January.

**THE QUEEN'S OWN NIGERIA REGIMENT.**—During a farewell broadcast message to the people of Nigeria on 15th February, H.M. The Queen said: "On the eve of our departure I would like to leave to all Nigerians a reminder of this visit, which has been a great experience to us and I believe also to you. I have therefore decided that from

now on The Nigeria Regiment is to be called The Queen's Own Nigeria Regiment. In this way I can also pay my tribute to the gallantry and loyalty of the people of the whole Federation who have served the Crown and their country so faithfully in peace and in war."

## FOREIGN AUSTRIA

### NEW FEDERAL ARMY COMMISSIONS

The first officers of Austria's new Federal Army received their commissions at a parade, in the presence of the President of the Republic and other members of the Government, at Schönbrunn Barracks on 3rd February from the Commander of the Vienna Garrison, Lieut.-Colonel Birsak.

## FRANCE

### APPOINTMENTS

The following appointments in the French High Command were approved by the French Cabinet on 29th February: General Clément Blanc as Inspector-General of the Army; and General Piatte as Chief of Staff of the Army.

## EAST GERMANY

### EAST GERMAN ARMY ADMITTED TO JOINT MILITARY COMMAND

At a meeting of the Political and Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization on 27th and 28th January, which was attended by the Foreign and Defence Ministers of all the eight signatories to the Warsaw Treaty—Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union—it was decided that contingents of the new East German Army would be incorporated in the unified command of the Warsaw Treaty Powers. The East German Defence Minister would become a deputy commander under Marshal Koniev. Although East Germany signed the Warsaw Pact in 1955, her participation in the unified command was deferred at the time for later consideration.

## UNITED STATES

### C.-IN-C., U.S. ARMY IN EUROPE

Lieut.-General Henry Hodes has been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Army in Europe as from 31st May.

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## AIR NOTES

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### H.M. THE QUEEN

**THE DUKE OF EDINBURGH AT LORD TRENCHARD'S FUNERAL.**—On 21st February, the Duke of Edinburgh represented The Queen at the funeral in Westminster Abbey of Marshal of the Royal Air Force the Viscount Trenchard.

**THE DUCHESS OF GLOUCESTER AT R.A.F. STATION.**—On 22nd March, the Duchess of Gloucester visited the R.A.F. Station, Sandwich.

**THE DUCHESS OF KENT PRESENTS STANDARD.**—On 6th April, the Duchess of Kent visited the R.A.F. Station, Celle, where she presented the Squadron Standard to No. 16 Squadron, 2nd Tactical Air Force.

**AIR AIDE-DE-CAMP.**—Air Chief Marshal Sir Francis J. Fogarty, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C., appointed Air Aide-de-Camp to The Queen (29th January, 1956).

**HONORARY PHYSICIAN.**—Air Commodore A. F. Cook, C.B.E., L.R.C.P.S., D.P.H., appointed Honorary Physician to The Queen (4th February, 1956).

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#### APPOINTMENTS

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE.**—Air Commodore A. A. Adams, D.F.C., appointed Chiefs of Staff representative with the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee, with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal (April, 1956).

**AIR MINISTRY.**—Air Vice-Marshal J. G. W. Weston, C.B., O.B.E., appointed Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Signals) (1st March, 1956).

Air Vice-Marshal J. R. Whitley, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., A.F.C., appointed Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, with the acting rank of Air Marshal (15th July, 1956).

**BOMBER COMMAND.**—Air Marshal Sir Harry Broadhurst, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C., appointed Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (22nd January, 1956).

Air Commodore G. A. Walker, C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.D.C., appointed Air Officer Commanding No. 1 Group, with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal (May, 1956).

**FIGHTER COMMAND.**—Air Vice-Marshal H. P. Fraser, C.B.E., A.F.C., appointed Air Officer Commanding No. 12 (Fighter) Group (June, 1956).

**MAINTENANCE COMMAND.**—Air Vice-Marshal R. B. Jordan, C.B., D.F.C., appointed Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, with the acting rank of Air Marshal (16th January, 1956).

**HOME COMMAND.**—Air Vice-Marshal H. H. Brookes, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C., appointed Air Officer Commanding No. 61 Group (April, 1956).

Air Vice-Marshal A. D. Gillmore, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Senior Air Staff Officer (June, 1956).

**No. 90 GROUP.**—Air Vice-Marshal L. Dalton-Morris, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Air Officer Commanding (1st March, 1956).

**IMPERIAL DEFENCE COLLEGE.**—Air Vice-Marshal E. C. Hudleston, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Royal Air Force Instructor (24th February, 1956).

**S.H.A.P.E.**—Air Vice-Marshal H. A. Constantine, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Deputy Chief of the Staff (Plans and Operations) (May, 1956).

**ALLIED AIR FORCES, CENTRAL EUROPE.**—Air Vice-Marshal T. N. McEvoy, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Chief of Staff, with the acting rank of Air Marshal (2nd May, 1956).

FAR EAST AIR FORCE.—Air Vice-Marshal F. J. St. G. Braithwaite, C.B.E., appointed Chief of Staff (May, 1956).

DIRECTOR, WOMENS' ROYAL AIR FORCE.—Group Officer M. H. Barnett, C.B.E., appointed Director, with the acting rank of Air Commandant (1956).

## PROMOTIONS

*Air Vice-Marshal to be acting Air Marshal.*—The Earl of Bandon, C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O. (22nd January, 1956).

*Air Commodores to be acting Air Vice-Marshals.*—V. S. Bowley, C.B.E. (16th January, 1956); W. E. Oulton, C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C. (1st March, 1956); J. Marson, C.B., C.B.E. (3rd March, 1956).

## RETIREMENTS

Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur P. M. Sanders, G.C.B., K.B.E. (29th January, 1956); Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil Embry, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C. (26th February, 1956); Air Chief Marshal Sir John Boothman, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C. (5th April, 1956); Air Vice-Marshal Sir Lawrence Darvall, K.C.B., M.C. (15th January, 1956); Air Vice-Marshal Sir Gordon Harvey, K.B.E., C.B., retaining the rank of Air Marshal (14th February, 1956).

## AIR ESTIMATES

The net expenditure provided for the Royal Air Force for 1956-57 amounts to £479,500,000 compared with £513,900,000 for 1955-56. It provides for a maximum of 257,000 officers, airmen, and airwomen compared with 272,000 for the previous year.

In his memorandum accompanying the Air Estimates, the Secretary of State for Air, Mr. Nigel Birch, made the following points:—

(i) Our contribution to the nuclear deterrent will rest mainly upon the power of the 'V' bombers. The first Valiant squadrons have been formed, and a small number of these aircraft will be used in the forthcoming trials of atomic weapons. We expect to see the Vulcan in service during the coming year.

(ii) The larger part of the day fighter squadrons has been equipped with Hunters. Javelins are now in service in Fighter Command and we can look forward to a progressive build-up of Javelin squadrons.

(iii) During the coming year Mark 3 Shackletons with more powerful engines will be introduced into service with Coastal Command while Britannias have been ordered for Transport Command.

(iv) The decision that the strength of the armed forces is to be reduced by 100,000 by April, 1958, means that the strength of the R.A.F. must come down by then to about 235,000.

(v) The manning situation in the more highly skilled trades in the four engineering trade groups has improved slightly, but is still far from satisfactory.



## INCREASES IN PAY AND PENSIONS

The new increased rates of pay, pensions, and terminal grants for the Services which came into effect on 1st April were published in a White Paper (Cmd. 9692) on 20th February. A selection of those for the Royal Air Force is given below.

*Officers*

## Pay (normal daily rates)

Rank	Basic pay	Flying pay
	s. d.	s. d.
Acting Pilot Officer ... ..	15 0	18 0
After 6 months in the rank (aircrew officers only)	17 0	18 0
After 1 year in the rank (other officers) ...	17 0	—
Pilot Officer ... ..	21 0	18 0
Flying Officer ... ..	24 0	20 0
After 1 year in the rank or 2 years' service ...	26 0	20 0
" 2 years " " " 3 " " "	28 0	20 0
" 3 " " " " 4 " " "	30 0	20 0
" 4 " " " " 5 " " "	32 0	20 0
Flight Lieutenant ... ..	36 0	22 0
After 1 year in the rank or 6 years' service ...	38 0	22 0
" 2 years " " " 7 " " "	40 0	22 0
" 3 " " " " 8 " " "	42 0	22 0
" 4 " " " " 9 " " "	44 0	22 0
" 5 " " " " 10 " " "	46 0	22 0
" 6 " " " " 11 " " "	48 0	22 0
" 7 " " " " 12 " " "	50 0	22 0
Squadron Leader ... ..	58 0	22 0
After 1 year in the rank ... ..	60 0	22 0
" 2 years " " " " " " "	62 0	22 0
" 3 " " " " " " "	64 0	22 0
" 4 " " " " " " "	66 0	22 0
" 6 " " " " " " "	68 0	22 0
" 8 " " " " " " "	70 0	22 0
Wing Commander ... ..	78 0	22 0
After 2 years in the rank or 19 years' service ...	81 0	22 0
" 4 " " " " " 21 " " "	84 0	22 0
" 6 " " " " " 23 " " "	87 0	22 0
" 8 " " " " " 25 " " "	90 0	22 0
Group Captain... ..	100 0	16 0
After 2 years in the rank... ..	105 0	16 0
" 4 " " " " " " "	110 0	16 0
" 6 " " " " " " "	115 0	13 0
Air Commodore ... ..	120 0	12 0
Air Vice-Marshal ... ..	160 0	—
Air Marshal ... ..	200 0	—
Air Chief Marshal ... ..	240 0	—
Marshal of the Royal Air Force ... ..	280 0	—

*Notes :—*

- (i) Officers of the Technical Branch who hold General List permanent commissions (except Acting Pilot Officers, Pilot Officers of less than 6 months' service, and officers above the rank of Wing Commander) will be eligible for technical qualification pay at 5s. a day.
- (ii) While under training officers receive flying instructional pay in lieu of flying pay. The rate is 6s. or 9s. a day, depending on the stage and type of training.
- (iii) A Flying Officer will receive flying pay at the rate of 22s. a day after two years in the rank.
- (iv) Officers on the Branch List other than Branch Officers qualify for three additional increments of 2s. a day in the rank of Flight Lieutenant.

*Branch Officers*

Rank	Basic pay	Flying pay
	s. d.	s. d.
Pilot Officer ... ..	36 0	18 0
After 2 years in the rank...	38 0	18 0
Flying Officer ... ..	43 0	20 0
After 2 years in the rank...	45 0	20 0
" 4 " " " " ... ..	47 0	20 0
" 6 " " " " ... ..	49 0	20 0
Flight Lieutenant ... ..	50 0	22 0
After 2 years in the rank...	52 0	22 0
" 4 " " " " ... ..	54 0	22 0
" 6 " " " " ... ..	56 0	22 0

(In ranks of Squadron Leader and Wing Commander, normal rates apply)

## Retired pay and terminal grants

Retired pay and terminal grants for Royal Air Force officers are the same as for the corresponding rank in the Army (see Army Notes).

*Aircrew*

## Pay

Rank	Weekly rates for those committed to serve for :			
	Less than 9 years but not less than 5 years		Not less than 9 years	
	Basic	Flying	Basic	Flying
	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
(i) <i>Pilots and Navigators :</i>				
Sergeant ... ..	185 6	70 0	206 6	70 0
Flight Sergeant ... ..	206 6	84 0	227 6	84 0
Master Aircrew ... ..	231 0	98 0	252 0	98 0
(ii) <i>Air Signallers (A)*, Air Engineers (A)*, Air Gunners (A)*, and Air Meteorological Observers :</i>				
Sergeant ... ..	185 6	56 0	206 6	56 0
Flight Sergeant ... ..	206 6	70 0	227 6	70 0
Master Aircrew ... ..	231 0	84 0	252 0	84 0
(iii) <i>Air Signallers, Air Engineers, and Air Gunners :</i>				
Sergeant ... ..	168 0	56 0	189 0	56 0
Flight Sergeant ... ..	189 0	70 0	210 0	70 0
Master Aircrew ... ..	213 6	84 0	234 6	84 0

## Ground Tradesmen

## Pay

Rank	Weekly rates for those committed to serve for :		
	Less than 5 years	Less than 9 years but not less than 5 years	Not less than 9 years
	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
(i) <i>Skilled Trades and Trade Assistants :</i>			
Aircraftman 2 (Recruit) ... ..	63 0	77 0	91 0
Aircraftman 2 ... ..	70 0	84 0	101 6
Aircraftman 1 ... ..	77 0	91 0	112 0
Leading Aircraftman ... ..	84 0	98 0	119 0
Senior Aircraftman ... ..	94 6	108 6	133 0
Corporal (not qualified S.A.C.) ... ..	112 0	126 0	147 0
Corporal ... ..	119 0	133 0	154 0
Sergeant ... ..	154 0	168 0	189 0
Flight Sergeant ... ..	175 0	189 0	210 0
Warrant Officer ... ..	199 6	213 6	234 6
(ii) <i>Advanced Trades (Aircraft Engineering, Radio Engineering, Armament Engineering, and Electrical and Instrument Trade Groups)* :</i>			
Junior Technician ... ..	122 6	136 6	157 6
Corporal ... ..	143 6	157 6	178 6
Corporal Technician ... ..	154 0	168 0	189 0
Sergeant ... ..	178 6	196 0	217 0
Senior Technician ... ..	178 6	196 0	217 0
Flight Sergeant ... ..	199 6	217 0	238 0
Chief Technician ... ..	199 6	217 0	238 0
Warrant Officer ... ..	227 6	241 6	262 6
Master Technician ... ..	227 6	241 6	262 6
(iii) <i>Advanced Trades (other Trade Groups) :</i>			
Junior Technician ... ..	112 0	126 0	147 0
Corporal ... ..	133 0	147 0	168 0
Corporal Technician ... ..	143 6	157 6	178 6
Sergeant ... ..	168 0	185 6	206 6
Senior Technician ... ..	168 0	185 6	206 6
Flight Sergeant ... ..	189 0	206 6	227 6
Chief Technician ... ..	189 0	206 6	227 6
Warrant Officer ... ..	217 0	231 0	252 0
Master Technician ... ..	217 0	231 0	252 0

\* Includes Trade Pay of 10s. 6d. a week.

## Pensions

Service Element.—For each year's reckonable service :— s. d.  
 From 1–22 years... .. 1 6 a week  
 For 23 years and over ... .. 4 6 "

Rank Element.—For each year of reckonable service in the rank of :—

s. d.  
 Corporal ... .. 0 8 a week  
 Sergeant ... .. 1 3 "  
 Staff Sergeant ... .. 1 10 "  
 W.O. II ... .. 2 2 "  
 W.O. I ... .. 2 8 "

## Terminal Grants

Terminal grants for Royal Air Force other ranks are the same as for the corresponding rank in the Army (see Army Notes).

*Women's Royal Air Force*

## Pay (daily rates)

	s.	d.	s.	d.
Pilot Officer...	17	0		
Flying Officer	20	0	24	0
Flight Officer	29	0	37	0
Squadron Officer	43	0	53	0
Wing Officer	58	0	68	0
Group Officer	75	0	86	0
Air Commandant	90	0		

*Princess Mary's Royal Air Force Nursing Service*

## Pay (daily rates)

	s.	d.	s.	d.
Flying Officer	22	0	26	6
Flight Officer	29	0	37	0
Squadron Officer	43	0	53	0
Wing Officer	58	0	68	0
Group Officer	75	0	86	0
Air Commandant	90	0		

## OPERATIONS

## A YEAR'S ACTIVITIES IN MALAYA

A review for 1955 just completed shows that a dozen different aircraft types were fully occupied in intensified operational roles throughout the year.

The three squadrons of Valetta transports—Nos. 110, 52, and 48—supported by Freighters of No. 41 Squadron, Royal New Zealand Air Force, successfully completed the Far East Transport Wing support commitment. These aircraft, during 1955, despatched by parachute 3,888 short tons of supplies for security forces on jungle operations and the garrisons of jungle forts. In addition to completing 2,065 operational sorties during the year, they dropped more than 140,000,000 leaflets over the nine States of the Federation during 365 sorties, to support the Government's psychological warfare campaign. In December alone, nearly 25,000,000 leaflets were air-despatched.

Bombing and strafing strikes by Canberra jet bombers of Nos. 101, 617, and 12 Squadron detachments, by Lincolns of No. 1 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force, and by Venom and Vampire ground-attack fighters of Nos. 60 and 45 Squadrons, R.A.F., and No. 14 Squadron, R.N.Z.A.F., exceeded 300 strikes in 1,831 sorties.

No. 1 Squadron, R.A.A.F.—now in its sixth year of anti-terrorist operations and winner of the 1955 Gloucester Cup for the most proficient squadron in the R.A.A.F.—carried out 505 sorties; No. 12 Squadron detachment, 74 sorties; No. 14 Squadron, 228 sorties; No. 45, 365 sorties; No. 60, 358 sorties; No. 101 Squadron detachment, 96 sorties; No. 205/209 Squadron (Sunderlands), 19 sorties; and No. 617 Squadron detachment, 59 sorties.

No. 194 (Light helicopter) Squadron, equipped with Sycamores and Dragonflies, successfully evacuated 469 casualties from the jungle, brought out the bodies of five terrorists for identification, carried 2,865 passengers—most of them security forces on operational duties—and lifted 80,038 lb. of freight.

Whirlwind helicopters of No. 155 Squadron, in 11,000 sorties, lifted 15,580 troops into and out of jungle operational areas, carried 836 passengers and 235,204 lb. of freight, evacuated 201 casualties, and lifted 34 tracker dogs.

No. 267 Squadron's Pioneer Flight completed 4,689 sorties, carrying 5,393 passengers—most of them security forces, or the garrisons of jungle forts—358,648 lb. of freight, and evacuating 113 casualties. The Dakota and Auster 'Voice' aircraft of this Squadron jointly completed 922 sorties, broadcasting for more than 870 hours over terrorist 'targets' in deep jungle.

## ORGANIZATION

**ATOMIC WEAPONS TEST.**—An Air Task Force, under the command of Group Captain S. W. B. Menual, is being formed for the third series of British atomic tests in the Monte Bello Islands. Comprising more than 20 aircraft of the R.A.F. and R.A.A.F., the Force will operate from Pearce Field and Onslow in Western Australia.

From the first of these bases, Canberras will be employed in collecting and delivering cloud samples, while Varsitys and Whirlwinds will fly low-level radiological surveys and take vertical photographs over the explosion area. Communication flights will also be made between the Monte Bello Islands and the mainland.

At the time of the detonations, R.A.A.F. Neptunes are to operate on safety patrols to watch that shipping is not in the danger area. From mid-February, R.A.F. Coastal Command Shackletons flying from Darwin will operate daily over the Timor Sea on look-out sorties for tropical storms, known as "willy-willies."

Although mainly self-supporting, the R.A.F. element has been offered the fullest facilities by the R.A.A.F. from whose bases its aircraft are to operate.

**AIR ELECTRONICS OFFICERS.**—The introduction of a new category of aircrew was announced in February, that of air electronics officers. They will operate airborne radio and electronic equipment not controlled directly by the pilot or navigator and will interpret the information obtained. These officers will be employed primarily in the V-bomber force of Bomber Command and to a lesser degree in Coastal and other Commands.

## MATERIEL

## FIRST AIR-TO-AIR GUIDED MISSILES FOR R.A.F.

The Ministry of Supply announced in February that it had placed a contract with the Fairey Aviation Co. for the production of an air-to-air guided missile known as the "Fireflash." Later, the Fairey Aviation Co. announced that a Fireflash guided weapon had successfully destroyed a Fairey Firefly target aircraft.

## TRAINING

**R.A.F. SUNDERLANDS FLY TO FAR EAST.**—Four R.A.F. Sunderland flying-boats of No. 201 Squadron, Coastal Command, based at Pembroke Dock, co-operated during March and April with units of the Royal Navy, the Royal Australian Navy, and the Royal New Zealand Navy in Far Eastern anti-submarine and fleet protection exercises.

Leaving England at 24-hourly intervals from 8th March, the Sunderlands flew 7,000 miles to the exercise area via Marsaxlokk, Malta; Fanara, Canal Zone; Bahrein, Persian Gulf; Korangi Creek, Karachi; Trincomalee, Ceylon; to the new temporary headquarters at Seletar, Singapore.

**JET TRAINING AT CRANWELL.**—From now on, cadets will complete their flying training on Vampire trainers at the College; the runways have been extended to permit their operation, and the Cranwell flying training syllabus now falls into line with that of the other R.A.F. flying training schools. Hitherto Cranwell cadets have qualified on Balliols and taken their jet flying course after leaving the College. The length of the College course is being increased from eight terms, lasting two years and eight months, to nine terms, lasting three years.

**NEW COMMANDANTS FOR CRANWELL AND MANBY.**—Air Commodore T. A. B. Parselle has been appointed Air Officer Commanding and Commandant of the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell (April, 1956).

Acting Air Commodore P. H. Dunn has been appointed Air Officer Commanding and Commandant of the Royal Air Force Flying College, Manby, Lincs. (April, 1956).



## "MISCELLANEOUS

**R.A.F. FLYING UNIT WITH TRANS-ANTARCTIC EXPEDITION.**—In February, the Air Ministry received the following signal from Dr. Vivian Fuchs, the leader of the British Trans-Antarctic Expedition: "Expedition's Royal Air Force Flight have done first-class job. First, in helping us to escape from the ice and second, on coastal and inland reconnaissances: aircraft now on skis. Flying continues."

**AIRLIFT TO CYPRUS.**—During a week's airlift to Cyprus, organized at short notice, 12,000 men of Headquarters, 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group, and the 1st and 3rd Battalions of The Parachute Regiment were flown out in Shackletons of Coastal Command and Hastings of Transport Command. Twenty-eight Shackletons were detailed for the operation together with 16 Hastings, the majority of the latter being used to carry the force's equipment.

**R.A.F. MOUNTAIN RESCUE MEN VISIT NORWAY.**—Four members of R.A.F. Mountain Rescue teams in England, Scotland, and Wales, led by Squadron Leader A. R. Gordon-Cumming, Air Ministry Inspector of Mountain Rescue, have attended a two weeks' mountain rescue course organized by the Norwegian Red Cross at Gardermoen.

**NEW MOUNTAIN RESCUE BADGE.**—The Queen has approved a badge for Royal Air Force Mountain Rescue teams. There are seven of these teams in the United Kingdom and another in Cyprus.

## CANADA

**FULL STRENGTH REACHED BY THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE.**—The Royal Canadian Air Force has announced that it reached its planned strength of 41 squadrons during 1955. It was further stated that it had 12 Sabre jet fighter squadrons in Europe, nine jet interceptor squadrons for home defence, four transport squadrons, three maritime reconnaissance squadrons, one photographic, and 12 reserve squadrons. The Canadian Air Division in Europe had been completed with the movement of No. 1 Fighter Wing from Britain to France. The personnel strength passed 50,000 during the year, making it the largest of the three Services. As regards equipment, the U.S.-built Neptune medium bombers had replaced Lancasters on maritime reconnaissance; the Mark VI Sabre had continued to replace earlier marks of that fighter; while a new version of the Bristol Britannia was being manufactured at Montreal for Air Transport Command.

**NEW CF-100 FOR R.C.A.F.**—It is understood that the Royal Canadian Air Force, at a cost of about \$150,000,000, about £53,600,000, will re-equip its home defence squadrons with a new version of the CF-100 jet interceptor. The new version is the Mk. 5 CF-100 with an operational ceiling some 5,000 feet higher than the Mk. 4 now used.

**SEARCH AND RESCUE SERVICE.**—More than 375 missions totalling approximately 5,460 flying hours were flown by R.C.A.F. aircraft on search and rescue missions during 1955. R.C.A.F. search and rescue handled 160 mercy flights, approximately 50 searches for missing or distressed aircraft, scores of patrols for distressed and missing marine vessels, and two major aerial operations in connection with forest fires in northern Ontario.

## AUSTRALIA

## APPOINTMENTS

Air Vice-Marshal W. L. Hely, C.B.E., A.F.C., has been appointed A.O.C., R.A.A.F. Training Command, Melbourne.

Air Commodore C. T. Hannah, C.B.E., has been appointed S.A.S.O. at Headquarters, F.E.A.F.

Air Commodore F. Headlam is attending the 1956 course at the Imperial Defence College.

## FOREIGN

## FINLAND

## PRODUCTION OF VIHURI AIRCRAFT

Production of the second batch of Vihuri aircraft commenced at the beginning of February. The estimated cost of each aircraft is £21,275 and it is anticipated that this order for an additional 20 trainers will be completed by the end of 1956. Various delays at the State Aircraft Factory at Tampere have held up production of these Vihuris since December, 1954.

## FRANCE

## GUIDED WEAPON FOR FRENCH ARMY

A new ground-to-air missile, the Parca, has been developed in France for use against high-speed aircraft.

## WEST GERMANY

**F-86S AND F-100S FOR LUFTWAFFE.**—The new West German *Luftwaffe* is to be equipped with United States F-86 and F-100 jet fighters, according to Defence Ministry officials. The first to be delivered will be Sabres, and German pilots have already begun training on these aircraft at United States bases in South Germany. The F-100 will be delivered in the second phase of equipping the *Luftwaffe*.

**LUFTWAFFE WILL USE HUNTERS.**—The new West German *Luftwaffe* is expected to be fully manned and equipped by the beginning of 1960. According to reports of the German Press Agency, which have the general blessing of the Ministry of Defence, 20,000 men are to have completed their training by the end of March, 1957; the full force will number 100,000 men, with 1,326 aircraft. The Ministry is said to be planning the purchase of British Hawker Hunters as well as American jet aircraft.

## ITALY

**GERMANY ORDERS ITALIAN TRAINER AIRCRAFT.**—Italian Press reports state that Germany has ordered 75 Piaggio P.149D light trainer aircraft and a subsequent contract for Focke-Wulf to build 200 under licence is to be signed.

**FIRST SABRES FOR THE I.A.F.**—The first Sabres, F-86E, for the Italian Air Force, have arrived in Italy. They will re-equip the 4th Air Brigade.

## JAPAN

**JET AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION.**—Japan and the United States are expected to exchange notes soon on arrangements for production of jet aircraft in Japan subsequent to June, 1957. Agreement has already been reached between the two countries on the assembly of 97 Shooting Star T-33 trainers and 70 Sabres F-86F by June, 1957. Under the new arrangements it is expected that between June, 1957, and June, 1958, a further 110 Sabres and 83 Shooting Stars will be assembled and manufactured in Japan.

**AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TO BE HANDED OVER TO THE JAPANESE.**—Air traffic control at Tokyo International, Matsushima, Itami, and Komaki airfields, now operated by the U.S.A.F., will soon be a Japanese responsibility. The U.S.A.F. have been training operators who are now reaching the required standards. U.S.A.F. personnel are expected to stay as supervisors.

**FORMATION OF THE FIRST FIGHTER WING.**—Training in Sabres F-86F of the Japanese Air Self Defence Force began on 1st March, 1956, at Tsuiki Air Base. The pilots in this newly formed wing are all veterans of Japan's war-time air arms of the Imperial Navy and Army. Although there are only 16 Sabres at present, it is expected that 54 will have been delivered by the United States under the Mutual Defence Aid Programme by the end of June.

**VAMPIRE TO BE TESTED.**—The Japanese Air Defence Force has taken delivery of a de Havilland Vampire T.55 trainer. It will be tested at the training base at Hamamatsu.

## RUSSIA

## ATOM-POWERED RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT ?

The Warsaw radio's air correspondent recently made reference to the Russian development of atomic-powered aircraft designed by Professor Pokrovsky. He claimed that this aircraft would have limitless range and endurance, but will be extremely large and heavy. Its fuselage will be some 150 feet in length the atomic reactor being situated at its extreme end in order to protect crew and passengers from radiation effects. The maximum speed of the prototypes will be between 370 m.p.h. and 500 m.p.h.

## UNITED STATES

**U.S. ARMED FORCES' BUDGET.**—The recent U.S. armed forces' budget revealed that the U.S.A.F. has 127 of the 137 wings scheduled by 30th June, 1957, and 916,000 of the 936,000 planned personnel. Of the 127 present wings, 114 are designated for combat and there are 13 troop-carrier wings, amounting in all to about 25,000 aircraft. This will increase to 26,736 when the 137 wings are in being. The U.S. Navy has 17 carrier air groups, but the number of carrier-borne and anti-submarine squadrons will increase from 19 to 31 by June, 1957.

**ADDITIONAL ARMY HELICOPTER UNITS FOR EUROPE.**—The U.S. Army's 587th Cargo Helicopter Company has arrived in West Germany. Equipped with 21 Sikorsky H-34 helicopters, the Company is the first of three such organizations scheduled for transfer to Germany before June, 1956. A helicopter company equipped with H-19 helicopters has been assigned to the European Command since 1953. The new units will provide additional air mobility for the U.S. Seventh Army. The H-34 is the Army designation of the Sikorsky S-58. It can carry 14 combat-equipped troops or approximately one and a half tons of cargo.

**C-123S TO BE DEPLOYED TO EUROPE.**—The 309th Troop Carrier Wing of Tactical Air Command, the first unit of the U.S.A.F. to be equipped with the new Fairchild C-123 Assault Transport, will leave for Europe this Spring, the U.S.A.F. has announced. The C-123 was designated for tactical airlift assault landings on rough terrain and can carry up to 60 combat troops or a 16,000 lb. load of equipment.

**B-36S TO BE REPLACED.**—The U.S. Air Force has announced that it has begun to replace the B-36 bombers of the Strategic Air Command with the new B-52 jet bombers. About 400 of the B-36s have been built and they have served as the main striking force of the S.A.C. for the past eight years. Their speed is of the order of 435 miles an hour. The new B-52 jet bombers are said to be capable of 650 miles an hour and 500 of them are to be built by the end of 1958, according to present plans.

**ATOMIC REACTOR FITTED TO B-36 ?**—America's first atom-powered aircraft, a giant B-36 trans-continental bomber, has been tested on flights over Texas and New Mexico. The *American Aviation Weekly*, one of the world's best-informed technical papers, claims that the giant bomber is fitted with an "atomic reactor in the nose."

**FIRST YC-121F DELIVERED.**—The first of two Lockheed YC-121F Super Constellations has been delivered to the U.S.A.F. and has begun its crew training programme. Powered by four 5,700 h.p. Pratt and Whitney T-34s, the YC-121F can cruise at more than 420 m.p.h. and could carry, it is claimed, 32,000 lb. loads non-stop from London to Dakar, 2,800 miles, in seven hours. Maximum loads are 106 passengers or 36,000 lb. of cargo. Two sister aircraft, designated R7V-2, are now being flight tested prior to delivery to the U.S. Navy.

## YUGOSLAVIA

## MIGs FOR YUGOSLAVIA

Russia is supplying Yugoslavia with jet aircraft and heavy weapons, according to reports received in Rome. The consignments included 35 MIG fighters.

## REVIEWS OF BOOKS

### GENERAL

**History of the Second World War. Administration of War Production.** By J. D. Scott and Richard Hughes. (H.M.S.O.) 37s. 6d.

This is the latest volume in the War Production Series of official histories. In *British War Production*, Professor M. M. Postan has painted the broad picture of the supply of arms to British forces during the War. This book deals with the machinery controlling that supply. Between the world wars each of the Services was responsible for its own production, using that word in its broadest sense to cover all processes from development and research to acceptance of the finished article into the Service. Co-ordination at high level was the task of the Principal Supply Officers' Committee

In the opinion of many this system was inefficient and wasteful in peace. Without doubt it was unsuited to war. But so long as peace prevailed successive governments were content to let 'sleeping dogs lie'. It needed the threat of war and the impetus of rearmament to set in motion the evolutions and changes which form the major theme of this volume.

The story starts in 1936 with the creation of a Directorate General of Munitions Production within the War Office charged with all production responsibilities save development and research. These remained with the Master General of the Ordnance. Thence it was but a logical step to divorce the War Office from all production responsibilities and vest them in a Ministry of Supply. But opposition had to be overcome, and it was not until August, 1939, that the Ministry was created. It needed the overwhelming pressure of events in 1940 to effect a similar process in the Air Ministry. For the first year of its existence the Ministry of Aircraft Production lived up to its description as "the child of crisis." Its task was to produce the goods at all costs. Thereafter it settled down to scientific planning and its Planning and Programme Division set a pattern for production which was a model of its kind. The Admiralty alone resisted all attempts to deprive it of its production tasks, being firmly imbued with the principle of the insoluble partnership of user and producer; though the Board of Admiralty, be it noted, conveniently overlooked this principle when it came to accepting responsibility for the building and repair of merchant shipping.

From 1940 onwards the story involves a kaleidoscopic pattern of new and ever-changing departments and committees out of which finally emerged the Ministry of Production. This ministry in effect acted as an 'over-lord' to the supply departments during the second half of the war, and had as its counterpart and close partner the American War Production Board. It is of passing interest to note that the organization of the Ministry of Production bore a marked similarity to the military command and staff system. Here at last after years of fumbling we arrived at a joint staff for war production, a system of devolution of responsibilities through regional organizations, and a 'Chief of Staff' in the person of the Chief Executive. In the words of Ernest Bevin war production "was gripped and controlled at the top," but the process had been a long and painful one and not unmarked by departmental jealousies and indecisions.

In attempting to record in digestible form the complex web of departments, committees, memoranda, and minutes on which was based the administration of war production the authors have set themselves a most formidable task. It is greatly to their credit that in parts they have evolved a readable story. Having carefully perused this volume of 500 pages at least one reader is left with the uncomfortable doubt whether in this present period of rearmament the lessons learned so painfully in the last war are being fully and successfully applied today.

**Against Great Odds.** By Brigadier C. N. Barclay, C.B.E., D.S.O. (Sifton Praed.) 15s.

This is the story of the first British military victory in the 1939-45 War—the first offensive in Libya, 1940-1941. Though a “resounding success and a model campaign,” it seems in danger of being forgotten. Yet, as Field-Marshal Sir John Harding remarks in his foreword, “its lessons have particular significance for the future and are worthy of careful study.” In writing this book the author has had the good fortune of being able to quote at length from Sir Richard O'Connor's personal narrative of the campaign.

Two chapters give what may be called the background to the campaign, including a brief description of the opposing forces, the state of their equipment, and potted biographies of higher commanders. The next chapter deals with the early operations, including the Italian advance and subsequent settlement in a system of entrenched camps. The Western Desert Force, later XIII Corps, under the command of O'Connor, consisted of the 4th Indian Division, 7th Armoured Division, and a few corps troops, including the 7th Royal Tank Regiment (48 “I” tanks). The development of the plan for the offensive is well described and the relevant factors are discussed, but the reason for the choice of Bir Enba as the concentration area is not given.

The narrative continues with the approach march and the Battle of Sidi Barrani. Complete surprise was achieved; with the “I” tanks leading, the first two objectives were assaulted from the rear. Some four divisions were destroyed, two more were roughly handled, one escaped. The number of prisoners captured exceeded the total strength of O'Connor's force. As soon as the battle ended on 11th December, 4th Indian Division was ordered to move to the Sudan where another offensive was in preparation. It was replaced, but not at once, by 6th Australian Division from Palestine.

In spite of many administrative difficulties Bardia was captured with 40,000 prisoners on 6th January and Tobruk with another 25,000 on 22nd January. After a rapid parallel pursuit the remainder of the Italian Army in Cyrenaica was intercepted at Beda Fomm on 5th February and surrendered on the 7th. In addition to the actual account of these events, the factors involved and the reasons for the decisions made are well discussed.

A chapter is devoted to the situation after the victory in which the author states why the advance into Tripolitania was not continued, although O'Connor appears to have thought it possible. One reason was the Government's decision to send troops to Greece; the author discusses this venture and remarks on its serious after-effects. In the final chapter he examines the offensive in retrospect, makes a number of cogent comments, and concludes with the opinion that “the campaign is likely to remain a guide to future conduct.”

The story is a fascinating one and there is no doubt that the campaign merits close study. The volume is provided with five clear sketch maps, photographs of commanders, and a brief index. One appendix gives the order of battle of Western Desert Force, the other consists of the reprint of an article by the late Lord Wavell on the campaign in Greece. This book is an excellent supplement to the Official History, especially as it gives much essential detail omitted from that work.

**Dieppe at Dawn.** By R. W. Thompson. (Hutchinson.) 15s.

This book tells the story of the first big combined operation of the war, the raid on Dieppe in August, 1942. The narrative is factually accurate and, as far as possible, complete. The author must have gone to very considerable trouble to ensure this. His diligence has produced not only a valuable historical record but a most vivid account of this gallant, though tragically costly, enterprise.

In the main Mr. Thompson has contented himself with facts without expressing controversial opinions. But in his prologue, with excessive modesty, he disclaims any practical military value for his studies on the ground that “Dieppe, along with the Charge of the Light Brigade” and all other great deeds from Marathon to Waterloo,



belongs to "old-fashioned warfare" in which men confronted men in battle. He seems to think that 'push-button' nuclear warfare will render infantry combat a thing of the past. Not being an old infantryman myself, I can flatly disagree with him without any suspicion of bias.

'Push-button' warfare, with its inevitable tendency to concentrate the sources of destructive power within small and static objectives such as aerodromes, launching sites, or the laboratories of nuclear scientists, will surely lend itself to many raids of the commando type. The attackers may be carried in aerial landing craft, unlike any aircraft hitherto visualized even in the pages of juvenile space-fiction. But, somehow or other, they will get to these vital objectives, and will attack them as infantry have always attacked defended posts, though the weapons which they will use may be more effective than those of infantry today. The essence of such raids, as regards both attack and defence, will be man-to-man fighting, just as it was at Dieppe or on the Imjin River.

My task is to criticize the book—not the Dieppe raid. But one cannot help regretting the fact that we had to relearn the lessons of Gallipoli and at such a heavy cost. Lack of fire support during the break-out from the beaches was the root of both these epic failures. Barbed-wire and machine guns together proved just as lethal on Dieppe beaches in 1942 as they were at Anzac in 1915.

Mr. Thompson's style is slightly journalistic, which detracts occasionally from the clarity of the narrative. For example, the expression "the clouding sky," used several times, leaves the reader in doubt as to whether cloud conditions were getting progressively worse throughout the day—an important point affecting the question of air support. Again he uses at least twice the expression "mortars used as howitzers." To me, as an old gunner, this could mean one of three things, none of them of great tactical significance. But it was evidently a point of some importance to the author.

These, however, are small faults of style, more than compensated by the vivid clarity of his descriptions of the infantry fighting itself. He writes as one who has obviously had similar experiences. Quite rightly he has emphasized the Canadian part in this operation. The 2nd Canadian Division's killed were 18 per cent of those who embarked plus 2,000 captured.

The book would have been better still with an index and it needs better maps. Those given are indistinct and omit many essential place-names.

**Guns.** Written and illustrated by S. E. Ellacott. (Methuen.) 8s. 6d.

This is the 17th volume in Methuen's "Outlines" series, described as a "reference library for boys and girls," and it may seem strange to find it reviewed in these pages. This book, however, can be recommended as good reading to anyone interested in firearms. In 76 pages and 86 close-packed illustrations Mr. Ellacott runs cheerfully and competently over the development of firearms from the XIVth to the XXth Century, and has a page or two to spare for primitive and classical methods of projecting missiles.

He begins with the Christchurch pot or vase and finishes with "Atomic Annie" and her 1,000-lb. miniature atom-bomb shell. Amongst the subjects dealt with are land and sea artillery, pistols, revolvers, smoothbores, rifled weapons, automatic guns, and machine carbines. He gives useful summaries of the immense changes in manufacture and working conditions during the XIXth Century. Ammunition is also touched upon. The drawings are simple and clear, annotated with skill, and extremely numerous; in a third of a page, for example, on bolt-action rifles, 1880-1890, are shown not only the Italian Vetterli .41 of 1883, but, in diagram form, the breech of the former open and the action of the latter cocked. Many of the sketches are from examples in the author's collection, and in the whole book there is no mistaking the passionate devotion of an enthusiast dealing with his hobby.

Naturally, in such a tremendous range there are some omissions; British military smoothbores and the development of field artillery during the 1914-18 War are rather

lightly mentioned, and modern armoured vehicles and their functions as gun-platforms receive only a few words. Still, one cannot have everything and each has his special interest in this fascinating subject.

Mr. Ellacott's style is concise, brisk, and, considering the amount of precise information he gives, lively. He finds time to play at the fascinating game of 'hunt the origins,' discovers rapid-fire breechloaders, revolvers, and hair-triggers before 1600 and butt-magazine repeaters and compressed air guns in the XVIIIth Century. Nor does he omit Mr. James Puckle's machine-gun of 1718, with its round bullets for use against Christians and square bullets for Turks.

As an introduction to the subject and to indicate the many lines of approach this book can hardly be bettered. Grown-up experts in any particular branch will be able to enjoy a quarrel on matters of selection, but even they will be all the better for a well-conducted and informed scamper over a vast range; and it is difficult to believe that any young person could fail to be enthralled.

**An Idea to Win the World.** By Peter Howard. (Blandford Press.) 3s. 6d.

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**Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific.** By Major Charles S. Nichols, Jr., U.S.M.C., and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. (U.S. Government Printing Office.)

This book is the 15th in a series of operational monographs prepared by the Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. It is compiled from the official records of the units concerned, as well as from Japanese sources.

The task of capturing Okinawa—the code name was "Operation Iceberg"—was assigned to the U.S. Tenth Army, of which the Marines formed a major complement. As is explained in the preface, "Army activities are treated herein with sufficient detail to reflect the Marines' contribution to the overall mission."

Okinawa is a large island among the chain of islands extending southwards from Japan and its capture was essential in order to provide, within moderate flying distance from the Japanese mainland, airfields whence the final heavy bombing assaults could be delivered.

The story opens with a chapter on the historical background of Okinawa, followed by one in which is described the intricate planning of the operation, during which the conflicting opinions of the various high authorities were eventually reconciled into the plan that was finally adopted. Next comes the "Preparations for the Assault" and the "Japanese Defensive Preparations." Six more chapters are devoted to the actual battle, which lasted from 24th March until 30th June, 1945, by which time the whole island was in American hands and the defending Japanese 32nd Army (about 100,000 men) had been destroyed.

The final chapter is entitled "Campaign Summary." Commenting on tactical evaluation, "The Okinawa operation represents 'the culmination of amphibious development in the Pacific War.' Before it was ended, 'more ships were used, more troops put ashore, more supplies transported, more bombs dropped, and more naval guns fired against shore targets' than in any previous (U.S.) campaign."

Appendices include a chronology of the principal events in 1944 and 1945; Command and Staff List of the Marine Units on Okinawa; Amphibious Corps Task Organization; Japanese Order of Battle; Marine casualties from 1st April to 22nd June, 1945; and citations of awards to individuals of the Medal of Honor and the Navy Unit Commendation Ribbon.

Conditions were arduous throughout and the enemy resistance was fanatically maintained to the last; in accordance with the Samurai tradition, the Japanese General and his Chief of Staff committed *hara-kiri*. The cost of victory was high. Out of the total American casualties of over 39,000 killed, wounded, and missing, those incurred by the Marines amounted to 1,091 officers and 19,717 enlisted men.

The book is very nicely produced and has an adequate index; the text is enlivened by numerous photographs of persons and action localities, as well as line diagrams of assault details at the different stages. In addition, at the end of the book, there are two general Pacific area maps and 25 contour maps. These latter show the general troop distribution (in dark blue) superimposed on a fainter background of the area concerned, and, being pull-out maps, facilitate reference to the text. The only criticism of these

maps and diagrams is that it is not easy for the lay reader fully to identify troop units by the symbols used. A legend, not necessarily with every single map, would obviate this disadvantage.

This is an excellent compilation of the events leading to the capture of Okinawa. It can be thoroughly recommended to all who take an interest in the achievements of determined troops in the face of every kind of difficulty.

**Spam Tomorrow.** By Verily Anderson. (Rupert Hart-Davis.) 15s.

The author of this unpretentious little work must be something of a character. Not many women would deliberately contemplate going AWL from their war-time military duties even to get married; although it is characteristic of Mrs. Anderson's alert practicality that she first ascertained that "the F.A.N.Y.'s were not subject to military law." Fortunately it was found possible to tie the matrimonial knot without flouting authority too outrageously; and as the wife of an official in the Ministry of Information—who emerges, incidentally, as a man of almost sublime serenity and forbearance—the bride cheerfully accepted the harassed life of one condemned to stick it out in war-time London.

Then came an interval, spent on London's outer rim, devoted to the production of babies; a period upon which the authoress dwells with a lavish attention to obstetrical and gynaecological detail which will rather command the male reader's respectful sympathy than his eager interest. In due course mother and two babies returned to London.

It was Sterne who pronounced that if a man knew *how* to write, then he could write intelligently about a broomstick. Mrs. Anderson's story of the 'blitz' differs, factually, little from a hundred others. But she has the trick of making it interesting and sometimes very amusing.

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'A brilliant writer' Sir Arthur Bryant calls him. He gives tremendously vivid accounts of fighting, details of campaign life, graphic descriptions of foreign towns and countryside, unforgettable sketches of the 'characters' in which the Army abounded. 336 pages. 21s. net.

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A concatenation of circumstances eventually drove mother and offspring, together with a friend with yet more offspring, to seek refuge in a Cotswold cottage which must have undergone its last overhaul somewhere about the time paraffin lamps were invented. A bad attack of what is known to the initiated as 'cramp in the kick', or 'overdrafititis', necessitated taking in lodgers; although on the whole it is difficult not to feel that it was the unfortunate hostesses who were 'taken in'. The impossible North-country tribe that arrived in a tradesman's van and waxed indignant that the Cotswolds could offer no accessible sea-front or paddling were only a little less impossible than the 'arty' trio who nearly tugged the old-fashioned, jangling bells out of their sockets.

Fortunately, a neighbouring American armoured unit furnished a little welcome diversion—and some much-appreciated bourbon. When it finally departed to play its part in the Normandy invasion, it left a gap that was only bridged in part by a letter in which true pathos has never been more succinctly expressed. "The weather is vile;" (the missive ran) "the liquor is undrinkable; money is valueless; and the women are repulsive. This, to an overpaid and oversexed American, adds up to bad news."

All this amounts to little more than a chronicle of small beer; but it is a pleasant enough brew, drawn by a woman of sterling character and unquenchable humour. Within these terms of reference it is recommended.

**Struggle for the Border.** By Bruce Hutchison. (Longmans, Green.) 30s.

There is only one land-border whose whole 3,986-mile length is free from fortifications, barbed wire, and suspiciously watchful frontier guards, and that is the boundary which (geographically) divides Canada from the United States. This near-miracle of good relations is, however, very much a blessing of recent years. For the borderlands of the early years were the scene of incessant fighting, in which English, French, and Red Indian penetration far below and above the 49th Parallel swung the advantage first one way and then the other.

The French had been slightly the earlier on the scene; but instead of consolidating the vast territories they claimed for the Bourbon lilies, they were content to exploit them in the interest of the immensely profitable fur trade. The English, bitterly divided amongst themselves and averse to any sort of military undertaking, were content to dig in on the constricted Atlantic shelf, despite the fact that the original Charters of Virginia, Massachusetts, and Connecticut had endowed the settlers with "all the land to the west." In effect, the French followed the rivers and the English followed their noses—which did not take them very far. It was only when La Salle followed the course of the Mississippi to its mouth that the New Englanders awoke, as Professor Callender put it, "to find themselves hemmed in by the rather artificial barrier of a hinterland that was staked out in claims but practically unoccupied". But the French held the two gateways to the New World—the mouth of the St. Lawrence and that of the Mississippi. The only thing that could break their grasp was the proper exercise of sea power; as 1st and 2nd Louisbourg amply demonstrated. It was sea power again which ultimately cut the Gordian knot for a fumbling and bewildered James Wolfe at Quebec.

The final expulsion of the Bourbon lilies from New France left the Americans free to launch a struggle for national independence upon which they would never have dared to embark with a Gallic threat to their northern flank still in existence. It was a strange requital for all the English blood and treasure poured out to complete the task; but in history's dictionary the word 'gratitude' is set up in the very smallest type. The real miracle was that the revolt of the thirteen colonies was not followed by that of the fourteenth. But Canada, with a mere 65,000 inhabitants—many of whom, however, were expatriate loyalists from what had become the United States—was determined to grow to nationhood under the British Crown. But the boundary settlement arrived at during the 1782 Peace Conference actually settled nothing. This was very largely due to the fact that the vast territories beyond the Rockies were still virtually unpenetrated and, where known, amounted to little more than a 'Tom-Tiddler's-ground' for every con-



ceivable type of adventurer. Yet despite the blunderings of the British Governments and the attempts of both the French and the Americans to fish in waters they themselves had been at pains to trouble, the fledgling people, irrespective of differing racial origins, stood fast to their resolve. The war of 1812; American aims to fulfil 'manifest destiny' by the colonization of the entire North—which read a little oddly in the light of contemporary transatlantic sentiment on the question of colonies!—the gold rush of '57; the abortive Fenian 'invasion', Louis Riel's rebellion—it was a long, hard road to confederation and that national consolidation which ultimately led to American recognition of Canada's manifest destiny, and to enduring peace along the border.

It is a tremendous, colourful story that Mr. Hutchison has to unfold, and despite certain naïveties he tells it crisply and with commendable clarity. At the price charged, however, a detailed expanding map should certainly have been included.

#### NAVAL

**The House That Jack Built.** The Story of H.M.S. *Excellent*. By Commander R. Travers Young, O.B.E., R.N. (Gale and Polden.) 15s.

After the battle of Trafalgar the standard of gunnery in the Royal Navy, with a few notable exceptions, had greatly declined, but it was not until some 25 years later that any steps were taken officially to remedy this state of affairs. Meanwhile, no gun drill had ever been standardized and each captain of a ship went his own way. The result, needless to say, was far from satisfactory.

In 1830, however, largely owing to the energy and far-sightedness of a few officers, the Admiralty gave orders for an old third rate (the *Excellent*) to be fitted out at Portsmouth as a gunnery school, in order to provide instruction for officers and men in the proper use of a ship's armament. Starting with a single hulk, then two, in 1891 the hulks were paid

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HEINEMANN

off and all hands moved ashore to Whale Island—originally a mere mudflat—into quarters which have been progressively improved as time went on. The whole establishment still bears the name of H.M.S. *Excellent*.

In this book Commander Young describes in an easy style how all this was brought about. It is no mere dry-as-dust chronicle of events that he presents, and the story is enlivened at appropriate points with anecdotes, apocryphal and otherwise, bearing on the phase of development that he is relating. He has avoided becoming bogged down in a mass of detail, and has condensed his narrative so as to give a broad picture of the vast expansion of the establishment, both instructional and experimental, that has taken place during the last 125 years. Inevitably it was not all plain sailing, and at times opposition had to be surmounted; but these difficulties never deterred the officers of the Gunnery School from progressing in the right direction.

Appendices include a chronology of the principal events in the history of the Portsmouth Gunnery School, and four lists of officers, with their dates of appointment, who have belonged to 'The Island.'

The print is clear and there are some interesting photographs, but the proof-reader has allowed a number of printer's errors to slip through and the author has been a little careless in the names of ships and persons; his account of the earlier history of the *Excellent* (page 28) is not entirely in accordance with the facts—in 1803 Captain Collingwood was a flag officer of some four years seniority, and the reason why the ship missed being present at Trafalgar is not as stated. The information about The Queen's Royal Regiment at the battle of the First of June, 1794, also, is not quite correct.

On the whole, however, Commander Young has provided a very attractive little book, which can be commended to all types of reader that take an interest in the Royal Navy, and especially to those officers who were once referred to by a senior officer, during the course of an after-dinner speech in the *Vernon*, as "our be-gaitered confrères over the way."

**The Keith Papers, Volume III, 1803–1815.** Edited by Christopher Lloyd. (Navy Records Society.) 45s.

This is the third and final volume of the letters and papers of Admiral Viscount Keith, G.C.B. The first volume (1761–1796) was printed in 1927 and the second (1797–1802) in 1950. The present volume is divided into three parts. Part I covers the period 1803–1807, during which Keith was in command of the North Sea Station; Part II that of 1812–1814, when he was Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet; and Part III the period of the "Hundred Days" in 1815, which culminated in the surrender of Napoleon and his banishment to St. Helena, for which he was recalled to resume command of the Channel Fleet. Keith then hauled down his flag for the last time.

The resumption of hostilities in 1803 caused a renewal of the fears of invasion, which were not finally dispelled until August, 1805, when Napoleon marched eastwards. The letters between Keith and the Prime Minister and the Admiralty, as well as those from the officers in command of the various forces employed in anti-invasion measures, show clearly that those fears were justified. The use of solid shot as the principal projectile was gradually being augmented by new forms of offensive weapons, among which were the Congreve incendiary rocket and the devices invented by the American Robert Fulton ("Mr. Francis").

Keith, who inclined to the belief that an invading force was more likely to start from the Texel than from Boulogne, established a close liaison with the military officers responsible for the defences along the east coast; the maintenance of the continental blockade was also one of his chief preoccupations.

Keith's principal task on assuming command of the Channel Fleet was to maintain a close blockade of Brest. Sporadic encounters took place in the Bay of Biscay by both

small squadrons and single ships, and the activities of smugglers and enemy privateers there and in the Channel, especially after America had declared war, kept the smaller ships of his command fully occupied. The abdication of Napoleon in April, 1814, brought the war with France to a close, and Keith hauled down his flag in the following July. War with America, however, continued until the end of the year.

The conjunct operations on the north coast of Spain were connected with the support of Wellington's army in the Peninsula. In 1813, Wellington complained that the Navy was not very helpful, but he did not realize the dangers of a lee shore to the larger ships. These misunderstandings were eventually cleared up when Rear-Admiral Sir Byam Martin—Keith's second-in-command at Plymouth—was sent out to explain matters personally to Wellington.

The account of the surrender of Napoleon, hitherto usually presented from the French point of view, is now seen from the naval aspect and throws a new light on the attitude of the British Government. Included among the letters printed here are some private ones from Keith to Melville, which are in the possession of Mr. William M. Spencer of Chicago, and are now reproduced with his permission for the first time.

Besides operations, the sections on the Sea Fencibles, manning, convoy, and blockade, as well as some miscellaneous contemporary items ranging from the establishment of chaplains to the introduction for the first time of canned meat as a naval ration, add to the general interest.

This volume is well up to the standard of its predecessors in the series. Professor Lloyd has provided, from among the mass of MSS available, a representative collection of letters and documents which illustrate the naval side of affairs in home waters during those troublous years.

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**CASELL**

**The True and Perfecte Newes of . . . Syr Frauncis Drake, 1587.** By Thomas Greepe. Edited by Lieut.-Commander D. W. Waters. (Yale University Press.)

The reprinting of the *True and Perfecte Newes* is a venture well worth the doing. Quite apart from its rarity, the ballad is of considerable interest, as Lieut.-Commander Waters points out in his introduction, as an example of the general method of the day of spreading the current news around the countryside. In this handsome book it is reproduced in facsimile from the copy in the library of Mr. Henry Taylor, of Cold Spring Harbor.

It is, however, the long and scholarly introductions by the editor which will probably most interest the reader. Lieut.-Commander Waters has gone to considerable pains to bring together as much as possible of the available source material covering this exploit of Drake's, and there can be little that has escaped his notice. With it he has given a most able and conscientious account of Drake's expedition which adds considerably to historical knowledge.

The book is sumptuously produced and extremely well printed. As the edition is limited to 560 copies, it will obviously become a collector's item.

#### ARMY

**Battle for Egypt.** The Summer of 1942. By Lieut.-Colonel J. L. Scoullar. Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939-45. (Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press.)

The aim of this volume is to record the experiences of 2nd New Zealand Division in the campaign of 1942 up to the change in command on 10th August. The intention is also "to draw from the campaign, for civilians and soldiers alike, such lessons in the art of war as may be of permanent value." In his early chapters the author discusses General Freyberg's problems and his meditations on his dual responsibility to his own Government and the Commander-in-Chief. The possible effect on the conduct of operations of the Divisional Commander's frequent objections to projects and orders is not considered. Discontent at the excessive publicity given by the Press and the B.B.C. to Dominion troops is mentioned and an outstanding example is quoted on page 13.

After 12 days of arduous fighting and heavy losses in Cyrenaica during the offensive in November, 1941, the Division was withdrawn to Baggush, leaving the 5th Brigade Group and some units with the 8th Army until March, 1942. After some amphibious training in the Canal Zone for an operation which was abandoned, the Division moved to Syria. It remained there until brought back to the Western Desert and ordered to hold the 'fortress' of Matruh during the crisis of June, 1942. The leading brigade arrived on 22nd June, and set to work restoring the defences. However, after representations by General Freyberg next day, the Army Commander agreed, in spite of the confusion and delay likely to result, that the formation should go to an area south and west of Minqar Qaim to act in a mobile role. The fortress would be held by 10th Indian Division, then withdrawing from the frontier. The move was completed by midnight 26/27th June. In the meantime General Auchinleck, who had taken direct command of the Army, decided not to fight a decisive battle at Matruh but to withdraw to the Alamein position.

On 27th June, the Division was surrounded by the Afrika Korps and Freyberg was wounded. That night the Division broke out in spectacular fashion, reached the southern sector of the Alamein position with very few losses, and was established by 30th June. Rommel attacked in the northern sector on 1st July with no success except at Deir el Shein, and again on the next two days. On the last day the Division struck a heavy blow at the Ariete Division, and farther north the Germans were fought to a standstill. The author pays tribute to the unfortunate 18th Indian Brigade whose last stand at Deir el Shein all through 1st July "may be said to have marked the turn in the battle on the Alamein line."

The Division took part in night attacks on Ruweisat Ridge on 14/15th July, using two brigades, and at Deir el Mreir on 21/22nd July, with one. Both ended in disaster and in each case the higher command and the armoured formations are blamed for the result. The inclusion of the Division's operation orders for these attacks would have added to the historical value of the narrative.

There followed a period when heat, flies, dust, and shortage of water caused much hardship and grumbling. But, as the author points out, conditions were the same for everyone. About this time "disparaging comment" and "criticism of the fighting qualities of other divisions" was prevalent. This extended to Cairo and "the good name of the Division suffered to the extent that action had to be taken." Copies of forthright circular letters issued by two brigade commanders are quoted in the text.

This interesting volume is well produced and has good sketch maps. Events are well described in great detail but the narrative suffers from too frequent digression into commentary. Much of it is criticism of the higher command, staff, and armoured formations and though some of it, especially as regards organization, is justifiable, the careful reader may wonder whether the tribulations and losses of the Division, particularly at Ruweisat and Mreir, were entirely due to the failings of others.

**It Don't Cost You a Penny.** By Eddie Harwood. (Max Parrish.) 9s. 6d.

It is very refreshing to come upon an English writer who has done so admirably for the British 'Tommy' what the respective authors of *The Good Soldier Schweik* and *Gunner Asch* have achieved for the German man in the ranks. Eddie, the protagonist of *It Don't Cost You a Penny*, is a hardy relic of that vintage period which extended between 1907 and 1914; a time when men were men, soldiers were soldiers, beer was beer, and

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# EVANS

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Woodbines were five for a penny. In his younger days Eddie was entitled pridefully to wear 'the Jacket'. His acceptance of re-enlistment in the then unproven Pioneer Corps does as much credit to his sense of the realities as to his nose for future values. For it is impossible not to surmise that Eddie's participation in the activities of this gallant and hard-working corps had more than a little to do with the award of the honorific prefix to which it is now entitled.

Far more typical an 'old sweat' than Bairnsfather's scrimshanking 'Old Bill', Eddie moves imperturbably from one hilarious adventure to another, exhibiting all the resource and ingenuity that only a lifetime of trying to 'dodge the serjeant-major' can perfect. Very occasionally, he slips; for although he could easily make rings round the Army Council, serjeant-majors are something else again. It is at these moments, possibly, that Eddie shows himself at his best. Resilient as a cork, knowing no malice—since even when trying to 'dodge the column', he wouldn't have it run anything but 'proper regimental'—there is no situation that his native Cockney wit and ingenuity fails to handle with superb aplomb. Your reviewer, for example, was once confronted with the invidious task of officially demobilizing a regimental goat, for which no one had even approximate use, but which for all that remained a charge on public funds. The depot, with seven of the creatures already dumped on it, would have nothing to do with the beast. The local inhabitants, with true Gallic avarice, wanted liberal payment even to take it away. If only Eddie had been at hand to deal with the matter in the masterly fashion narrated in Chapter 9, everybody—with the possible exception of the goat—would have been perfectly satisfied, and public funds so beautifully adjusted that even a board of actuaries would have found no possible grounds for complaint.

In an army of well-intentioned but technically uninstructed troops, such as we have had to fight all our recent wars with, the Eddies of this world are worth their weight in gold. With almost uncanny percipience, the author has drawn the portrait of this typical 'old sweat'—"warts and all"—and left us with an impression of an individual whom every officer and non-commissioned officer would curse, but with whom none of them would willingly be without. To anyone with memories of the old Army and all it stood for, this little book is a *must*, to be purchased, read, and conned over time and time again. The illustrations are by Sillince, and if you like these sort of illustrations, these are the sort of illustrations you will like. It is doubtful, however, if Eddie would approve the drawing (facing page 111) which depicts a company of be-medalled Old Comrades marching in column of route, nearly every man-jack of them with his coat unbuttoned and flapping in the breeze!

**The Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire), 1919-1953.** By Captain C. G. T. Dean, M.B.E. (Published at Regimental Headquarters, Fulwood Barracks, Preston.)

The records of our British infantry regiments provide striking testimony of the part played by the Army in the discharge of our Imperial and international responsibilities both in peace and war. This is the dominant impression conveyed by Captain Dean who carries on the history of the Loyals from 1919 up to the years of uneasy peace which have followed the end of the 1939-45 War. It is a plain straightforward tale, describing with skill and care the fortunes of the Loyals in battle and omitting nothing which is of value and interest in the continuous life of the Regiment. And one can admire the admirable adaptability shown when a battalion is called upon to turn itself into another arm of the Service.

Between the wars the 1st Loyals served in Turkey, Greece, North China, India, and Palestine before returning home to embark for France in the 1st Division of the B.E.F. in 1939. The battalion has every reason to be proud of the part it played in the Dunkirk campaign; later it fought with distinction in North Africa and in Italy at Anzio and after. The 2nd Loyals were stationed in Singapore when the Japanese invaded Malaya and acquitted themselves well in more than a month of heavy fighting, mostly in Johore, before the surrender. It was the fortune of war. Also involved in the disaster was the

newly arrived 18th Reconnaissance Regiment, the old 5th (Territorial) Battalion of the Loyals.

The 50th Battalion, raised in 1941, was renumbered 10th and later became the new 2nd Battalion; it fought in Italy and, after the war, was eventually absorbed by the 1st Loyals. Counted a Territorial battalion was the 6th, formed just before the outbreak of the war and converted into the 2nd Reconnaissance Regiment in 1941; this unit went to India, helped to repel the Japanese attempt at invasion, and bore its part in the re-conquest of Burma. The other active units of the Regiment were concerned in "Overlord", the campaign in North-West Europe, but not as infantry: the old 4th (Territorial) Battalion had been transformed into the 62nd Searchlight Regiment, R.A., and then into the 150th L.A.A. Regiment; the 7th, 8th, and 9th Battalions, formed in 1940, were converted respectively into the 92nd and 93rd L.A.A. Regiments, R.A., and the 148th Regiment, R.A.C. The 30th and 31st Battalions, formed from personnel of the Corps of Military Police, did garrison duty on the Continent before and after the German surrender.

Subsequent disbandments and reorganizations have today reduced the Loyals to their one Regular battalion, one Territorial unit, the 5th, and the Depot of the Regiment.

This volume is amply provided with sketch—maps to show the areas of operations and is profusely illustrated. The frontispiece is a charming and gracious portrait by Baron of Her Majesty the Queen, Colonel-in-Chief of The Loyal Regiment.

**The Siege.** By Arthur Campbell, M.C. (Allen and Unwin.) 12s. 6d.

It is a little difficult, in reviewing this book, to decide whether it falls into the category of regimental history, war memoirs, or fiction. In its main conception it tells the story

## CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS OF THE ROYAL NAVY

by Commander A. B. Campbell, R.D.

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This book is the story of the origins and developments of the customs and traditions which have enriched, and still enrich, the story of the Royal Navy. Commander Campbell deals with all aspects of naval life, from the "anatomy" of a ship, ship-launching

ceremonies, lower-deck customs etc., to medals and decorations, with a chapter on naval language.

For anyone who has taken a pride in the Navy, or is interested in its colourful background, this book will be of exceptional interest.

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of the 4th Battalion, The Royal West Kent Regiment, at the siege of Kohima in 1944. but it tells it in a fashion that borders partly on the realm of memoir and partly on that of fiction.

The historian of the Burma campaign will not like this account of the siege, for it does not draw the true picture. It ignores almost completely the other two regiments of the brigade engaged in the battle, whose presence, in fact, enabled the Royal West Kents to hold out in their forward box on Hospital Spur—Tail Hill. It might, perhaps, also have been mentioned in the book that the casualties of one of the other two regiments in the brigade—both of them were Indian regiments—were some 50 per cent. higher than those of the Royal West Kents.

Yet, as a book to read, *The Siege* has its merits. It is graphic, gripping, and shows the British soldier at his best in a tight spot. The daily tension of the battle is remarkably well brought out, and the long fight against vast odds makes exciting and inspiring reading. Yet the picture is false, and the reader will find it difficult not to become irritated at the lack of justice done to the 1st Punjab and the 4/7th Rajput Regiments in this memorable battle. For here was a chance to tell a true story of magnificent courage and endurance, a story that might have welded into an imperishable monument the traditions of the British and Indian Armies at their best. It is a pity that the chance was not taken.

**Six Years of War.** The Army in Canada, Britain, and the Pacific. Being Volume I of the official history of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. By Colonel C. P. Stacey, O.B.E., C.D., R.M., Ph.D., R.F.S.C. Published under the authority of the Minister of National Defence, by the Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery—Ottawa. Price \$4 or 30s., post paid.

In 1948, the Historical Section of the General Staff in Canada published officially an historical summary dealing with the Canadian Army, 1939–1945. The volume now under review, which is written by the same author, is the first to be published of the four contemplated in the official series, recording the history of the Canadian Army in the 1939–45 War. It is thus an expanded and amended version of portions of the 1948 summary. It is divided into three parts dealing with the raising and training of the Army and its role in home defence; the Army in Britain; and the Canadian share in the war against Japan. The first 200 pages are designed for the information of Canadians generally, but some of the figures they contain are of wider interest. For instance, the Canadian Army reached its peak strength of 495,804 on the 22nd March, 1945, when the 1st Canadian Army, then engaged in the campaign in North-West Europe, consisted of two corps, comprising three infantry and two armoured divisions. Though the stories of the Canadian forces in Newfoundland, West Indies, Gibraltar, Iceland, and Spitzbergen are included in this volume, the main operations referred to are the Dieppe raid, the defence of Hong Kong, and the campaign in the Aleutian Islands.

Of all the countries of the Commonwealth, Canada was perhaps the most fortunate in that the major elements of her armed forces were not committed till 1943. She was, however, confronted with the same problems that each had to solve and one of these, of basic importance, was the authority possessed by any senior Canadian commander, serving overseas, to commit his force, or any part of it, without reference to his own Government. Both Australia and New Zealand issued 'charters' to their commanders and at the start South Africa limited the employment of her contingent to the continent of Africa, but Canada decided to stand by the terms of the "Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Acts". This series of Acts had received the approval of all the great self-governing Dominions in 1933 and was designed to meet just such an emergency as arose six years later. It must be remembered, however, that these Acts only considered the relationship between the forces of the countries of the Commonwealth and when any of the latter had to co-operate with Allies, some form of 'charter' was usually issued to the Commonwealth commander concerned.

Of the campaigns dealt with, the author rightly allots considerable space to the raid on Dieppe, which took place on 19th August, 1942. This was the first occasion in the war in which comparatively large Canadian forces were involved. Though further research has revealed few new facts, the story is now better told and the additional detail makes it easier to understand. Many of the rumours, which gained such credence at the time, are dissected and dismissed and it is made clear that, without this raid and the lessons it taught at such a heavy price, the landings in Normandy might have proved much more costly than they did.

The story of the fall of Hong Kong is the first detailed account to be published and makes most interesting reading. It is apparent that nearly all the British commanders in the Far East not only made a faulty appreciation of Japanese intentions but underestimated their opponents. Once Japan entered the war Hong Kong, which could not then be reinforced, could not be defended for very long. It fell far more quickly than was expected because an opportune attack on the Gin Drinkers Line captured the Shing Mun redoubt and so rendered the position on the mainland untenable. Once the garrison was forced back to the defence of the island itself, there was little hope of any prolonged resistance with the forces then available, and though these gave a very good account of themselves, they were forced to surrender on Christmas Day after 18 days' fighting.

The only interest attached to the campaign in the Aleutian Islands lies in the fact that, owing to faulty intelligence, an amphibious operation embracing some 35,000 troops was launched against Kiska Island, when it had been evacuated by the Japanese garrison 18 days before.

This is a very well written book and a fine production in every way, well worthy of the men whose deeds it recalls. The maps are particularly good and clear and the

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illustrations have been carefully selected to portray the ground over which the fighting took place.

**Soldier and Soldiering in India.** By Brigadier Rajendra Singh. (Army Educational Stores, Ambala.) Rs. 5.

This small volume comprises 10 essays designed primarily to inform the Indian public of the problems which face their country in the sphere of defence and to draw attention to those essentials which are needed to maintain their Army in a state of efficiency.

The author has long since established his reputation as a military writer and novelist, and those in this Country who have known and loved India will find much to interest them in this lucid and forthright exposition of India's military problems. The first six essays deal primarily with the Indian Army. One of them is devoted to an appreciation of General Cariappa, the first Indian Commander-in-Chief, to whom the volume as a whole is dedicated.

In Part II Rajendra Singh launches out into wider fields. He examines defence problems in general and suggests the reorganization required to meet them. In many of the measures he proposes he aims high, no doubt deliberately and wisely, with the purpose of stressing India's pressing need for advancement in matters scientific and industrial if she is to enjoy security and prosperity.

**The Soldier's Pocket Book.** By Major R. C. W. Thomas, O.B.E. (Evans Bros.) 5s.

In his preface the author of this little book states his aim as "to try to give a general description of life in the Army today, in the hope that it will be of interest and help to any young man who is on the threshold of his Army career, either as a Regular soldier or National Service man." It is neither a training manual nor a technical book but an attempt to describe in simple language the role, structure, and organization of the Army, the soldier's daily life in all its aspects, and the Army as a career.

It contains a great deal of information, including material to disconcert the 'barrack-room lawyer' or to confound those who write or talk nonsense about service in the Army at home and abroad. The author explains many things of interest about which the young man of today is usually totally ignorant, and even includes some notes on military customs and traditions. There are two appendices, one of which is a list of regiments and Services with some details; the other shows the grouping of Regiments of Infantry of the Line.

This is a very useful little book which ought to have a wide distribution, even among Members of Parliament. It should be made available in recruiting offices and reading rooms in depots, as well as in public libraries for the information of parents and those about to be called up or who are contemplating an army career. It should be noted that the old, not the new, rates of pay are given.

**The South Lancashire Regiment (Prince of Wales's Volunteers).** By Colonel B. R. Mullaly. (The White Swan Press, Bristol.)

It has been said that the history of the British Army is the history of the expansion, consolidation, and defence of the British Empire. The object of this book is to tell the story of an old regiment whose services justify this statement. The 1st Battalion, raised in 1717, as Phillip's Regiment, became the 40th Foot. The 2nd Battalion was formed as the 82nd Foot (Prince of Wales's Volunteers) in 1793. Between them they managed to take part in nearly every campaign in which British troops have been engaged, and to describe their services over such a long period in a single volume needs much compression. The author has accordingly treated the campaigns on the distant past in broad outline with emphasis on the part played by the Regiment, but has recounted the events of the two World Wars in more detail.



The 40th and 82nd became 1st and 2nd Battalions, The Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire Regiment) in 1881. Even at this time the Regiment's Colours carried 22 battle honours, including "Salamanca," "Waterloo," and the rarity, "New Zealand." In the South African War the 1st Battalion particularly distinguished itself in a bayonet charge at Pieter's Hill. During the War of 1914-1918, the Regular, Territorial, and 'Kitchener' battalions of the Regiment served in every theatre of war, except Palestine, with considerable distinction and won many decorations, including four V.C.s.

Just before the 1939-45 War the Regiment's title was altered to emphasize the county connection.

In 1939-1940, the 1st Battalion was in France and Flanders with 4th Division. Serving in 3rd Division the unit was one of the assault battalions on D-Day and captured all its objectives. Later, the Battalion was involved in heavy fighting in the Nijmegen corridor, the Reichswald, and in the final advance to Bremen. The 2nd Battalion took part in the Madagascar campaign, the advance from Kohima, the assault crossing of the Irrawaddy, and the final victory in Burma. The two Territorial and the temporary battalions were employed in home defence and draft finding.

The author has obviously taken great pains in writing this long book. It is well arranged and the narrative is generally provided with adequate background. There are the usual appendices which include imposing lists of honours and awards as well as regimental information. The volume is well produced and illustrated, but the six sketch-maps are awkwardly placed.

History of the Second World War

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**The Story of the Royal Army Service Corps, 1939-1945.** (Bell.) 45s.

Aandalsnes, Aden, Archangel, Ascension Island, Azores. These names, taken from the index of this seven-hundred-page volume, are a few samples out of many to indicate the geographical variety of R.A.S.C. experience during the 1939-45 War. Air despatch, amphibious transport, animal transport (camel, donkey, and horse)—these are only a few out of many items in the same index, which go to prove the complexity of the technical problems which the Corps successfully tackled in its many and widely differing theatres.

It is hardly surprising that the narrative of all this activity has assumed the appearance of a work of reference rather than a normal regimental history. This voluminous tome is indeed a valuable book of reference for all who wish to study seriously any particular aspect of R.A.S.C. services in almost any part of the world under almost any conditions. But it is far more than a mere reference book.

The R.A.S.C. History Committee, aided by its team of authors, each one an expert in his own subject, has managed to instil into what might otherwise have been a slightly ponderous story a vein of humour and a personal touch which makes the whole record very pleasantly readable, even for those who abhor staff tables and statistics.

There is of course a great deal of solid information included. Without it this great work would have lost much of its value. But it is so arranged that the reader of lighter tastes can skim through the weightier stuff, absorbing just enough of it to appreciate the magnitude of the task, without losing sight of the fact that R.A.S.C. personnel are normal soldiers, tackling their strange and difficult problems in the British soldier's usual cheerful and very human way.

This book should kill once and for all the absurd fallacy (a relic of 1914-18 trench warfare) that the life of R.A.S.C. soldiers is a safe and 'cushy' one. In this book there are quite enough tales of adventure by land, sea, and air to satisfy the most voracious seeker after thrills. The long Roll of Honour at the end of the book bears silent testimony to the battle-risks of the R.A.S.C. in modern war.

By virtue of its role as maintainer of all fighting forces everywhere, the Corps had dealings with many strange and exotic formations, from 'Popski's Private Army' to the Chindits of Burma and the partisans of Yugoslavia. The Corps dabbled also in air and sea transport, experiences which rarely came the way of less fortunate soldiers. Another proof of the ubiquity of R.A.S.C. work can be seen in the multitude of foreigners who served in its ranks. These included Algerians, Arabs, Basutos, Belgians, Chinese, Cypriots, Dutch, Italians, Jamaicans, Mauritians, and many others.

There are many excellent photographs. I have only one small criticism. To make the book more easily readable by the uninitiated, a table of military abbreviations would have been useful. Many, even among old soldiers, have forgotten the meanings of certain cryptic initials!

## ADDITIONS TO THE LIBRARY

(\* Books for reference in the Library only)

### GENERAL

- BEAVERBROOK. By Tom Driberg. Demy 8vo. 323 pages. (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1956.) 21s.
- THE BOMB. Challenge and Answer. By Alexander Haddow and others. Demy 8vo. 160 pages. (Batsford, 1955.) 25s.
- BOSWELL ON THE GRAND TOUR. VOLUME II. Edited by Frank Brady. Medium 8vo. 343 pages. (Heinemann, 1955.) 25s.
- BRITAIN IN WESTERN EUROPE. Report by R.I.I.A. Demy 8vo. 121 pages. (R.I.I.A., 1956.) 7s. 6d. Presented by the publishers.
- LORD CHATHAM. By O. A. Sherrard. Medium 8vo. 422 pages. (The Bodley Head, 1955.) 30s.
- THE COLONIAL OFFICE. By Sir Charles Jeffries. Medium 8vo. 222 pages. (Allen and Unwin, 1956.) 15s.
- DEFEAT INTO VICTORY. By Field-Marshal Sir William Slim. Medium 8vo. 576 pages. (Cassell, 1956.) 25s.
- DIEPPE AT DAWN. By R. W. Thompson. Demy 8vo. 215 pages. (Hutchinson, 1956.) 15s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- GESTAPO. By Edward Crankshaw. Medium 8vo. 275 pages. (Putnam, 1956.) 21s.
- OFFICIAL HISTORY OF NEW ZEALAND IN SECOND WORLD WAR. Battle for Egypt. By Lieut.-Colonel J. L. Scoullar. Medium 8vo. 399 pages. (Oxford University Press, 1956.) 42s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. Administration of War Production. By J. D. Scott and Richard Hughes. Medium 8vo. 544 pages. (H.M.S.O. and Longmans, Green, 1955.) 37s. 6d. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- MEMOIRS OF HADRIAN. By Marguerite Yourcenar. Demy 8vo. 320 pages. (Secker and Warburg, 1955.) 15s.
- AN IDEA TO WIN THE WORLD. By Peter Howard. Demy 8vo. 127 pages. (Blandford Press, 1955.) 7s. 6d. Presented by Brigadier D. Forster, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- INSIDE AFRICA. By John Gunther. Medium 8vo. 976 pages. (Hamish Hamilton, 1955.) 30s.
- LANDFALL AT SUNSET. By David Bone. Demy 8vo. 223 pages. (Duckworth, 1955.) 18s.
- LAST AND FIRST IN BURMA. By Maurice Collis. Demy 8vo. 303 pages. (Faber, 1956.) 30s.
- \* THE LIBRARY AND PICTURE COLLECTION OF THE PORT OF LONDON AUTHORITY. By Bertram Stewart. Medium 8vo. 86 pages. (The Richards Press, 1955.) Presented by the author.
- MACARTHUR, 1941-1951. By Major-General Charles Willoughby and John Chamberlain. Medium 8vo. 414 pages. (Heinemann, 1956.) 42s.
- MORALE IN WAR AND WORK. By T. T. Paterson. Demy 8vo. 256 pages. (Parrish, 1955.) 18s.
- MORE THAN MOUNTAINS. By John A. Jackson. Demy 8vo. 213 pages. (Harrap, 1955.) 18s.
- MUSSOLINI. Twilight and Fall. By Roman Dombrowski. Medium 8vo. 248 pages. (Heinemann, 1956.) 21s.

- MY FATHER. The True Story. By A. W. Baldwin. Medium 8vo. 360 pages. (Allen and Unwin, 1955.) 25s.
- OKINAWA. Victory in the Pacific. By Major Charles S. Nichols, Jr., and Henry I. Shaw Jr. Medium 8vo. 332 pages. (U.S. Marine Corps, 1955.) Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- \* THE PUBLIC AND PREPARATORY SCHOOLS YEAR BOOK, 1956. Edited by J. F. Burnet, M.A. Demy 8vo. 1,000 pages. (A. and C. Black, 1956.) 18s.
- AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF SCIENCE. By F. Sherwood Taylor. Medium 8vo. 173 pages. (Heinemann, 1955.) 25s.
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- THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BORDER. By Bruce Hutchison. Medium 8vo. 500 pages. (Longmans, Green, 1956.) 30s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- THE UNDAUNTED. By Ronald Seth. Demy 8vo. 327 pages. (Frederick Muller, 1956.) 18s.
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- VOYAGE TO THE AMOROUS ISLANDS. By Newton A. Rowe. Demy 8vo. 256 pages. (André Deutsch, 1955.) 21s.
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## NAVAL

- THE DRAMA OF THE SCHARNHORST. By Fritz-Otto Busch. Medium 8vo. 186 pages. (Robert Hale, 1956.) 15s.
- HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War. By C. B. A. Behrens. Medium 8vo. 494 pages. (H.M.S.O. and Longmans, Green, 1955.) 35s.
- \* THE TRUE AND PERFECTE NEWES OF SYR FRAUNCIS DRAKE, 1587. By Thomas Greepe. With an introduction, etc., by Lieut.-Commander D. W. Waters, R.N. Demy 4to. 95 pages. (Yale University Press.) Presented by Lieut.-Commander D. W. Waters, R.N. (See review in this JOURNAL.)

## ARMY

- AGAINST GREAT ODDS. By Brigadier C. N. Barclay. Demy 8vo. 112 pages. (Sifton Praed, 1956.) 15s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- \* THE STORY OF THE ROYAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS, 1939-45. Medium 8vo. 720 pages. (Bell, 1955.) 45s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- \* HISTORY OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY BAND. By Henry George Farmer. Medium 8vo. 485 pages. (R.A. Institution, London, 1954.) 22s. 6d.
- BEHIND THE LINES. Edited by Irwin R. Blacker. Demy 8vo. 433 pages. (Cassell, 1956.) 18s.
- BUGLES AND A TIGER. By John Masters. Demy 8vo. 335 pages. (Michael Joseph, 1956.) 16s.

- ADMINISTRATION IN THE BURMA CAMPAIGN, 1941-45. By Major B. N. Majumdar. Demy 8vo. 68 pages. (Clifton and Co., Delhi, 1955.) 5s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in JOURNAL for February, 1956.)
- A BRIEF STUDY OF THE BURMA CAMPAIGN, 1943-45. By Captain S. G. Chaphekar. Demy 8vo. 100 pages. (Maharashtra Militarisation Board, 1955.) 7s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in JOURNAL for February, 1956.)
- HENRY, CLIFFORD, V.C. His letters and sketches. Medium 8vo. 288 pages. (Michael Joseph, 1956.) 42s.
- GUNS. By S. E. Ellacott. Demy 8vo. 76 pages. (Methuen, 1955.) 8s. 6d. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- \* THE LOYAL REGIMENT (NORTH LANCASHIRE) 1919-1953. By Captain C. G. T. Dean. Medium 8vo. 329 pages. (Published by the Regiment, 1955.) Presented by the Regiment. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- THE SIEGE. By Arthur Campbell. Demy 8vo. 211 pages. (Allen and Unwin, 1956.) 12s. 6d. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- SIX YEARS OF WAR. Volume I of the official history of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. By Colonel C. P. Stacey. Medium 8vo. 629 pages. (Department of National Defence, 1955.) \$3.50. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- \* THE SOUTH LANCASHIRE REGIMENT. By Colonel B. R. Mullaly. Medium 8vo. 520 pages. (The White Swan Press, 1956.) Presented by the Regiment. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
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# AIR

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- \* SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT. By Roy Cross. Medium 8vo. 62 pages. (Macdonald, London, 1956.) 6s. 6d.



The first of these is the fact that the United States is a young nation, and its history is therefore a history of growth and development. The second is the fact that the United States is a large nation, and its history is therefore a history of expansion and conquest. The third is the fact that the United States is a diverse nation, and its history is therefore a history of conflict and compromise.

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The fourteenth is the fact that the United States is a nation of learners, and its history is therefore a history of growth and development. The fifteenth is the fact that the United States is a nation of teachers, and its history is therefore a history of wisdom and knowledge.

G  
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## ONE HUNDRED-AND-TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING

ON TUESDAY, 6TH MARCH, 1956, at 3 p.m.

GENERAL SIR RICHARD N. GALE, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C., presiding.

THE SECRETARY (LIEUT.-COLONEL P. S. M. WILKINSON) read the notice convening the meeting which appeared in *The Times* of Wednesday, 15th February, 1956.

### ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1955

The Council have the honour to present their Annual Report for the year 1955.

#### COUNCIL

##### VICE-PRESIDENTS

Field-Marshal The Viscount Alanbrooke, K.G., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., was re-elected for a further term as Vice-President.

##### ELECTED MEMBERS

The following Members were re-elected at the Anniversary Meeting held on 8th March, 1955 :—

Admiral Sir John A. S. Eccles, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., C.B.E.

General Sir John Westall, K.C.B., C.B.E., R.M.

General Sir George Erskine, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C.

General Sir Richard N. Gale, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C.

General Sir Cameron G. G. Nicholson, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C.

Brigadier Sir George S. Harvie-Watt, Bart., T.D., Q.C., D.L., M.P., A.D.C.

Brigadier J. A. Longmore, C.B.E., T.D., D.L.

Air Chief Marshal Sir James M. Robb, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.

The following elections were made to vacancies on the Council :—

Lieut.-General Sir Colin B. Callander, K.C.B., K.B.E., M.C., vice Lieut.-General G. W. Lathbury, C.B., D.S.O., M.B.E.

Bt. Colonel J. A. T. Barstow, D.S.O., T.D., vice Brigadier A. D. McKechnie, D.S.O., O.B.E., T.D., A.D.C.

##### REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERS

Captain G. W. Hawkins, R.N., succeeded Captain W. A. Adair, D.S.O., O.B.E., R.N., as the Admiralty Representative.

## EX OFFICIO MEMBERS

The following accepted the invitation of the Council to become an ex officio Member of the Council on taking up the appointment shown :—

Admiral The Earl Mountbatten of Burma, K.G., P.C., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

General Sir Gerald W. R. Templer, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.B.E., D.S.O., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Major-General M. M. A. R. West, C.B., D.S.O., Director, Territorial Army and Cadets.

## MEMBERSHIP

The total number of members on the roll at the end of 1955 was 6,191 compared with 6,159 in 1954. During the year 287 members joined the Institution compared with 242 in 1954. The following shows the figures for the past seven years :—

Year	Joined		Total	Re- signed	Deceased		Struck off	Total
	Annual	Life			Annual	Life		
1955 ...	239	48	287	142	56	35	22	255
1954 ...	199	43	242	192	48	29	34	303
1953 ...	190	57	247	184	34	42	18	278
1952 ...	197	53	250	206	56	21	26	309
1951 ...	224	56	280	125	49	35	24	233
1950 ...	289	56	345	126	41	50	21	238
1949 ...	397	103	500	185	58	64	57	364

The details of members joining during the year 1955 are as follows :—

Regular Army ...	...	...	...	...	...	153
Royal Air Force ...	...	...	...	...	...	51
Royal Navy ...	...	...	...	...	...	27
Dominion Forces...	...	...	...	...	...	22
Territorial Army...	...	...	...	...	...	11
Royal Marines ...	...	...	...	...	...	9
Indian Forces ...	...	...	...	...	...	4
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve	...	...	...	...	...	2
Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve	...	...	...	...	...	2
Women's Royal Army Corps ...	...	...	...	...	...	1
Women's Royal Air Force ...	...	...	...	...	...	1
Royal Marine Volunteer Reserve	...	...	...	...	...	1
Pakistan Forces ...	...	...	...	...	...	1
Civilian (Staff College Graduates)	...	...	...	...	...	2
						<hr/> 287 <hr/>

## COVENANTED SUBSCRIPTIONS

At the end of 1955 there were 1,272 annual covenanted subscriptions compared with 1,264 in 1954 ; and 202 covenanted life subscriptions compared with 236 in 1954.

During 1955, 67 annual covenants out of a total number of 92 were renewed on expiry and 62 life covenants completed the seven-year period.

## FINANCE

The excess of expenditure over income is £912 8s. 1d. compared with a similar excess in 1954 of £373 0s. 7d.

Comparisons of the principal items of Receipts and Expenditure are shown below :—

## RECEIPTS

	1955			1954		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Annual Subscriptions ... ..	5,748	19	6	5,746	5	0
Life Subscriptions (amount brought to credit) ... ..	2,162	3	0	2,098	0	0
Museum ... ..	3,423	8	0	3,703	6	0
Journal Sales ... ..	2,872	6	6	2,568	7	0
Journal Advertisements ... ..	790	19	11	624	7	4
Sales of Catalogues and Pamphlets ...	113	13	7	124	19	7

Life subscriptions brought to credit represent £1 10s. 0d. from each Life Member whose capital payment has not yet been so expended; the balance is held in the Life Subscription Fund. £474 3s. 10d. has been transferred to this Fund on account of tax rebate on covenanted life subscriptions.

*Museum.* The fall in paid admissions reflects the general attitude of the public towards serious entertainment.

*Journal.* The sales are a record for an actual year and revenue from advertisements is the best figure so far.

## EXPENDITURE

	1955			1954		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Salaries and Allowances, Wages, and National Insurance ... ..	9,982	2	10	9,836	11	9
Journal Printing ... ..	4,645	8	4	4,245	17	1
Library—Purchase of Books ... ..	468	10	5	384	9	3
Binding ... ..	91	7	6	92	6	6
Fuel ... ..	371	7	7	273	6	6
Lighting and Electric Fires ... ..	510	9	5	512	8	0
General Repairs and Maintenance ... ..	195	1	5	202	6	0
Other Printing and Stationery ... ..	336	15	10	226	15	9
Museum Expenses ... ..	19	16	11	127	8	6

*Printing and Stationery.* The rise is attributable to extra copies of the Journal, reprints of certain lectures, and the Chairman's letter issued with the February Journal.

*Library.* Extra copies of books were purchased in order to decrease the waiting list.

*Fuel.* The increase is due to a rise in the Government charges for heating.

*General Repairs and Maintenance.* Because of the adverse balance at the end of 1954, it was decided to defer the maintenance programme as far as redecoration was concerned. Certain items, such as plumbing and electrical, were essential and the necessary repairs and replacements have been done.

### GENERAL

The comprehensive maintenance inspection programme compiled in 1954 ensures the examination of all parts of the Institution, both external and internal (structural and suspensions, plumbing and sanitary, electrical) once a month, and the roofs, including the Banqueting House, weekly. All minor repairs are carried out by the staff to whom acknowledgment of this extra service is made. In addition to the routine inspections, there is a 'defects book' in which any fault is noted immediately it becomes evident and action is taken at once.

It is expected that the painting of Her Majesty The Queen by Commander Denis Fildes, R.N., will be completed by the middle of 1956. Arrangements have been made for the picture to be framed and hung in the Entrance Hall under the direction of the Parker Gallery.

### JOURNAL

The valuable lectures given at the Institution and the number of excellent articles received from officers and others are the main causes which have contributed to the continuity of the popularity of the Journal during the year. Once again there has been an increased number of sales, caused chiefly by a bulk order from the Royal Air Force.

As forecast in the Annual Report for 1954, the income derived from advertisements has continued to rise as a result of careful supervision and encouragement. In consequence, an increase in the space available to advertisers has been arranged, which is expected to lead to a further rise in income from this source in future.

Several excellent photographs of interiors of the Institution have been used as frontispieces in the Journal. It was found that no such photographs had been taken since 1896, and it is thought that this new series will bring the amenities of the Institution to the immediate notice of members, and others, who have not visited the building.

The willing assistance given by Service Departments, Commandants of Staff Colleges, and Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry Representatives on the Council in preparing the lecture programme, in facilitating approval for articles written by serving officers, and in advising the Editor in many matters, is gratefully acknowledged.

### LIBRARY

Both the lending and research sections of the Library have been very active during the year and once again the number of books issued, 7,962 (7,779 in 1954), has been greater than ever before in spite of the rail strike, which stopped parcels for a time, and the increased cost of postage. Five hundred and forty-two new volumes have been acquired, compared with 484 in 1954, and 147 books were rebound.

A special effort has been made during the year to meet the ever growing demands for recommended books for promotion and Staff College candidates. It has been possible to purchase several additional copies of these, but of course in some cases, such as books dealing with the American Civil War, they are out of print and unobtainable secondhand.

One keen and enterprising candidate serving overseas had two books sent to him by air mail at a cost of 23s. ; it is hoped that he qualified.

A number of recent books on atomic energy and atomic warfare, some from the U.S.A., have been added to the shelves.



Works on biography and exploration have proved popular with members, but the books most read in 1955 were in the following order, the publisher's name being placed after the author's:—

"The Third Service"—Joubert (Thames and Hudson); "First and Last"—Galland (Methuen); "Officers and Gentlemen"—Waugh (Chapman and Hall); "Called Up"—Anthology (Allan Wingate); "Going to the Wars"—Verney (Collins); "Take These Men"—Joly (Constable); "Cloak Without Dagger"—Sillitoe (Cassell); "Direction of War"—Kingston-McCloughry (Jonathan Cape); "Eyes of the Navy"—James (Methuen); "Panzer Battles, 1939-45"—von Mellenthin (Cassell); "H.M.S. Ulysses"—Macleane (Collins); "Crecy War"—Burne (Eyre and Spottiswoode); "Requiem for a Wren"—Shute (Heinemann).

To turn to another side of the picture, many members are still extremely casual about returning books in good time, which naturally deprives other members of their use. To give an example: during December alone, after repeated reminders, volumes were returned on three separate occasions which had been out of the Library for more than two years. All of these were out of print and were being asked for continually during this time.

### MUSEUM

During the year, 29,285 adults and 17,335 children paid for admission to the Museum compared with 31,798 adults and 19,024 children in 1954. Free admission was given to 3,177 members of the Services and to 1,380 cadets, scouts, and school parties.

As in previous years, the appeal of the Museum seems to be stronger to foreign visitors, who, perhaps, follow a more meticulously planned programme than visitors from the United Kingdom. In common with similar organizations, including the free National museums, attendances have been lower. The number of organized school parties was above average and it is clear that these visits are appreciated as they are repeated each year and newcomers are added. One visit to be specially remembered was a party of blind boys from Linden Lodge, London, which was followed by letters of thanks written in Braille.

This report gives an opportunity to acknowledge expert services given to the Museum by members, and this year the Museum Committee and Curator express their grateful thanks to Captain W. A. Tinlin, M.C. Captain Tinlin is one of the leading experts in the wide and intricate subject of medals and his advice is much sought and valued by the professional houses. Notwithstanding these constant calls, rarely a week passes without his practical help and advice being given to the Museum. Like Captain H. T. Bosanquet, C.V.O., R.N., whose voluntary work in the naval sword section is a permanent tribute to his generosity and knowledge, Captain Tinlin will leave the distinguishing mark of the true expert.

Although display space is at a premium, it has been possible to accept a number of new exhibits. These have already been listed in the Secretary's Notes and the appreciation of the Council and members expressed to the donors for their generosity.

Practical help to Service and other museums by the gift or loan of exhibits was continued throughout the year and the following have benefited:—

H.M.S. *St. Vincent*; H.M.S. *Thunderer*; Grenadier Guards; The Royal Fusiliers; The Somerset Light Infantry; The Worcestershire Regiment; The Loyal Regiment; The Middlesex Regiment; The King's Royal Rifle Corps; The Rifle Brigade; The Royal Army Medical Corps; Imperial War Museum; The Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst; The Gordon Boys' School; Ethnological Museum.

## ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION BALANCE SHEET, 31st DECEMBER, 1955

1954	£	s.	d.	1954	£	s.	d.
ACCUMULATED FUND— Excess of Assets over Liabilities as at 31st December, 1954 ... ..	47,453	9	6	LEASEHOLD BUILDING, Whitehall, S.W.1 FURNITURE, FIXTURES, FITTINGS (as valued for Insurance at 4th July, 1945, with subsequent additions at cost) As at 31st December 1954 ... ..	23,102	10	8
Less: Depreciation of Investments since 31st December, 1954 ... ..	2,720	5	0		7,594	17	0
44,733	4	6					
Less: Revenue Account— Deficit per annexed account ... ..	912	8	1	LEASEHOLD REDEMPTION FUND— Premiums paid to 31st December, 1954 on Insurance Policies for £23,100 expiring October, 1972 ... .. Add: Premium paid during the year ... ..	4,987	16	9
43,820	16	5			4,983	3	7
MUSEUM EXHIBITS PURCHASE FUND ... ..	418	11	10	LIFE SUBSCRIPTION FUND— Investments at Market Prices, 31st December, 1955— £2,500 0s. 0d. 3% Savings Bonds, 1962-70 ... .. £2,500 0s. 0d. 3% Savings Bonds, 1962-70 ... .. £2,004 12s. 3d. Met. Water Board 3% "B" Stock ... .. £2,868 11s. 1d. 3% Redemption Stock, 1966-96 ... .. £4,891 6s. 3d. 3% British Transport Guaranteed Stock 1978-88 ... .. £1,080 0s. 0d. 3% Conversion Loan ... .. 200 General Electric Co., Ltd. £1 Ordinary Shares ... .. 1,000 Indian and General Investment Trust Ltd. 5% Deferred Stock Units ... .. 500 Northern Securities Trust, Ltd.—10/- Ordinary Stock Units ... .. Balance at Bankers ... ..	18,966	7	4
389 ... ..	5,053	0	4	DISCRETIONARY FUND— Investment at Market Price, 31st December, 1955— £1,783 14s. 4d. 3% Savings Bonds, 1965-75 ... .. Balance at Bankers ... ..	1,783	3	0
4,987 ... ..	16,737	9	4	INVESTMENTS at Market Prices, 31st December, 1955— £2,569 2s. 9d. 3% Savings Bonds, 1965-75 ... .. £505 8s. 8d. Met. Water Board 3% "B" Stock ... .. £16,298 3s. 11d. 3% British Transport Guaranteed Stock 1978-88 ... ..	17,093	12	9
18,966 ... ..	1,588	3	0	DEBTORS, STOCK OF PAMPHLETS AND AMOUNTS PAID IN ADVANCE ... ..	782	9	5
1,787 ... ..	794	2	3	CASH AT BANK AND IN HAND ... ..	2,032	17	9
453 ... ..	2,596	3	1		£76,372	6	3
2,337 ... ..					£71,068	6	3

JOHN A. LONGMORE, Brigadier, *Chairman, Finance Committee.*P. S. M. WILKINSON, Lt.-Col., *Secretary.*

## TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

We have audited the above Balance Sheet dated 31st December, 1955, and have obtained all the information and explanations we have required. In our opinion such Balance Sheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the Institution's affairs according to the best of our information and the explanations given to us and as shown by the books of the Institution.

Alderman's House,  
15th January, 1956.  
BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,  
Chartered Accountants,  
Auditors.

## REVENUE ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER, 1955

[illegible]

## CHESNEY MEMORIAL MEDAL FUND

31st DECEMBER, 1955

	£	s.	d.		£	s.	d.
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1954 :-				GOLD MEDAL, 1955	...	...	39 3 0
Balance at Bankers	...	...	71 9 7	DEPRECIATION OF INVESTMENT since 31st December, 1954	...	...	40 12 0
Investment at Market Price	...	...	268 16 0	BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1955 :-			
DIVIDENDS RECEIVED, GROSS	...	...	340 5 7	Balance at Bankers	...	...	40 14 7
			8 8 0	Investment at Market Price :-	...	...	228 4 0
			£348 13 7	£280 3% Savings Bonds 1960-70	...	...	268 18 7
							£348 13 7

We have audited the above Statement of the Chesney Memorial Medal Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1955, and certify the same to be correct.  
 ALDERMAN'S HOUSE, BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.  
 18th January, 1956.

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,  
 Chartered Accountants,  
 Auditors.

## TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE FUND

31st DECEMBER, 1955

	£	s.	d.		£	s.	d.
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1954 :-				PRIZE ESSAYS	...	...	63 0 0
Balance at Bankers	...	...	235 19 0	DEPRECIATION OF INVESTMENTS since 31st December, 1954	...	...	292 5 1
Investments at Market Prices	...	...	1,869 8 10	BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1955 :-			
DIVIDENDS RECEIVED, GROSS	...	...	2,105 7 10	Balance at Bankers	...	...	44 19 0
			69 7 0	Investments at Market Prices :-	...	...	
			£2,174 14 10	£1,922 10s. 3d. British Transport 3%	...	...	1,413 0 9
				Guaranteed Stock 1978-88	...	...	72 10 0
				100 0s. 3d. War Bonds	...	...	100 0 0
				£100 0s. 0d. 3% Defence Bonds	...	...	100 0 0
				100 Cedar Investment Trust Ltd.	...	...	165 0 0
				£1 Ordinary Shares	...	...	1,819 9 9
							£2,174 14 10

We have audited the above Statement of the Trench Gascoigne Prize Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1955, and certify the same to be correct.  
 ALDERMAN'S HOUSE, BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.  
 18th January, 1956.

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,  
 Chartered Accountants,  
 Auditors.

BRACKENBURY MEMORIAL FUND  
31st DECEMBER, 1955

	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1954 :-									
Balance at Bankers ... ..	44	9	10						9 14 1
Investment at Market Price ... ..	367	7	4						45 6 0
DIVIDENDS RECEIVED, GROSS ... ..				411	17	2			
				14	14	8			
									371 11 9
									£428 11 10
EXPENDITURE ON BOOKS, Etc. ... ..									
DEPRECIATION OF INVESTMENT since 31st December, 1954 ... ..									
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1955 :-									
Balance at Bankers ... ..							49	10	5
Investment at Market Price :-									
£421 1s. 0d. 3½% War Stock ... ..							322	1	4
									£428 11 10

We have audited the above Statement of the Brackenbury Memorial Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1955, and certify the same to be correct.  
ALDERMAN'S HOUSE, BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.  
18th January, 1956

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,  
Chartered Accountants,  
Auditors.

EARDLEY-WILMOT MEDAL FUND  
31st DECEMBER, 1955

	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1954 :-									
Balance at Bankers ... ..	10	8	9						20 6 0
Investment at Market Price ... ..	134	8	0						
DIVIDENDS RECEIVED, GROSS ... ..				144	16	9			
				4	4	0			
									128 14 9
									£149 0 9
DEPRECIATION OF INVESTMENT since 31st December, 1954 ... ..									
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1955 :-									
Balance at Bankers ... ..							14	12	9
Investment at Market Price :-									
£140 3% Savings Bonds 1960-70 ... ..							114	2	0
									£149 0 9

We have audited the above Statement of the Eardley-Wilmot Medal Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1955, and certify the same to be correct.  
ALDERMAN'S HOUSE, BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.  
18th January, 1956

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,  
Chartered Accountants,  
Auditors.



## CHAIRMAN'S ADDRESS

THE CHAIRMAN: The first resolution is:

"That the Report and Accounts, as circulated, be taken as read and adopted."

Before moving that I should like to make a few remarks on the work of the Institution and on the Report itself as your Chairman.

The first point is that for some time past I, personally, have felt that the Institution may be regarded perhaps a little too much today as a museum and, as it were, the custodian of the past. So it is, and in that connection I think it does invaluable work; but it is also an Institution for the development and encouragement of forward thinking in the whole field of science and the art of war.

I think we can confidently say that we have been very careful to reflect this in our selection of lectures and lecturers, and I think you will probably agree with me that we have had no small success. We are indeed truly grateful to those very eminent and very busy men who have given up so much of their valuable time to help us. But my personal feeling again is that there is still much more that we could do. The Council has therefore a scheme, which is now in the very early days of negotiation, to found a section of the Institution which deals specifically with the impact of scientific and engineering development on the whole field of military thought. This will cost money and will I think demand some form of endowment. I think that this is an immensely important project, and it will undoubtedly take a bit of time to negotiate and to put into effect, but I do sincerely hope that that time will not be too long. At this early stage when negotiations are only beginning it would be indiscreet of me to say more.

Early this year the Council decided to establish a separate Library Committee and up to that time one Committee served both the Journal and the Library. The Library has always had the highest reputation for research, essentially in affairs of the past, and the tentative scheme to which I have just referred will enlarge and I think force us to reorganize that section of our activities. Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb very kindly accepted the Chairmanship of this Committee, and we are all extremely grateful to him for his help and for his wise counsel in all matters connected with that affair.

Turning to the Journal I think that you will have noticed the satisfactory increase in the sales of the Journal. I hope that its sales will continue to improve. We are indebted to all those who are connected with the Journal, including those behind the scene, and I would specifically refer to Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Power, who has done an immense amount of work for the whole Institution, and particularly as Chairman of the Journal Committee.

I think that a matter of special importance to the Institution is the question of membership. The prosperity and, indeed, the whole future and utility of the Institution turns on its membership. During the past few years the influx of new members has barely balanced the loss of the old ones going out, and the Council feel we ought to be far more embracing. They would like to arrive at the state of affairs when the majority of officers in the fighting Services are members of the Institution and not, as up to now, a minority. Perhaps some of the things that we have in mind may help us to increase that membership.

I should like to speak about one member of the Institution and one of the Chairmen of our Committees, that is, Brigadier Longmore who is sitting at the end of the table. He has been Chairman of the Finance Committee, and he is a man on whose time very heavy calls have been made in many other directions, for nearly 10 years, and has been a member of that Committee for 12 years. Last year he suffered a breakdown in health which I think was substantially due to his voluntary activities and to the enthusiasm and energy he applies to every single thing he does. I am delighted personally, as we all are, to see him back and I really believe in jolly good health. (*Hear, hear.*) I can tell you that the Institution owes a great deal to Brigadier Longmore. May he go from strength to strength.

There are one or two points in connection with the actual Report for 1955 to which I would draw your attention. I think that if we take it in sections, page by page, it will be more convenient.

Pages one to three contain a record of the facts and as such they call for no further comment, except, perhaps, to say that the figure of 287 new members last year is the best since 1950, but below the post-war average. Before we go on to finance, I think there is one matter which I should report to you. You will notice that we receive a Government grant, really from the three Services, annually. That Government grant has for some considerable time stood at the figure of £975. We have approached the heads of the three Services, the Chiefs of Staff, and we are now negotiating with the Treasury through them for a substantial increase in that grant. I am fairly confident in saying to you that we have every hope in the near future of getting a considerable increase in that sum. Again, it would be inappropriate to say what that increase is, because it is a matter of negotiation at the moment.

I propose insofar as the remainder of the Report is concerned to ask those Chairmen of the Committees responsible for the various sides of the Report to answer any questions or to make any observations which they consider the Report might call for.

I will deal first with finance and ask Brigadier Longmore if there are any points which he would wish to make, and whether there are any questions which you would like to ask him.

BRIGADIER J. A. LONGMORE: May I say on the accounts that the deficit of £912, even if we get the extra Government grant which we are negotiating, is likely to be a continuing item, because until we get a further £3,000 a year I think we shall be in deep water financially. In emphasizing this point I would like to mention that our staff are to my mind very good in the way they work for the Institution and refrain from asking for increases in salaries and wages. I think we shall be in honour bound to reconsider them very shortly. If any member can think of any way of increasing either the membership or by getting people in industry and science to take a financial interest in us by giving us covenanted subscriptions, it will be of the greatest help. In fact, unless we get in more money we shall be faced with an increase in subscriptions which I do not think is good for the Services. Therefore, if you can get help from outside it will stop us from doing that which we do not want to do, namely, to hurt the pocket of the serving officer.

*(No questions were asked.)*

THE CHAIRMAN: The next section covers the Journal, and the meeting would be very grateful, I am certain, if Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Power would deal with that matter.

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR ARTHUR POWER : I think that the policy is to aim high. In the past we have not aimed high enough, and I see no reason why the Chair on one occasion in the future should not be taken by a member of the Royal Household. The Duke of Edinburgh might come if we staged an appropriate lecture. We did ask Sir Winston Churchill, but he stood down. We need someone of that calibre, and if we aim high I think we shall get a great improvement right through the standard of lecturers. I think that it would be a tremendous help to the Institution if we could get His Royal Highness to take the Chair on one occasion, or even to speak. No one is better equipped to speak on a wide variety of subjects than he is, and that is the sort of level on which we ought to think, rather than think of small men. We should ask the very biggest men. They can only say "No." Our policy should be to aim really high.

*(No questions were asked.)*

THE CHAIRMAN : I will ask Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb whether he will say something about the Library.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR JAMES ROBB : I do not think I need add to what the Librarian has put in the Report. It is gratifying to see that the activity of the lending section increases each year and I think we can confidently expect our library service to go from strength to strength. You will be sorry to hear that the Chief Library Clerk [Mr. Holland] has been ill for some weeks. With 47 years' service his absence is naturally a handicap, but this is being overcome by the Librarian and his remaining assistant.

*(No questions were asked.)*

THE CHAIRMAN : The Museum Section comes next and I wonder whether the Secretary has anything he can add to the Report.

THE SECRETARY : Only to point out that the policy laid down whereby all museums of all Services are helped to the limit has been carried out during the year. There is quite a selective list set out and that only includes major help. In many cases small items have been offered and passed on. Beyond that I think that the Report covers the main facts in relation to the Museum.

*(No questions were asked.)*

THE CHAIRMAN : I propose :

"That the Report and Accounts, as circulated, be taken as read and adopted."

BRIGADIER J. A. LONGMORE : I second that.

*The resolution was carried unanimously.*

COMMODORE R. HARRISON : I have much pleasure in proposing :

"That Messrs. Barton, Mayhew & Company be re-elected Auditors for the ensuing year."

In this connection I feel that it would be appropriate to mention the name of Mr. Unthank, a partner in the firm of Messrs. Barton, Mayhew & Company, who takes a very considerable personal interest in the matter and is most helpful.

BRIGADIER J. A. LONGMORE : I second that.

*The resolution was carried unanimously.*

## VACANCIES • ON THE COUNCIL

THE CHAIRMAN: The third resolution relates to vacancies on the Council. The undermentioned officers have been nominated as candidates for the vacancies on the Council :—

*Royal Navy*

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur J. Power, G.C.B., G.B.E., C.V.O.  
Vice-Admiral Sir Aubrey Mansergh, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.C.

*Royal Naval Reserve*

Commodore R. Harrison, D.S.O., R.D.

*Territorial Army*

Major-General I. T. P. Hughes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., D.L.

*Royal Air Force*

Air Chief Marshal Sir Norman Bottomley, K.C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.F.C.

As there are no other nominations under Bye-Law, Chapter III, paragraph 5, I ask you to approve of their election.

*These officers were unanimously elected.*

THE CHAIRMAN: The fourth resolution stands in the name of the Council, and before I read this resolution out I will say a few words by way of introducing it.

It is a fact that since 1937 the representatives of the Regular elements of the three fighting Services have been as follows: the Royal Navy, 4; the Army, 6; and the Royal Air Force, 3. That fails to reflect the situation as it is today in the whole art of war, and it is for that reason that we have, after consultation with the Chiefs of Staff and having obtained their agreement, decided that the number of Regular officers on the Council should be brought into line with the state of affairs that exists today. You will see that we have brought them all to the same number, and I therefore propose:

“The Council shall be a representative one and the elected Members shall be as follows: Naval Members seven, to include four representatives of the Royal Navy and one each of the Royal Marines, Royal Naval Reserve, and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve; Army Members eight, to include four representatives of the Regular Army and four of the Territorial Army, the Army Members should, as far as possible, be representatives of the various Arms; Air Force Members five, to include four representatives of the Royal Air Force and one representing the Royal Auxiliary Air Force and Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve. Retired officers of the above-named Services shall be eligible as Members of the Council.”

Are there any dissentients? If not, is that agreed?

*The resolution was carried unanimously.*

## TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1955

THE CHAIRMAN: I will now ask the Secretary to report the results of the Trench Gascoigne Prize Essay Competition for 1955.

The Secretary announced that there were 17 entries. On the recommendation of the Referees, the Council had awarded the First Trench Gascoigne Prize of 30 guineas to Major-General B. T. Wilson, C.B., D.S.O.

The Chairman then presented the prize.

The Secretary announced that the Second Prize of 20 guineas had been awarded to Major H. S. Langstaff, R.A., and the Third Prize of 10 guineas to Lieutenant-Commander F. P. U. Croker, R.N. (Retd.), neither of whom was able to be present.

ADMIRAL SIR GEOFFREY N. OLIVER : I beg to propose :

“That the thanks of the Meeting be accorded to the retiring Chairman.”

I do so with great pleasure mixed with regret. Good wine needs no bush, and there is no point in my extolling the Chairman, but I would like to say that the Institution owes a great deal to General Gale's unstinted wise counsel. I say “unstinted” because it is at a time when he is Commander-in-Chief of the Forces on the Rhine, a big and important job, and yet he finds time to come here and guide our affairs.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR JAMES ROBB : It is my equally great pleasure to second this resolution and associate myself with all that Admiral Oliver has said. One can well realize our indebtedness to General Gale who, being stationed abroad, has nevertheless done so much by way of responsibility and constructive work for the Institution.

*The vote of thanks was carried unanimously, with acclamation.*

THE CHAIRMAN : Thank you very much. That concludes the meeting.



